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Abstract 
An Empirical Investigation of Inward Foreign Direct Investment in Vietnam 
 
by 
Linh Tu Ho 
 
This study investigates inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) at the national, regional and provincial 
levels in Vietnam. The focus is to examine the long-run bi-directional relationship between FDI and 
economic growth (EG), FDI competition, the effects of policies and laws on attracting FDI, and the 
determinants of FDI location selection. The study employs a three-step approach including Pedroni’s 
model, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, and the error correction model to evaluate the long-
term relationship. Retail sales of goods and services are employed instead of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) to represent EG at the regional and provincial levels, which reduces the limitations of GDP 
calculations at non-national levels. The OLS estimation is used to examine FDI competition, to 
identify the FDI determinants, especially those determinants affecting FDI location selection from the 
investors’ perspective. The provincial competitiveness index (PCI) and sub-indices are employed to 
investigate PCI-based competition in FDI attraction. The investment incentive policies (IIP) index is 
proposed as an aggregate index of three types of investment incentives (free land, income tax 
exemption, and import tax exemption) to examine IIP-based competition in FDI attraction. The study 
investigates the effects of laws, including the release of new investment and enterprise laws in 2005, 
and participation in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and Free Trade Agreements (FTA) on FDI in 
Vietnam. Country risk and website quality indices are proposed to identify the determinants of the 
FDI location selection. Ranking regions, provinces and cities based on their socio-economic 
conditions is employed to investigate different effects of the determinants in different areas in 
Vietnam. 
The study has several important findings. A long-term bi-directional positive relationship between 
FDI and EG is found at the Vietnam provincial level. FDI plays a less important role in promoting EG at 
the national level.  Foreign investors are more likely to invest in areas with better economic 
 iii 
governance (a higher PCI). Only three of nine PCI sub-indices (assistance to foreign investors to start 
a business, access to information, and solving legal matters) significantly affect FDI. Assisting the 
investors to start a business is likely to be the most important PCI sub-index. Higher investment 
incentives (a higher IIP index) are not attractive FDI factors. Changes to laws and the WTO and FTA 
memberships may not be important at national and regional levels, but significantly impact on FDI at 
the provincial level. Provinces with more difficult socio-economic conditions attract less FDI. The 
positive effects of the new laws in 2005 and infrastructure development on FDI attraction decrease 
in provinces with more difficult socio-economic conditions. Geographical concentration of FDI exists 
at the provincial level. Foreign investors tend to invest more in an area with higher EG, better 
educated labour force, lower value currency, more efficient capital use, lower inflation rate, better 
economic governance, fewer investment incentives, and better infrastructure. Interestingly, FDI 
flows into Vietnam increased after the 2008 financial crisis. Investors may have invested in Vietnam 
after the financial crisis to take advantage of a lower value currency and lower cost in areas offering 
high IIP. 
Keywords: Foreign direct investment, economic growth, provincial competitiveness index, 
investment incentive policies, FDI location selection. 
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Definitions of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) have changed over time. In 1999, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) defines FDI as “the objective of obtaining a lasting 
interest by a resident entity in one economy in an entity resident in an economy other than that of 
the investor” (OECD, 1996, p. 7). Thirteen years later, OECD (2009, p. 17) redefines FDI as “a category 
of cross-border investment made by a resident in one economy (the direct investor) with the 
objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise (the direct investment enterprise) that is 
resident in an economy other than that of the direct investor. The motivation of the direct investor is 
a strategic long term relationship with the direct investment enterprise to ensure a significant degree 
of influence by the direct investor in the management of the direct investment enterprise”. Kumari 
(2014, p. 118) adds that “FDI refers to an investment in a foreign country where the investor retains 
control over the investment”. 
Pazienza (2014) summarises three different ways to classify FDI. From the view of the investor or the 
source country, FDI can be classified as horizontal, vertical and conglomerate. FDI can also be 
categorized into import-substituting, export-increasing and government-initiated FDI from the view 
of the host country. The last classification divides FDI into two categories, expansionary and 
defensive capital. Pazienza (2014) emphasises the importance of understanding inward and outward 
FDI flows or stocks based on the directions of investment in the home country or abroad, 
respectively. Therefore, FDI can be understood in four different ways (see Figure 1.1). 
FDI can be measured quantitatively both as a flow and stock for associates and subsidiaries, and for 
branches (Pazienza, 2014). For associates and subsidiaries, FDI flows consist of the net sales of shares 
and loans to the parent company, plus the effects of parent firm’s share of the affiliate’s reinvested 
earnings plus total net intra-company loans (short term and long term) provided by the parent 
company. On one hand, FDI stocks represent the value of the share of the capital and reserves 
attributable to the parent enterprise, plus the net indebtedness of the associate or subsidiary to the 
parent firm (UNCTAD, 2018). For branches, though FDI flows consist of the increase in reinvested 
earnings plus the net increase in funds received from the foreign direct investor, FDI stocks include 
the value of fixed and current assets and investments, excluding amounts due from the parent, less 
liabilities to third parties. 
2 
 
Source: Pazienza (2014) 
Figure 1.1 The Different Classifications of FDI 
In general, FDI effects involve the transfer of various elements from an investing country to a host 
country (Pazienza, 2014); these elements can be economic, political, social and natural 
environmental effects. Figure 1.2 illustrates the economic elements including macro effects (the 
provision of capital, output and growth levels, employment levels and wages, balance of payments, 
trade flows, and host economy via inter-industry linkages) and micro effects (productivity level, 
technology transfer, local people training, and market structure). 
The relationship between FDI and economic growth (EG)1 has been studied in various countries by 
many researchers. However, not many studies investigate the bi-directional relationship between FDI 
and EG. Kinuthia and Murshed (2015), Omri and Kahouli (2014), Moudatsou and Kyrkilis (2011), 
Andraz and Rodrigues (2010) and Srinivasan, Kalaivani, and Ibrahim (2010) find a two-way causal link 
between them. Except for Andraz and Rodrigues (2010) and Srinivasan et al. (2010), most 
researchers did not study the long-term relationship. 
FDI determinants have been studied broadly by many researchers. They found that, besides EG, 
many other factors have been considered key drivers that can boost or impede the flow of FDI. 
Though some factors, such as trade openness, stable inflation, infrastructure development, exchange 
rate, market size and domestic investment, have played a positive role in the FDI flow (Kinuthia & 
Murshed, 2015; Labes, 2015; Castiglione, Gorbunova, Infante, & Smirnova, 2012), others, such as 
higher unemployment, existence of poverty, excessive population, higher level of risk and corruption, 
have an adverse effect (Kumari, 2014). 
 
1 EG is defined as an increase in the Gross Domestic Product of a country over a specific period (NZIER, 2018; 
Haller, 2012).  

























Source: Pazienza (2014) 
Figure 1.2 The Economic Effects of FDI 
In addition, some researchers have conducted studies on the determinants of investors’ decisions 
about where to locate capital. Important factors identified include improved democracy (Hasan & 
Mahvash, 2015), higher education levels and lower delinquency rates (Escobar, 2013), and political 
stability and security (Castiglione et al., 2012). 
However, there are still debatable conclusions about some FDI determinants such as trade openness, 
exchange rate, and inflation. Though Razmi and Behname (2012) find that trade openness exhibits a 
negative impact on FDI, but it positively affects FDI according to studies by Hasan and Mahvash 
(2015), Kinuthia and Murshed (2015), and Labes (2015). Similarly, the exchange rate impacts FDI in 
both a positive (Kinuthia & Murshed, 2015; Labes, 2015) and negative direction (Kinuthia & Murshed, 
2015; Haq, 2001). Hasan and Mahvash (2015) and Razmi and Behname (2012) show that the inflation 
rate and FDI exhibit a negative relationship, but it is positive in Kinuthia and Murshed’s (2015) study. 
Vietnam has been quite successful in attracting FDI inflows since the inception of economic reform in 
1986 (Nguyen & Nguyen, 2007). Figure 1.3 shows the total registered capital of FDI projects licensed 
in Vietnam by year from 1988 to 2014. Following the Doi Moi reform in 1986 towards a market 
economy, Vietnam passed a law on 29 December, 1987, that gave the first legal basis for FDI (Hoang 
& Goujon, 2014). Licensed FDI in Vietnam rose rapidly from 0.3 billion United States Dollars (USD) in 
1988 to 10 billion USD in 1996. After a fall resulting from the Asian financial crisis in 1997 (FDI 
reached only 2.8 billion USD in 2000), FDI recovered to high levels in the 2000s, supported by the 













Output and growth levels










investment law in 2005 and accession to the WTO in 2007, FDI grew significantly to 21 billion USD in 
2007 and 71 billion USD in 2008. The 2008 world financial crisis affected Vietnam’s FDI, which fell to 
20 billion USD in 2010. That level decreased to 15.6 billion USD in 2011 before it recovered and 
varied around 22 billion USD in 2013 and 2014. According to Hoang and Goujon (2014), Vietnam 
benefited from FDI in terms of its contribution to EG, foreign currency flows, and production 
systems. However, the FDI distribution was unequal, and this led to inequality of development and 
income among the provinces and cities in Vietnam (Hoang and Goujon, 2014). 
 
 
Note: Prel. stands for Preliminary. 
Source: Data collected from GSO (2016h) 
Figure 1.3 Total Registered Capital of FDI Projects Licensed in Vietnam 1988-2014 
In general, empirical studies of inward FDI in Vietnam have focused on topics that can be divided into 
five main groups: (i) the relationship between FDI and EG (Nguyen & Ho, 2013; Nguyen, Ho, & Zhang, 
2012; Hoang, Wiboonchutikula, & Tubtimtong, 2010; Srinivasan et al., 2010); (ii) FDI provincial 
competition (Nguyen & Ho, 2013; Nguyen, Ho, et al., 2012; Malesky, 2010; Nguyen & Nguyen, 2007); 
(iii) policies’ effects on FDI (Hoang & Goujon, 2014; Vu, Ngo, & Ho, 2009); (iv) laws’ effects on FDI 
(Nguyen & Ho, 2013; Nguyen, Ho, et al., 2012; Pham, 2011); and (v) FDI location and industry 
selection (Hoang & Goujon, 2014; Vu et al., 2009; Nguyen & Nguyen, 2007). However, no single study 
explores all five topics. 
Many researchers have studied the effects of FDI on Vietnamese EG or Gross Domestic Product 
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5 
They employed the Johansen Cointegration technique followed by the Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM) and standard Granger Causality test to investigate the causal nexus between FDI and EG in 
ASEAN economies. Though the Johansen Cointegration result showed a long-run relationship 
between FDI and GDP in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam, the empirical 
results of VECM revealed a long-run bi-directional causal link between GDP and FDI for only Malaysia 
and Vietnam. This gives rise to questions whether this link is strong and to what extent GDP affects 
FDI as well as how much FDI can explain GDP growth in Vietnam. 
To attract FDI, the Vietnamese government uses Investment Incentive Policies (IIP), such as subsidies 
to affect the investment location. Forms of investment incentives include tax preferences, grants, tax 
holidays, free of land use and other inputs (Thomas, 2009), and regulatory policy concessions (Oman, 
2000). Mayer and Nguyen (2005) emphasise that foreign investors make decisions on their 
operations’ locations based on institutional conditions that are different not only among countries 
but also within a host country. 
The Vietnam Ministry of Finance reports that 32 of 48 surveyed provinces issued extra-legal 
documents granting extra incentives to investment projects (Vu, Le, & Vo, 2007).  Vu et al. (2009) 
show 11 of the 32 provinces in Vietnam had violated the regulations of corporate income tax, and 21 
provinces offered more land incentives than the national land framework with an extension of the 
exemption period up to 20 years.    
Vu (2007) reveals that provinces that adopted extra-legal incentives experienced a decrease in the 
amount of FDI per capita after the adoption of extra-legal incentives. However, this conclusion was 
based on only a small survey of foreign firms in 2008. According to Vu et al. (2009), Vietnam made 
great efforts to regulate sub-national incentives. Hence, the issue of whether investment incentives 
actually reduce or raise the amount of FDI is questionable. 
The effects of laws and agreements on FDI may be another critical issue. Because Vietnam’s 
commitments under the WTO and the FTAs with the US and other countries require national 
treatment after phase-in periods, the needs of foreign and domestic investors with regard to 
regulatory policies should be converging. Consequently, a significantly positive impact on inward FDI 
was reported after Vietnam accessed the WTO (Pham, 2011). The Unified Enterprise Law (2005), 
Common Investment Law (2005), and the equality in income taxes between foreign and domestic 
firms are some of the milestones to ensure these commitments into Vietnam laws (Malesky, 2010). 
In Vietnam, the Investment Law (2014) was released and enacted on 1 July, 2015. Hence, it would be 
interesting to empirically test the effects of the laws on FDI in Vietnam. 
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Investors’ subjective decisions in choosing the investment location are important to Vietnam’s EG 
and development. However, only a few researchers (Hoang & Goujon, 2014; Vu et al., 2009; Nguyen 
& Nguyen, 2007) focus on this topic for Vietnam and their results are inconsistent. Thus, a study of 
the determinants of FDI location selection can provide a more comprehensive picture of what affects 
FDI capital location in Vietnam. 
1.2 Research Problem and Objectives 
There are still some outstanding issues related to FDI that have not been addressed in previous 
studies. These gaps are: 
(i) The relationship between FDI and EG: many studies focus on the two-way nexus between FDI 
and EG but most researchers did not study their long-term relationship. 
(ii) FDI determinants: there are still inconsistent conclusions about some FDI determinants 
(trade openness, exchange rate, and inflation). 
(iii) Determinants of investors’ decisions about where to locate their capital: it is relatively a new 
approach to identify the FDI determinants in terms of the investors’ views in selecting 
investment locations because of the limited number of studies. Hence, factors such as 
improved democracy (Hasan & Mahvash, 2015), higher education levels and lower 
delinquency rates (Escobar, 2013) and political stability and security (Castiglione et al., 2012) 
should be further explored. 
(iv) Research topics are not unified: generally, the empirical studies of FDI determinants in 
Vietnam have focused on five different topics, the relationship between FDI and EG; FDI 
provincial competition; policy effects on FDI; law effects on FDI; and FDI location selection. 
However, these research topics were investigated separately. This study explores these five 
topics in a single study to provide cohesive conclusions about FDI in Vietnam. 
(v) Differences in research areas and time duration on the same topic: though some empirical 
studies (in Vietnam, for example) are based at the national level, others investigate at the 
regional or provincial level, which can generate inconsistent results. In addition, data 
collected during different time periods can produce different findings. 
Therefore, to fill these literature gaps, I investigate inward FDI in Vietnam using a unique data set at 
the national, regional, and provincial levels to: 
(i) Examine the bi-directional relationship between FDI and EG; and 
(ii) Analyse the FDI determinants to identify the determinants affecting FDI location selection in 
terms of the investors’ view. 
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The aim of this study is to investigate FDI with regard to GDP, laws, and the location of investments 
in Vietnam between 2000 and 2015.  
The specific objectives of this study are to: 
(i) identify the relationship between FDI and GDP in 63 provinces and cities of Vietnam;  
(ii) examine the levels of the “Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI)-based” competition and 
“IIP-based” competition in 63 provinces and cities of Vietnam in attracting FDI; 
(iii) evaluate the impacts of WTO, FTAs and Vietnamese law on attracting FDI to the 63 provinces 
and cities of Vietnam; and  
(iv) investigate factors affecting foreign investors’ decisions in choosing locations to invest in 
Vietnam. 
The research questions are: 
1. What is the relationship between FDI and EG in the provinces and cities of Vietnam? 
2. How does PCI-based and IIP-based competition affect FDI at the provincial level in Vietnam? 
3. Does the rule of law matter in attracting FDI to Vietnam? 
4. Is there any geographical concentration of FDI in Vietnam? 
1.3 Research Methodology and Data 
The empirical models are based on the literature and are estimated using Eview9 software.  
For the first research question, Pedroni’s Model is used to evaluate the long-term relationship 
between FDI and GDP and the relationship is re-evaluated using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimator. Next, the Error Correction Model (ECM) is employed to evaluate not only the long-term 
relationship but also the existence and the direction of causality between FDI and GDP. This 
procedure is called a Cointegration – OLS – ECM approach or a three-step approach that has not 
been used widely to test similar FDI links that typically use the conventional OLS estimator. An OLS 
approach or a one-step approach of the OLS estimator is used to examine the second, third and 
fourth research questions.  
A panel data set will be used in this study. The study considers 63 provinces and cities in Vietnam 
from 2000 to 2015. For the five variables, namely, FDI, GDP, open trade (OT), exchange rate (ER), and 
population (POP), the study period is from 1990 to 2015 to evaluate the long-term relationship 
between FDI and GDP at the national level in Vietnam. The data sources include the General 
Statistics Office (GSO), Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI), Ministry of Industry and Trade 
(MOIT), Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA), Ministry of Transport (MOT), Ministry 
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of Information and Communications (MIC), Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), the Vietnam 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI), and the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group. 
1.4 Research Contribution 
FDI plays an important role in most countries in terms of developing their economy based on 
technological advancements, exports, production improvements and improving manufacturing 
employment (Naveed & Hurmat, 2013). According to Dutta (2012), these facilities bring great 
benefits to small and medium-sized enterprises. Therefore, this study is beneficial to various interest 
groups such as researchers, policymakers, foreign investors and the community. 
This study attempts to extend the literature in examining the debatable issues of: (i) the relationship 
between FDI and GDP; and (ii) the competition, determinants, and impacts of laws or rules on 
attracting FDI. In addition, the study could enhance FDI into Vietnam such as: (i) offering a good 
reference for the Vietnamese government to understand the bi-directional relationship between FDI 
and GDP; (ii) identifying the factors affecting the competition to attract FDI; (iii) understanding 
decisions related to FDI issues that should be considered by each province or city to attract FDI in the 
future; and (iv) offering suggestions to the Vietnamese government and authorities to plan 
development projects as well as to enact laws to boost EG.  
1.5 Thesis Outline  
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 provides an overview of FDI in 
Vietnam. Chapter 3 presents the literature on the long-term relationship between FDI and GDP as 
well as the determinants of FDI from both international and Vietnamese evidence. The chapter also 
reviews updated theories of FDI according to the five content groups: the relationship between FDI 
and EG, FDI provincial competition, policy effects on FDI, law effects on FDI, and investment location 
selection. Chapter 4 presents the data and research methodology used in the study. Chapter 5 
presents the empirical findings of the study. Chapter 6 concludes the study with the key research 
findings and implications as well as the limitations of the study and potential future study areas. 
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Chapter 2 
An Overview of Inward FDI in Vietnam 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of Vietnam’s socio-economic development and the attraction of 
FDI. Section 2.2 introduces socio-economic development in Vietnam, which includes the 
characteristics of the population, labour, investment and EG. Section 2.3 gives a brief introduction to 
the important laws and regulations related to FDI and continues with the attraction of FDI to 
Vietnam, which includes the number of projects, the total registered capital and the total 
implemented capital by years, by kinds of economic activity, by main investment counterparts (main 
foreign investors of Vietnam by countries), by sub-nations and the FDI contributions to the economy. 
Section 2.4 concludes the chapter. 
2.2 Socio-economic Development in Vietnam 
According to the latest UN estimate in 22 September, 2016, the population of Vietnam was 
94,667,081, which was equivalent to 1.27% of the world’s population and ranked 14th in the list of 
countries by population (Worldometers, 2016). The population density in the largest population 
country (China) was only 147 people per km2, but the figure for Vietnam was over double that at 305 
people per km2. Vietnam’s annual population growth rate reached a peak of 3.07% in 1960 before 
declining gradually and has fluctuated around 1.10% from 2011 to 2016 (see Figure 2.1). 
   
Note: Additional information on Vietnam’s population and yearly population growth rate is provided 
in Appendix Table A.1. 
Source: Worldometers (2016) 
Figure 2.1 The Total Population and Yearly Population Growth Rate of Vietnam 1950-2016 
In 2015, Vietnam’s labour force of 15 years of age and above was about 54 million people (around 
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with 2000, the labour force growth rate remained constant at about 1% per year from 2000 to 2015 
(see Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1 The Average Population and Labour Force of 15 Years of Age and Above in Vietnam 
2000-2015 
Year 




% over average 
population 
Labour force 
growth rate (%) 
2000 77630.9 38545.4 49.65 - 
2001 78620.5 39615.8 50.39 1.03 
2002 79537.7 40716.0 51.19 1.03 
2003 80467.4 41846.7 52.00 1.03 
2004 81436.4 43008.9 52.81 1.03 
2005 82392.1 44904.5 54.50 1.04 
2006 83311.2 46238.7 55.50 1.03 
2007 84218.5 47160.3 56.00 1.02 
2008 85118.7 48209.6 56.64 1.02 
2009 86025.0 49322.0 57.33 1.02 
2010 86947.4 50392.9 57.96 1.02 
2011 87860.4 51398.4 58.50 1.02 
2012 88809.3 52348.0 58.94 1.02 
2013 89759.5 53245.6 59.32 1.02 
2014 90728.9 53748.0 59.24 1.01 
2015 91713.3 53984.2 58.86 1.00 
Source: Data collected from GSO (2016e), GSO (2016l) and computed by the author. 
In general, from 2000 to 2014, Vietnam’s unemployment rate was only a half of that of the East Asia 
and Pacific region and much lower than the world unemployment rate. It had two peaks, 2.8% and 
2.6% in 2001 and 2010, respectively, before dropping to 1.8% in 2012, and rose to 2.3% in 2014 (see 
Figure 2.2). Appendix Table A.2 provides the unemployment rates for Vietnam, the East Asia and 
Pacific region, and the world from 2000 to 2015. 
 
Source: Data collected from the WB (2016c). 
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Note: Additional information on investment by type of ownership and GDP is provided in Appendix 
Table A.3. 
Source: Data collected from GSO (2016i) and GSO (2016j). 
Figure 2.3 Investment by Type of Ownership and GDP in Vietnam 1995-2015 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the total capital investment at current prices by type of ownership and GDP at 
current prices in Vietnam between 1995 and 2015. The total capital has grown rapidly from 70 trillion 
Vietnam Dong (VND) to nearly 1,370 trillion VND over the 21 years. Generally, there was an increase 
in the capital of all three ownership types: state-owned sector, non-state-owned sector and foreign 
invested sector2. Based on the data from GSO (2016j), the state sector contributed most in terms of 
 
Note: Additional information on GDP growth rate of Vietnam, the East Asia and Pacific region, and 
the world is provided in Appendix Table A.4. 
Source: Data collected from the WB (2016c). 
Figure 2.4 The GDP Growth Rate of Vietnam, East Asia and the Pacific, and the World 2000-2015   
 

















































































































2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
%
GDP Growth Rate
Vietnam East Asia & Pacific World
12 
total capital each year until 2014, followed by the non-state sector and the foreign invested sector. In 
2015, the percentage of non-state sector capital (38.7%) was higher than that of the state sector 
(38%). 
In addition, although Vietnam GDP grew remarkably from 900 trillion VND in 2005 to over 4,100 
trillion VND in 2015 (see Figure 2.3), the EG rate increased slowly (GSO, 2016f). As shown in Figure 
2.4, the Vietnam economy experienced quite a high and stable GDP growth rate compared with EG 
rates in the East Asia and Pacific region and the world. Between 2008 and 2009, while the rates of 
the East Asia and Pacific region and the world declined dramatically from 3.58% to 1.32% and from 
1.84% to -1.68% respectively, Vietnam still maintained a GDP growth rate of about 5.5% that has 
risen gradually to 6.7% by 2015. 
 
Note: Additional information on the GDP growth rate, capital growth rate, and ICOR of Vietnam is 
provided in Appendix Table A.4 and Table A.5. 
Source: ICOR and capital growth rate computed by the author based on data collected from GSO 
(2016j), GDP growth rate data collected from the WB (2016b). 
Figure 2.5 The ICOR, Capital Growth Rate, and GDP Growth Rate of Vietnam 2000-2015 
In terms of investment efficiency, the Incremental Capital Output Ratio (ICOR)3 (see Figure 2.5) 
shows the inefficient use of the capital invested in development in Vietnam. From 2000 to 2010, 
although the capital growth rate exhibited large fluctuations, especially the big jump in 2007 and 
quick drop in 2008, the ICOR for Vietnam reached a peak of 4.3 in 2001 and kept stead at 2.8 in 2007 
and 2008 before rising to 3.67 in 2009 and falling to 2.38 in 2010 (see Figure 2.5). From 2011 to 2015, 
the Vietnam ICOR increased quickly from 1.49 to 5.36, which means that, to create one more VND in 
GDP in 2015, the economy had to invest 5.36 VND, which was much higher than the 1.49 VND in 
2011. This situation can be called a “hungry status in capital” but the capital is used inefficiently 
(GSO, 2016f). In addition, Vietnam’s growth rate of capital was much higher than that of GDP 
 
3 ICOR is an aggregated indicator of the ratio of investment to growth, which is equal to 1 divided by the 














between 2000 and 2015. On average, the capital growth rate was 15.9%, which was about 2.5 times 
the economy’s growth rate (6.4%) over the 16 years (see Figure 2.5). 
  
Note: Additional information on GDP per capita and CPI-based inflation rates of Vietnam, the middle-
income group and the world is provided in Appendix Table A.6. 
Source: Data collected from the WB (2016c).   
Figure 2.6 The GDP per Capita (left) and CPI-based Inflation Rate (right) of Vietnam, the Middle 
Income Group Countries, and the World 2000-2015 
It can be seen clearly from Figure 2.6 that Vietnam has had a lower GDP per capita but higher 
inflation rate than those of the middle-income group countries and the world. In terms of GDP per 
capita, Vietnam used to be one of the poorest countries but presently has become a lower middle-
income nation with over 2000 USD per capita since 2014 (GSO, 2016f). Although Vietnam GDP per 
capita in 2015 reached 2,111.14 USD (4.87 times higher than that of 2000), the number equalled only 
around a half and a fifth of those of the middle income group countries and the world, respectively. 
Vietnam’s inflation rate was unstable with two extreme changes in 2008 and 2011. The CPI-based 
inflation rate of the country dramatically jumped up from 8.3% in 2007 to 23.1% in 2008, followed by 
a sharp drop to 7.1% in 2009 before going up to 18.7% in 2011. From 2012 to 2015, Vietnam 
experienced a downward trend in its inflation rate like the middle-income group countries and the 
world (see Figure 2.6), but its CPI-based inflation rate decreased more quickly and was much lower in 
2015 (only 0.63% compared with 3.06% and 1.44% of the middle-income group countries and the 
world, respectively). 
Compared with East Asia and the Pacific and the world, international trade has played quite an 
important role in developing Vietnam’s economy from 2000 to 2015, which is shown by the export 
and import rates over GDP in Figure 2.7. Though the figures for East Asia and the Pacific and the 
world were quite steady around 30% from 2000 to 2015, Vietnam’s export and import proportions 
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Source: Data collected from WB (2016c). 
Figure 2.7 The Export Rate (left) and Import Rate (right) as a Percentage of GDP in Vietnam, East 
Asia and the Pacific, and the World 2000-2015 
In conclusion, although Vietnam has advantages (such as the high labour force rate over average 
population, low unemployment rate, and high and steady GDP growth rate), the country has faced 
difficulties in using capital efficiently, controlling the inflation rate, and administering international 
trade, as well as managing the economy.  
2.3 Inward FDI in Vietnam 
2.3.1 Regulations Related to FDI in Vietnam 
Historically, since the Doi Moi reform in 1986, many laws and regulations related to FDI have been 
promulgated and taken in effect in Vietnam. Table 2.2 lists the important laws including the first FDI 
law in 1987, the Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam in 1996, the Unified Enterprise Law in 2005, 
the Common Investment Law in 2005, and the new Investment Law in 2014. The first FDI law in 1987, 
Law No. 4-HĐNN8 dated 29 December, 1987, of the National Assembly on Foreign Investment in 
Vietnam, has been considered one of the most important legal documents for the country to begin 
attracting foreign capital sources (Hoang & Goujon, 2014). Following amendments and supplements 
in 1990 and 1992, this law was replaced by the Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam 1996 dated 12 
November, 1996, which was modified in 2000 by the Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam (Law No. 
18/2000/QH10). 
Five years later, two new laws, the Law on Investment or the Common Investment Law in 2005 (Law 
No. 59/2005/QH11) and the Law on Enterprise or the Unified Enterprise Law in 2005 (Law No. 
60/2005/QH11), were promulgated by the National Assembly and known as the first outstanding 
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2014, these laws were completely replaced by the Law on Investment (Law No. 67/2014/QH13) and 
the Law on Enterprise (Law No. 68/2014/QH13) which took effect on 26 November, 2014 and 1 July, 
2015, respectively. 
Table 2.2 A Summary of the Important Laws Related to FDI in Vietnam 
Year Documentation Description Date of issue 
Effective 
date Status 
2014 Law No. 67/2014/QH13 The Law on Investment 26/11/2014 26/11/2014 Effective 
2014 Law No. 68/2014/QH13 The Law on Enterprise 26/11/2014 01/07/2015 Effective 
2005 Law No. 59/2005/QH11 The Law on Investment 29/11/2005 01/07/2006 Ineffective 
2005 Law No. 60/2005/QH11 The Law on Enterprise 29/11/2005 01/07/2006 Ineffective 
1996 Law 1996 The Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam 12/11/1996 12/11/1996 Ineffective 
1987 Law No. 4-HĐNN8 The Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam 29/12/1987 29/12/1987 Ineffective 
Source: Information collected from MPI (2016) 
Vietnam integrated into the regional and global economies by joining ASEAN in July 1995, AFTA in 
December 1995, APEC in November 1998, the United States – Vietnam BTA in July 2000, the WTO in 
January 2007, and the TPP in February 2016 (see Figure 2.8). Because of Vietnam’s commitments 
under the WTO and trade agreements with the US and other countries, which require national 
 
Figure 2.8 The Important Law and Regulation Milestones Related to FDI in Vietnam 
treatment after phase-in periods, the needs of foreign and domestic investors with regard to 
regulatory policies have been converged by the Vietnamese law system. The laws in 2005, the recent 
equalization of income taxes between foreign and private firms regulated by the Law on Enterprise 
Income Tax (Law No. 14/2008/QH12 dated 03/06/2008), and the laws in 2014 are some of the first 
steps in enshrining these commitments into the national legal system. 
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2.3.2 FDI Attraction in Vietnam 
After the first FDI law in 1987 had taken effect, Vietnam attracted the first FDI projects in 1988. 
Following this, the number of inward FDI licensed projects increased rapidly from 211 in 1988-1990 
to 2,120 projects in 2015. In total there have been 21,397 projects for the 28 years from 1988 to 
2015. The total registered capital including supplementary capital to licensed projects is 358,588.9 
million USD (see Table 2.3). 




Total registered capital4 Total implemented capital 
Million USD Million USD 
% over total registered 
capital 
1988-1990 211 1603.5 .. .. 
1991 152 1284.4 428.5 33.36 
1992 196 2077.6 574.9 27.67 
1993 274 2829.8 1117.5 39.49 
1994 372 4262.1 2240.6 52.57 
1995 415 7925.2 2792.0 35.23 
1996 372 9635.3 2938.2 30.49 
1997 349 5955.6 3277.1 55.03 
1998 285 48734.0 2372.4 4.87 
1999 327 2282.5 2528.3 110.77 
2000 391 2762.8 2398.7 86.82 
2001 555 3265.7 2225.6 68.15 
2002 808 2993.4 2884.7 96.37 
2003 791 3172.7 2723.3 85.84 
2004 811 4534.3 2708.4 59.73 
2005 970 6840.0 3300.5 48.25 
2006 987 12004.5 4100.4 34.16 
2007 1544 21348.8 8034.1 37.63 
2008 1171 71726.8 11500.2 16.03 
2009 1208 23107.5 10000.5 43.28 
2010 1237 19886.8 11000.3 55.31 
2011 1191 15618.7 11000.1 70.43 
2012 1287 16348.0 10046.6 61.45 
2013 1530 22352.2 11500.0 51.45 
2014 1843 21921.7 12500.0 57.02 
2015 2120 24115.0 14500.0 60.13 
Total 21397 358588.9 138692.9 38.68 
Source: Data collected from GSO (2016h) and GSO (2015b). 
According to Table 2.3, the total implemented FDI capital reached 138,692.9 million USD, which 
accounted for 38.68% of the total registered capital between 1988 and 2015. On average, the 
amount of implemented FDI capital was 4,953.32 million USD per year (see Table 2.4). Over the 16 
years from 2000 to 2015, Vietnam attracted 18,444 projects (1,153 projects per year) with a total 
 
4 Including supplementary capital to licensed projects in previous years 
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implemented FDI capital of 120,423.4 million USD (constituting 44.27% total registered capital) or 
7,526.46 million USD per year (see Table 2.4). It can be seen clearly from Table 2.4 that, compared 
with 1988-2015, most of the capital was invested in this 16-year period with 86.2% of total projects 
and 75.85% of total registered capital. 
Table 2.4 The Inward FDI to Vietnam 2000-2015 Compared with 1988-2015 
 Unit 
1988-2015 2000-2015 




Number of projects Projects 21,397 764 18,444 86.20 1,153 
Total registered 
capital 
Million USD 358,588.90 12,806.75 271,998.90 75.85 16,999.93 
Total implemented 
capital 
Million USD 138,692.90 4,953.32 120,423.40 86.83 7,526.46 
% 38.68 - 44.27 - - 
Source: Data collected from GSO (2016h) and GSO (2015b), and computed by the author. 
Although the annual registered FDI capital in Vietnam rose rapidly to 24,115 million USD in 2015 (15 
times increase compared with 1988-1990), the figure fluctuated rapidly over the 28-year period (see 
Figure 2.9). The figure shows that, after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the registered capital fell 
dramatically from under 50 billion USD in 1998 to over two billion USD in 1999 and recovered 
gradually in the 2000s. 
 
Source: Data collected from GSO (2016h) and GSO (2015b).  
Figure 2.9 The Inward FDI to Vietnam 1988-2015 
Because of the significant changes in the investment environment supported by the new laws in 
2005 and accession to the WTO in 2007 (Nguyen et al., 2012), the registered capital of FDI licensed 
projects in Vietnam significantly grew from 21 billion USD in 2007 to 71 billion USD in 2008 (see 
Figure 2.9). The implemented FDI capital has reached over 10 billion USD since 2008 after 
maintaining a low level of only 2 billion USD on average from 1988 to 2006 (see Table 2.3 and Figure 
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capital of almost 50 billion USD in 2010 in Vietnam. The amount dropped to 15.6 billion USD in 2011 
before it recovered to vary around 22 billion USD between 2013 and 2015 (see Figure 2.9). 
Table 2.5 The Social Investment Structure by Capital Source in Vietnam 1995-2015 (Total Social 
Investment = 100%) 
Year State sector (%) Non-state sector (%) FDI sector (%) 
1995-2015 46.2 32.1 21.7 
1995 42.0 27.6 30.4 
1996 49.1 24.9 26.0 
1997 49.4 22.6 28.0 
1998 55.5 23.7 20.8 
1999 58.7 24.0 17.3 
2000 59.1 22.9 18.0 
2001 59.8 22.6 17.6 
2002 57.3 25.3 17.4 
2003 52.9 31.1 16.0 
2004 48.1 37.7 14.2 
1995-2004 53.2 26.2 20.6 
2005 47.1 38.0 14.9 
2006 45.7 38.1 16.2 
2007 37.2 38.5 24.3 
2008 33.9 35.2 30.9 
2009 40.5 33.9 25.6 
2010 38.1 36.1 25.8 
2011 37.0 38.5 24.5 
2012 40.3 38.1 21.6 
2013 40.4 37.7 21.9 
2014 39.9 38.4 21.7 
2015 38.0 38.7 23.3 
2005-2015 39.8 37.4 22.8 
Source: Data collected from GSO (2016j) and GSO (2015c).  
In Vietnam, FDI has importantly contributed to the total capital invested in development (GSO, 
2016f). Table 2.5 describes the country’s social investment structure from the capital sources of the 
state-owned sector, non-state-owned sector and foreign invested sector from 1995 to 2015. The 
table shows that even though the FDI sector instituted 20.57% total social investment, on average, in 
1995-2004 and rose to 22.79% in 2005-2015, the rate of state sector capital fell from 53.19% to 
39.83%. However, since 2009, the contribution rate of FDI gradually decreased after peaking at 
30.9% in 2008 (see Table 2.5). In 2015, the proportion of non-state sector capital was highest at 
38.7% (529,600 million VND), followed by the state sector ranked second with 38% (519,500 million 
VND), and the FDI sector at 23.3% (318,100 million VND) of the total social capital of Vietnam (see 
Figure 2.3 and Table 2.5). 
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Table 2.6 FDI Projects Licensed by Kind of Economic Activity in Vietnam (accumulated total of 
projects in effect as at 31 December, 2015) 
Economic activity 
Number of projects Total registered capital5 
Projects % Million USD % 
Agriculture 521 2.60 3654.9 1.30 
Industry 11013 54.88 181141.2 64.26 
Construction and real estate 1264 6.30 10893.8 3.86 
Services 7271 36.23 86192.6 30.58 
Total 20069 100 281882.5 100 
Source: Data collected from GSO (2016f) and computed by the author. 
In terms of economic activity, Table 2.6 shows that the FDI capital in Vietnam was mainly invested in 
industrial activities. From 1988 to 2015, Vietnam attracted 21,397 projects6 (see Table 2.3), of which 
over 20 thousand projects were operating (or in effect) based on an accumulative data of FDI  
 
Source: Data collected from GSO (2016f) and computed by the author. 
Figure 2.10 The Accumulated Registered Capital Structure of FDI Projects as at 31 December, 2015, 
by Kind of Economic Activity in Vietnam 
projects collected from GSO (2016f). According to Table 2.6, the total number of projects was 20,069, 
of which 11 thousand (accounting for 54.88%) focused on developing industries, 7.2 (36.23%) on 
service activities, and of the remaining 6.3% were in construction and real estate and 2.6% were in 
agriculture. The total registered FDI capital of the industrial sector was highest at 181,141.2 million 
USD (64.26%) and the service sector was second with 86,192.6 million USD (30.58%) (see Table 2.6). 
 
5 Includes supplementary capital to licensed projects in previous years 
6 The total number of licensed FDI projects from 1988 and 2015 includes: (1) licensed projects are operating 
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Based on the data from GSO (2015a), the percentage of the population in rural Vietnam was over 
66%; the labour force at 15 years of age and above in rural areas constituted 68.7% of the country’s 
total labour force, and the agriculture sector contributed 17% to the GDP (at current prices) in 2015. 
Table 2.6 and Figure 2.10 indicate that the registered FDI capital in agricultural activities was only 
1.3% of the total registered capital (including supplementary capital to licensed projects in previous 
years), which is not commensurate with the country’s agricultural development potential. 
Table 2.7 The Vietnam FDI Projects Licensed by the Main Contributors (accumulated total as at 
31 December, 2015)  
  Number of projects Total registered capital7 
Unit Projects % Million USD % 
Total 20069 100 281882.5 100 
Country       
Republic of Korea 4970 24.76 45191.1 16.03 
Japan 2914 14.52 38973.6 13.83 
Singapore 1544 7.69 35148.5 12.47 
Taiwan 2478 12.35 30997.4 11.00 
British Virgin Islands 623 3.10 19275.3 6.84 
Hong Kong SAR8 (China) 975 4.86 15546.8 5.52 
Malaysia 523 2.61 13420.1 4.76 
United States 781 3.89 11301.8 4.01 
China, PR9 1296 6.46 10174.2 3.61 
Netherlands 255 1.27 8264.5 2.93 
Thailand 419 2.09 7727.9 2.74 
Cayman Islands 67 0.33 6392.3 2.27 
Samoa 150 0.75 5771.7 2.05 
Canada 147 0.73 5252.7 1.86 
United Kingdom 241 1.20 4739.3 1.68 
France 448 2.23 3423.0 1.21 
Russia 113 0.56 2080.1 0.74 
Switzerland 111 0.55 2045.1 0.73 
Australia 357 1.78 1652.7 0.59 
Germany 260 1.30 1393.7 0.49 
Source: Data collected from GSO (2015d) and computed by the author. 
In terms of investment counterparts, the inward FDI for Vietnam was mostly from Asia between 1988 
and 2015 (see Table 2.7). The proportion of FDI from East Asia including the Republic of Korea, Japan, 
Taiwan, and China (Hong Kong and Mainland China) made up around 63% of total projects and 50% 
total registered capital. Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, that are ASEAN members, contributed 
over 12% of total FDI projects with nearly 20% of total registered capital. Vietnam attracted only a 
small percentage of FDI from developed countries including the US, Canada, the United Kingdom, 
 
7 Total registered capital includes supplementary capital to licensed projects in previous years. 
8 SAR stands for Special Administrative Region. 
9 PR stands for Peoples’ Republic. 
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France, Russia, Switzerland, Australia, and Germany (around only 12% of the total projects and about 
11% of the total capital, see Table 2.7). 
Table 2.8 The Number and Value of FDI Projects Licensed by Vietnam Region (accumulated total 
as at 31 December, 2015)  
Region Number of projects Total registered capital10 
Unit Projects % Million USD % 
Total 20069 100 281882.5 100 
1. Northern Midlands and Mountain Areas 617 3.07 13369.0 4.74 
2. Red River Delta 6186 30.82 72257.9 25.63 
3. North Central and Central Coastal Areas 1236 6.16 53278.0 18.90 
4. Central Highlands 131 0.65 781.7 0.28 
5. South East  10686 53.25 122544.5 43.47 
6. Mekong River Delta 1162 5.79 16867.7 5.98 
Oil and Gas 51 0.25 2783.7 0.99 
Source: Data collected from GSO (2015d) and computed by the author. 
It can be seen from Table 2.8 that the FDI distribution was uneven among the six Vietnam regions. 
Most of the FDI capital was invested in the South East region (53.25% of the total number and 
43.47% of the total registered capital between 1988 and 2015); only 5.79% of total FDI projects and 
5.98% of the total registered value was in the Mekong River Delta, which is southern Vietnam. 
Appendix Table A.8 provides additional information on the FDI projects licensed by region in 
Vietnam. 
 
Source: Data collected from GSO (2015d) and computed by the author. 
Figure 2.11 The Accumulated Registered Capital Structure of FDI Projects by Vietnam Region as at 
31 December, 2015 
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In the north, the FDI projects and registered capital in the Red River Delta were the second highest 
(30.82% and 25.63%, respectively), whereas in the Northern Midlands and Mountain Areas, they 
were very low (3.07% and 4.74%) (see Table 2.8 and Figure 2.11). In the middle of Vietnam, the 
North Central and Central Coastal Areas attracted 18.9% of the total registered capital, but very few 
FDI projects (accounting for 0.28% of the total registered capital) were located in the Central 
Highlands (see Table 2.8 and Figure 2.11). This implies that foreign investors did not prefer investing 
in the midland, highland and mountain regions of Vietnam, which could increase the unequal 
development and income in those provinces and cities. 
Unequal distribution of FDI was also reported at the Vietnam provincial level. Table 2.9 lists 20 cities 
and provinces that attracted the most and least FDI registered capital between 1988 and 2015 
(including only projects in effect). 
Table 2.9 Vietnam Cities or Provinces Attracting the Most and Least FDI Registered Capital 
(accumulated total as at 31 December, 2015) 
Ranking 
position 





















1 Ho Chi Minh city 5886 42366.8 55 Quang Binh 12 109.1 
2 Ba Ria - Vung Tau 322 27766.4 56 Dong Thap 17 105.5 
3 Ha Noi city 3467 25490.9 57 Bac Lieu 17 94.2 
4 Binh Duong 2731 24026.0 58 Quang Tri 21 85.6 
5 Dong Nai 1350 24025.9 59 Kon Tum 2 70.2 
6 Hai Phong city 513 11651.3 60 Cao Bang 24 51.2 
7 Bac Ninh 721 11328.3 61 Dak Nong 6 19.6 
8 Ha Tinh 64 11265.0 62 Bac Kan 6 14.3 
9 Thanh Hoa 71 10409.1 63 Gia Lai 5 9.7 
10 Hai Duong 376 7385.2 64 Lai Chau 3 4.0 
Source: Data collected from GSO (2015d) and computed by the author. 
The top five provinces and cities attracting FDI (see Table 2.9) include Ho Chi Minh city (ranked first 
in both number of projects and registered capital), Ba Ria – Vung Tau (second in registered capital), 
Ha Noi city - the capital of Vietnam - (ranked second in the number of projects and third in registered 
capital), Binh Duong (ranked fourth), and Dong Nai (ranked fifth). Interestingly, four of the top five 
provinces and cities are in the South East region of Vietnam.   
Among the 64 provinces and cities, Lai Chau ranked last with only three FDI projects (4 million USD) 
over 28 years. At 63rd, 62nd and 61st positions were Gia Lai with less than 10 million USD FDI in total, 
Bac Kan (14.3 million USD) and Dak Nong (19.6 million USD), respectively. Lai Chau and Bac Kan are in 
the Northern Midlands and Mountain Areas, and Gia Lai and Dak Nong are in the Central Highlands 
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of Vietnam; all four provinces have extremely difficult socio-economic conditions and are listed as 
areas eligible for investment incentives (regulated by Appendix II promulgated together with the 
Government's Decree No. 118/2015/NĐ-CP dated 12/01/2015 on guidelines for some articles of the 
Law on Investment 2014 (Government, 2015)). 
Table 2.10 The Percentage Contribution of FDI Enterprises to Vietnam’s Economy 
Economic Category 
Percentage Contribution 
2005 2010 2014 
1. To job solution 2.7 4.4 6.4 
2. To state budget revenue 8.4 11.0 13.9 
3. To export value 57.2 54.2 62.5 
4. To Vietnam GDP 15.2 15.2 16.4 
% FDI capital in the social investment structure 14.9 25.8 21.7 
Source: Data collected from GSO (2016f), GSO (2016j) and GSO (2015d) 
Although the distribution of FDI in Vietnam was unequal within the country, in general, FDI has 
significantly contributed to the economy in terms of creating jobs, increasing state budget revenue, 
supporting exports, and boosting the EG (GSO, 2016f). Table 2.10 shows the outstanding role of FDI’s 
contribution to Vietnam’s export value of 57.2% in 2005 and 62.5% in 2014, which means that FDI 
significantly supported the nation’s international trade development. The level of FDI enterprises’ 
contribution to jobs for local employees over the total working force was not very high but increased 
gradually from 2.7% in 2005 to 6.4% in 2014. However, compared with the FDI capital rate of 22.8% 
in the social investment structure in the period 2005-2015 (see Table 2.5), the contribution of FDI to 
GDP and the state budget revenue of Vietnam was modest (see Table 2.10). It can be clearly seen 
from Table 2.10 that the contribution of FDI to GDP rose by only 1.2% in 15 years (remained at 15.2% 
from 2005 to 2010 and slightly grew to 16.4% in 2014). In 2014, though the FDI sector contributed 
16.4% to GDP, the contribution of FDI to the state budget revenue was only 13.9%, which was much 
lower than that of FDI capital (21.7%) to the social investment structure (see Table 2.10). 
In summary, since 1987, Vietnam has made concerted efforts to improve the law and regulation 
systems related to FDI to ensure international commitments after integrating into the regional and 
global economy. Consequently, the number of FDI licensed projects and the total registered capital 
increased dramatically, 20,069 projects worth 281,882.5 million USD in 2015 (see Table 2.6). In 
addition, FDI contributed more than one fifth of the total social investment in Vietnam between 1995 
and 2015 (see Table 2.5). Remarkably, FDI has played an important role in supporting exports with a 
contribution rate of over 62% in 2014 (see Table 2.10). However, Vietnam has faced some difficulties 
in attracting and managing FDI. In terms of the investment contributors11, Vietnam’s inward FDI was 
mostly from Asia; only a small percentage of FDI came from developed countries (see Table 2.7). The 
 
11 Main foreign investors in Vietnam by countries 
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FDI distribution has been unequal in terms of the types of economic activity as well as among 
regions, provinces and cities (see Tables 2.8, 2.9, and Figure 2.11), which can increase the inequality 
of development and income. Although FDI has contributed to Vietnam’s economy, the proportions of 
FDI in creating jobs, increasing state budget revenue, and in boosting the EG were quite modest 
compared with the FDI capital rate to the social investment structure (see Table 2.10). 
2.4 Conclusion 
This overview of Vietnam’s socio-economic development and FDI attraction illustrates that the 
nation has had some advantages with regard to the socio-economic development, such as the high 
labour force rate, low unemployment rate, and high and steady GDP growth rate. However, the 
country has faced difficulties in using the capital efficiently, controlling inflation and administering 
international trade. In terms of the FDI attraction, since 1987, Vietnam has improved its law and 
regulation systems related to FDI and has experienced rapid increase in the number of FDI licensed 
projects and the total registered capital between 1988 and 2015. Although FDI has played an 
important role in contributing highly to Vietnam’s total social investment and exports, the 
contribution of FDI to creating jobs, increasing state budget revenue, and boosting EG were quite 
modest compared with the FDI capital rate to social investment. Further, the country has faced 
unequal FDI distribution among economic activities as well as among regions, provinces and cities. 







This chapter reviews the literature related to inward FDI to identify gaps in the Vietnam context. 
Section 3.2 provides worldwide evidence of FDI-EG linkages, which shows a lack of studies 
investigating a long-run two-way relationship between FDI and EG. Section 3.3 reviews the 
determinants affecting FDI positively, negatively, and both positively and negatively. Empirical 
studies of inward FDI in Vietnam are summarised in Section 3.4 in terms of the five research topics: 
the relationship between FDI and EG, FDI provincial competition, the effects of policies on FDI, the 
effects of laws on FDI, and FDI location selection. Section 3.5 identifies the gaps, research directions, 
and hypotheses. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter. 
3.2 The Relationship between FDI and EG 
The relationship between FDI and EG has been studied in developed (high income) and developing 
economies12. The FDI-EG linkage studies in developed economies13 include 16 EU countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (Moudatsou & Kyrkilis, 2011; Andraz & Rodrigues, 
2010); Singapore (Moudatsou & Kyrkilis, 2011; Srinivasan et al., 2010); five EU economies from the 
CEE: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia (Kornecki & Rhoades, 2007). With 
regard to developing economies, the nexus between FDI and EG was investigated in Kenya (Kinuthia 
& Murshed, 2015); the BRICS economies, i.e., Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (Labes, 
2015); Malaysia (Kinuthia & Murshed, 2015; Srinivasan et al., 2010); 13 MENA countries, i.e., Algeria, 
Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the 
United Arab Emirates (Omri & Kahouli, 2014); China (Wen, 2013; Wei & Li, 2011; Guo & Luo, 2009; Li 
& Shen, 2008; Yao, Feng, & Wei, 2006; Sun, 2002); Vietnam (Nguyen & Ho, 2013; Nguyen, Zhang, & 
Tran, 2012; Hoang et al., 2010; Srinivasan et al., 2010); eight Islamic countries (Razmi & Behname, 
2012); Indonesia and the Philippines (Moudatsou & Kyrkilis, 2011; Srinivasan et al., 2010); Thailand 
(Moudatsou & Kyrkilis, 2011; Srinivasan et al., 2010; Thanyakhan, 2008); and Brunei, Laos, and 
Myanmar (Srinivasan et al., 2010) . 
 
12 The term countries, used interchangeably with economies, does not imply political independence but refers 
to territories for which authorities report separate social or economic statistics. 
13 The classification of the economies is based on the WB (2016a) 
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However, not many studies investigate the bi-directional relationship between FDI and EG. In the last 
10 years, Kinuthia and Murshed (2015), Omri and Kahouli (2014), Moudatsou and Kyrkilis (2011), 
Andraz and Rodrigues (2010) and Srinivasan et al. (2010) have found a two-way causal link between 
FDI and EG (see Table 3.1). Except for Andraz and Rodrigues (2010) and Srinivasan et al. (2010), most 
researchers did not study the long-term relationship. 
In terms of the bi-directional linkage, Kinuthia and Murshed (2015) studied the relationship between 
FDI and EG in two developing countries, Malaysia and Kenya, by estimating a Vector Error Correction 
Model (VECM). Their empirical analysis, based on time series data from 1960 to 2009, indicates that 
a two-way causal link exists only in Malaysia by testing for the short-run Granger causality between 
FDI and Gross National Income (GNI). A two-way nexus between FDI and EG was also found by Omri 
and Kahouli (2014) in a study of 13 MENA countries (see above). The authors use the Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) to test simultaneous-equation models based on a growth model 
framework and a panel data between 1990 and 2010.  
The bi-directional relationship between FDI and EG was examined by Moudatsou and Kyrkilis (2011) 
in two economic associations, the EU and ASEAN, from 1970 to 2003. The authors applied a four-
stage procedure of the Unit Root, Johansen’s approach, the Johansen (1988) cointegration test and 
the ECM technique. Their results revealed a two-way causality between GDP per capita and FDI in 
Indonesia and Thailand. The other two ASEAN countries (Singapore and the Philippines) and the 16 
EU countries (see above) experienced a one-way causality of GDP-to-FDI. 
In terms of the long-term relationship between FDI and EG, Andraz and Rodrigues (2010) show a bi-
directional causal relationship between FDI and EG in the short run and concluded that FDI was a 
major factor in boosting growth via exports in the short and long term in Portugal. The authors used 
a three-stage procedure including the Dickey-Fuller unit root test, the Johansen-Juselius 
cointegration test, and the Granger causality test applied to annual data from 1977 to 2004.  
Srinivasan et al. (2010) studied ASEAN nations. The authors used the Johansen cointegration test to 
establish a long-run nexus between FDI and GDP for Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and 
Vietnam. They then employed the VECM, which revealed a long-run GDP-to-FDI causality in 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore; and a long-run two-way nexus between GDP and FDI in 
Malaysia and Vietnam. The standard Granger Causality test showed no link between the two 
variables in Brunei and Laos, but a one-way relationship of GDP-to-FDI and FDI-to-GDP in the short 
run in Myanmar and Thailand, respectively. 
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Table 3.1 A Summary of Selected Empirical Studies on the Relationship between FDI and EG 
Author(s) Countries Time Method(s) 
Do FDI and GDP have any 
relationship? 
Is a long-term relationship 
studied? Results? 
Yes No Yes No 
Kinuthia and Murshed (2015) Kenya and Malaysia 1960-2009 VECM 
FDI⇄GNI: Malaysia 
GNI→FDI: Kenya 
  No 
Labes (2015) 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa) 
1992-2012 
OLS pooled regression with random 
effects method 
GDP per capita→FDI   No 
Omri and Kahouli (2014) 
13 MENA countries (Algeria, 
Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Tunisia, and UAE) 
1990-2010 
A ‘growth model’ framework & 
simultaneous-equation models 
estimated by GMM 
FDI⇄ GDP growth   No 
Razmi and Behname (2012) 8 Islamic countries 1985-2009 OLS with random effects model Growth→FDI   No 
Moudatsou and Kyrkilis (2011) EU & ASEAN 1970-2003 
A four-stage procedure based on the 
Unit Root, Johansen’s approach, the 
Johansen (1988) Co-integration Test, 
and the  Error Correction Mechanism 
technique 
Growth → FDI: EU 
 
ASEAN: 
FDI⇄ GDP per capita: 
Indonesia &Thailand 
 
Growth → FDI: 
Singapore & the 
Philippines 
  No 
Andraz and Rodrigues (2010) Portugal 1977-2004 
A three-stage procedure based on Unit 
Root, Cointegration and Causality 
FDI⇄ EG  Yes; long-term  
Srinivasan et al. (2010) ASEAN 1970-2007 
Johansen Cointegration technique 
followed by the 
VECM and standard Granger Causality 
























Thanyakhan (2008) Thailand 1980-2004 Extended Gravity Model GDP→FDI   No 
Kornecki and Rhoades (2007) 
CEE: Hungary, Czech Republic, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia 
1990-2001 Correlation Coefficient FDI→GDP   No 
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Other researchers mostly studied the one-way linkage between EG and FDI. Labes (2015) finds that 
GDP per capita had a significant positive relationship with FDI (the EG-to-FDI nexus) in BRICS 
economies based on panel data between 1992 and 2012. The author employed an OLS pooled 
regression with a random effect method and checked the robustness with the Hausman Test. 
Employing the same method for a balanced panel data, Razmi and Behname (2012) find that eight 
Islamic countries’ FDI was significantly impacted by EG from 1985 to 2009. In Thailand, GDP growth 
exhibited a positive effect on attracting FDI (Thanyakhan, 2008) based on the extended Gravity 
Model of a panel data between 1980 and 2004. In terms of the FDI-to-EG nexus, countries from the 
CEE experienced a one-way relationship from 1990 to 2005 (Kornecki and Rhoades, 2007). According 
to these authors, foreign capital plays a vital role in producing more goods and services and increases 
the average capital to labour ratio in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
In summary, most previous researchers did not investigate the bi-directional relationship between 
FDI and EG for a long period. This study investigates the long-term bi-directional relationship 
between FDI and EG in Vietnam. 
3.3 Determinants of FDI 
FDI determinants have been studied broadly by many researchers (see Table 3.2). The studies show 
that, besides EG, many other factors have been considered as key drivers that can boost or impede 
the flow of FDI. Though some factors played a positive role in the FDI flow (Kinuthia & Murshed, 
2015; Labes, 2015; Castiglione et al., 2012), other factors had an adverse effect (Kinuthia & Murshed, 
2015; Kumari, 2014; Pradhan, 2012; Razmi & Behname, 2012; Haq, 2001). 
Some relatively recent studies identified GDP per capital, market size, trade openness, exchange 
rate, stable inflation, infrastructure development, domestic investment, technology, geographical 
position, governance, and democracy as positive determinants in attracting FDI. For example, GDP 
per capita, trade openness and exchange rate exhibit a significant positive relationship with FDI in 
the BRICS economies from 1992 to 2012 (Labes, 2015). According to Kinuthia and Murshed (2015), 
stable inflation and trade openness positively impact the attraction of FDI to both Kenya and 
Malaysia from 1960 to 2009. FDI in Kenya was well supported by the development of infrastructure 
and democracy, whereas an increase in FDI in Malaysia is because of the exchange rate and 
governance. Castiglione et al. (2012), based on data for 79 Russian regions from 1996 to 2001, show 
market size (gross regional product per capita, population size), coastal position, infrastructure 
improvements, and domestic investments are positive determinants of FDI. Pradhan (2012) identifies 
power availability indicating partly that the development of infrastructure and domestic investment 
as being two key determinants of FDI in 16 Indian states between 2001 and 2010. Technological 
factors were also identified as important determinants in attracting FDI to the US (Haq, 2001). 
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According to Haq (2001), expenditure on research and development (R&D) and patents, which 
demonstrate the capabilities of host countries’ technology, exhibit a strong positive relationship with 
FDI in the US between 1997 and 1998.  
On the other hand, negative determinants of FDI were found by Kinuthia and Murshed (2015), 
Kumari (2014), Pradhan (2012), Razmi and Behname (2012), and Haq (2001). Though Haq (2001) 
shows that exchange rate variation and cultural distance between home and host-country had a 
significant negative impact on FDI in the US’s manufacturing industries, Kumari (2014) identifies a 
higher level of unemployment, the existence of poverty, excessive population, a higher level of risk, 
and corruption in the host countries as other negative determinants of FDI. Kinuthia and Murshed 
(2015) reveal that wages and financial development levels significantly negatively affect FDI in both 
Kenya and Malaysia from 1960 to 2009. The volatility of profit is another factor impacting negatively 
on FDI for 16 Indian states between 2001 and 2010 (Pradhan, 2012). Razmi and Behname (2012) find 
that inflation rate, oil extraction and openness had a negative effect on attracting FDI in to eight 
Islamic countries from 1985 to 2009.  
Some researchers have conducted studies related to the determinants of investors’ decisions about 
where to locate capital. Important factors identified include improved democracy (Hasan & 
Mahvash, 2015), higher education levels and lower delinquency rates (Escobar, 2013), and political 
stability and security (Castiglione et al., 2012). 
Based on panel data of five countries (Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Turkey) 
from 1990 to 2012, Hasan and Mahvash (2015) find improved democracy positively affects investors’ 
decisions about where to locate capital. The study employed a four step method of the panel unit 
root tests, the Panel cointegration (the Pedroni test), the Hausman Test, and the Generalised Least 
Square (GLS) technique. The authors’ result shows that low corruption, inflation, high openness, 
literacy rate and infrastructure significantly support FDI in those nations.  
Escobar (2013) investigated the location pattern of FDI in Mexico from 1994 to 2004 using data at a 
state-level and employed spatial econometric techniques. The author’s results indicate that higher 
education levels and lower delinquency rates are important determinants of where foreign investors 
allocate their capital in Mexico’s states.  
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Table 3.2  A Summary of Selected Empirical Studies on FDI Determinants for Various Countries 
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Castiglione et al. (2012) conducted a study investigating the determinants of FDI inflows in 79 
Russian regions from 1996 to 2001. Based on cross-sectional and panel data, their results reveal that 
political stability and security played an important role in attracting FDI in Russia. The authors reveal 
that foreign investors consider Russia an ideal nation in which to allocate their capital in terms of 
stability and institutional factors. 
However, the effects of FDI determinants do not remain unchanged over long periods (Zhao & Xiang, 
2012; Huang & Chai, 2006; Sun, 2002). Five major factors, government policy, industrial structure, 
economic openness, human capital and the level of marketization, are believed to be important in 
influencing the location of FDI in China, but the effects of these factors exhibit structural changes in 
terms of different stages of economic development (Zhao & Xiang, 2012; Huang & Chai, 2006; Sun, 
2002). The results of previous studies related to the FDI development in China also suggest that the 
role of tax incentives has been weakened gradually while some other factors, such as financial 
support, trade costs, and improved infrastructure, play more important roles in attracting FDI (Li & 
Shen, 2008; Huang & Chai, 2006). Based on Table 3.2, there are still debatable conclusions on the 
effects of some FDI determinants such as trade openness, exchange rate, and inflation. Though 
Razmi and Behname (2012) find that trade openness exhibits a negative impact on FDI, Hasan and 
Mahvash (2015), Kinuthia and Murshed (2015) and Labes (2015), show positive impacts of trade 
openness on FDI. Similarly, the exchange rate impacts FDI both positively (Kinuthia & Murshed, 2015; 
Labes, 2015) and negatively (Kinuthia & Murshed, 2015; Haq, 2001). Hasan and Mahvash (2015) and 
Razmi and Behname (2012) show that the inflation rate and FDI have a negative relationship, but it is 
positive in Kinuthia and Murshed’s (2015) study. 
3.4 Empirical Studies of Inward FDI in Vietnam 
FDI is a popular topic in empirical studies in most countries including Vietnam. In general, empirical 
studies of inward FDI in Vietnam have focused on five main groups of topic: (i) the relationship 
between FDI and EG (Nguyen & Ho, 2013; Nguyen, Zhang, et al., 2012; Hoang et al., 2010; Srinivasan 
et al., 2010); (ii) FDI provincial competition (Nguyen & Ho, 2013; Nguyen, Ho, et al., 2012; Malesky, 
2010; Nguyen & Nguyen, 2007); (iii) the effects of policies on FDI (Hoang & Goujon, 2014; Vu et al., 
2009); the effects of laws on FDI (Nguyen & Ho, 2013; Nguyen, Zhang, et al., 2012; Pham, 2011); and 
(v) FDI location and industry selection (Hoang & Goujon, 2014; Vu et al., 2009; Nguyen & Nguyen, 
2007). No research explores these five topics in a single study (see Table 3.3).  
Table 3.3 shows that, at most, three of the five topics were investigated in one study. Both Nguyen 
and Ho (2013) and Nguyen, Ho, et al. (2012) study three topics, the FDI-EG relationship, FDI 
provincial competition, and the effects of laws on FDI in Vietnam. However, Nguyen, Ho, et al.’s 
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(2012) findings are based on panel data of only 14 provinces and cities in one region, the North 
Central and South Central Coast (NCSCC) areas, the other study uses a panel data of all 64 provinces 
and cities and six regions of the country. Other researchers focus on one or two of the five topics 
related to inward FDI in Vietnam (see Table 3.3).  
According to Nguyen and Ho (2013), the relationship between FDI and EG in Vietnam is not the same 
in all provinces and regions. Their empirical results support a positive two-way nexus between FDI 
and GDP per capita growth in 64 provinces and cities, but that relationship appeared in only five of 
six Vietnam regions between 2001 and 2010. The regions with more difficulties in terms of socio-
economic conditions experienced a tighter interaction between the two variables. Nguyen and Ho 
(2013) also find competition among Vietnam areas in attracting FDI. Further, both introducing new 
laws and Vietnam becoming a WTO member had a positive impact on FDI, but the effect of the laws 
was greater than that of WTO membership. 
Table 3.3 A Summary of Selected Empirical Studies on FDI in Vietnam 
Author(s) Research Topics Scale Time Method 
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In the NCSCC areas of Vietnam between 2001 and 2010, the positive bi-directional linkage between 
FDI and EG was strong, especially in the extremely difficult socio-economic provinces (Nguyen, Ho, et 
al., 2012). It is believed that the higher total registered capital of licensed inward FDI projects is not 
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the result of better governance but better information and infrastructure. Both Nguyen, Ho, et al. 
(2012) and Nguyen and Ho (2013) find that FDI was positively impacted by the new laws and WTO 
membership in the whole country and the NCSCC, respectively. 
Both Srinivasan et al. (2010) and Hoang et al. (2010) investigate one topic in FDI-EG linkages in their 
studies; Pham (2011) studied the WTO membership effects and Malesky (2010) focused on FDI 
provincial competition. Srinivasan et al. (2010) believe that a long-run two-way nexus between GDP 
and FDI exists in five countries, including Vietnam; and Hoang et al. (2010) find a strong, positive 
effect of FDI on EG in 61 Vietnamese provinces between 1995 and 2006. Pham (2011) shows that 
accessing WTO in 2007 had a significant positive effect on both imports and inward FDI in Vietnam 
between 1990 and 2008; and Malesky’s (2010) study shows that better governance results in higher 
FDI implementation rates and encourages foreign investors to add more capital to current businesses 
in 64 provinces of Vietnam in 2006.  
The effects of policies on FDI and the selection of FDI location and industry are two topics studied by 
Hoang and Goujon (2014) and Vu et al. (2009); Nguyen and Nguyen’s (2007) study investigated FDI 
provincial competition and the selection of location and industry. FDI provincial competition and the 
selection of location and industry were studied by Nguyen and Nguyen (2007). Their empirical 
analysis shows that the FDI spatial distribution across Vietnam’s provinces was determined by 
market, labour and infrastructure, but government policy was measured by the PCI. In addition, it is 
believed that foreign investors from different nations behave differently in making decisions about 
locating their capital. Hoang and Goujon (2014) employ spatial econometric models to investigate 
FDI distribution among Vietnam provinces after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The authors show that 
both national and provincial economic policies play a significant important role in attracting FDI. It 
was also revealed that provinces that adopted extra-legal incentives actually reduced the amount of 
FDI per capita they receive in the year after adopting the incentives (Vu, 2007). However, this 
conclusion was based on only a small survey of foreign firms. According to Vu et al. (2009), Vietnam 
made great efforts to regulate sub-national incentives. Hence, the issue of whether investment 





3.5 Research Direction, Questions and Hypotheses 
3.5.1 Research Direction 
According to results of previous studies on FDI, there are some outstanding issues about FDI that 
have not been addressed. First, in terms of the relationship between FDI and EG, many studies focus 
on the two-way nexus between FDI and EG; most researchers did not study their long-term 
relationship. Secondly, the conclusions about some FDI determinants (trade openness, exchange rate 
and inflation) are inconsistent. Thirdly, studies identifying FDI determinants in terms of the investors’ 
views in selecting investment locations are relatively new because of the limited number of studies. 
Hence, some new factors such as improved democracy (Hasan & Mahvash, 2015), higher education 
levels and lower delinquency rates (Escobar, 2013), and political stability and security (Castiglione et 
al., 2012) should be explored further. Fourthly, research topics on FDI in Vietnam are not unified. 
Generally, empirical studies on FDI determinants in Vietnam focus on the five different research 
topics: the relationship between FDI and EG; the FDI provincial competition; the policy effects on FDI; 
the law effects on FDI; and the FDI location selection. However, the topics were investigated 
separately. This study explores the five topics in a single study to provide cohesive conclusions about 
FDI in Vietnam. Lastly, there are differences in research areas and duration on the same topic. 
Though some empirical studies are based at the national level (e.g., Vietnam), others investigated at 
the regional or provincial level, which can generate inconsistent results. In addition, data collected 
during different time periods can produce different findings. Therefore, to fill the knowledge gaps in 
the literature, we investigate inward FDI in Vietnam using a data set at national, regional and 
provincial levels to: 
(i) examine the bi-directional relationship between FDI and EG; and 
(ii) analyse FDI determinants and identify determinants affecting the FDI location selection in 
terms of the investors’ views. 
3.5.2 Hypotheses Development 
To fill the knowledge gaps about inward FDI in Vietnam, this study focuses on five research topics: 
(1) The relationship between FDI and EG 
(2) The provincial competition for FDI 
(3) The effects of policies on FDI 
(4) The effects of laws on FDI 
(5) The FDI location selection 
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3.5.2.1 Relationship between FDI and EG 
The relationship between FDI and EG has been documented by many scholars around the world. 
Many different approaches have been employed to assess the topic and studies have been 
conducted not only within individual nations, but also regionally among countries (Nguyen & Ho, 
2013). Existing evidence shows that many conclusions are consistent but contradictions exist. 
Based on the literature, the FDI and EG relationship can be divided to two types: a “one-way nexus” 
(including “FDI-to-EG” and “EG-to-FDI”) and a “two-way nexus”. The one-way nexus FDI-to-EG 
relationship is supported by Kinuthia and Murshed (2015) in their study of Malaysia; Hoang et al. 
(2010) for Vietnam; Srinivasan et al. (2010) for Myanmar; and Kornecki and Rhoades (2007) for 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The EG-to-FDI relationship was studied 
by Kinuthia and Murshed (2015) for Kenya and Malaysia; Labes (2015) for the BRICS countries; Razmi 
and Behname (2012) for eight Islamic countries; Moudatsou and Kyrkilis (2011) for the EU, Singapore 
and the Philippines; Srinivasan et al. (2010) for Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand; 
and Thanyakhan (2008) for Thailand. However, Srinivasan et al. (2010) find no relationship between 
FDI and EG for Brunei Darussalam and the Laos People’s Democratic Republic. 
For the two-way nexus between FDI and EG, scholars have found a bi-directional relationship 
between FDI and EG for the 13 MENA countries (Omri & Kahouli, 2014), Vietnam (Nguyen & Ho, 
2013; Nguyen, Ho, et al., 2012), Indonesia and Thailand (Moudatsou & Kyrkilis, 2011), Portugal 
(Andraz & Rodrigues, 2010), and Malaysia and Vietnam (Srinivasan et al., 2010). However, except for 
Andraz and Rodrigues (2010) and Srinivasan et al. (2010), they did not study the long-term 
relationship between FDI and EG. In addition, except for Nguyen and Ho (2013) and Nguyen, Ho, et 
al. (2012), who focussed on the two-way nexus between FDI and EG at provincial and regional levels, 
most studies were conducted at the national level. 
Considering that China and Vietnam have a similar political and economic system, existing China-
related studies can provide some useful information for understanding the potential relationship 
between FDI and EG and the effects of provincial (or regional) competition on the location of FDI in 
Vietnam. According to the results for China, at FDI’s introduction, it has a positive impact on EG 
because it is believed that FDI is embedded with advanced technologies and knowledge, which shifts 
the host country’s production frontier (Wen, 2013; Guo & Luo, 2009; Yao et al., 2006). However, 
along with the domestic economy’s rapid development, it has been shown that FDI gradually played 
a less important role in promoting China’s EG (Wei & Li, 2011). To the contrary, a positive effect of 
the high EG rate on FDI was commonly identified in China over the past three decades (Wei & Li, 
2011; Li & Shen, 2008; Sun, 2002). Some evidence suggests that the spatial spill-over effect of FDI on 
EG is different among China’s regions (Wen, 2013). This FDI spatial spill-over effect on EG is 
37 
 
significantly present in the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) and Pearl River Delta (PRD); the effect is 
positive in PRD-based provinces but negative in YRD-based provinces. 
Hence, the relationship between FDI and EG is debatable for all 6314 provinces and cities, in six 
regions and the whole of Vietnam. This gives rise to questions whether the link is strong, to what 
extent GDP affects FDI and how much FDI explains EG.  
Therefore, the following relationships are hypothesized:  
(H1.1)  There is a strong long-term bi-directional link between FDI and EG in Vietnam;  
(H1.2)  FDI significantly, positively affects EG at the provincial, regional, and national levels in 
Vietnam; and  
(H1.3)  EG significantly, positively affects FDI attraction at the provincial, regional and national levels 
in Vietnam. 
3.5.2.2 FDI Provincial Competition and the Effects of Policies 
3.5.2.2.1 FDI Provincial Competition 
The determinants of FDI that have pushed foreign investors to invest in a single country or location is 
an important question that has been studied by many researchers (see Table 3.2). These 
determinants have been considered FDI-attractive factors that make some regions more favourable 
than others in competing for limited funds from overseas. To identify the FDI-attractiveness or FDI-
competitive determinants, some studies conducted empirical analyses at the national level (Hasan & 
Mahvash, 2015; Kinuthia & Murshed, 2015; Labes, 2015; Razmi & Behname, 2012; Thanyakhan, 
2008; Haq, 2001) and others at sub-national levels (Escobar, 2013; Castiglione et al., 2012; Pradhan, 
2012; Wei & Li, 2011; Li & Shen, 2008; Sun, 2002). In Vietnam, FDI competition at sub-national levels 
has been studied by different authors. Nguyen and Ho (2013), Nguyen, Ho, et al. (2012), Malesky 
(2010) and Nguyen and Nguyen (2007) use the PCI as a tool to evaluate and compare provinces’ 
competitiveness for FDI flows and the relationship between economic governance (the main focus of 
the PCI) and FDI attraction (Malesky, 2010). 
According to Malesky (2010, p. 2), FIEs “have strong interests in at least nine of the ten PCI sub-
indices: 1) lower entry costs; 2) access to land; 3) transparency and equity of business information; 4) 
low informal charges; 5) less time wasted on bureaucratic compliance; 6) lack of bias toward the 
state sector; 7) a proactive and creative leadership; 8) well-trained labour;” 9) fair legal protection; 
and 10) PSD policies. The PSD sub-index is not only “specifically about intervention geared at private 
entrepreneurs, but also includes some indicators which affect FDI prospects as well, such as the 
 
14 From 2004 to 2007, the number of administrative units in Vietnam was 64 provinces and cities (Assembly, 
2008b). In 2008, Ha Tay province merged with Ha Noi city, which reduced the number to 63 (GSO, 2016m). 
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number of locally-sponsored trade fairs and business match-making” (Malesky, 2010, p. 2). Hence, 
these sub-indices are expected to be associated with FDI. 
However, different researchers have found different results on the relationship between the PCI and 
FDI attraction. Malesky (2010) finds a strong, positive correlation between the PCI and FDI flows in 
Vietnamese provinces and cities; Nguyen, Ho, et al. (2012) conclude that provinces or cities with 
better governance are not strongly associated with higher total registered capital of licensed inward 
FDI projects in the NC and SCC areas of Vietnam. Nguyen and Ho (2013) show there is sub-national 
competition in the 6415 provinces to attract FDI, whereas Nguyen and Nguyen (2007) conclude that it 
did not seem to be a significant factor when considering some provinces and Vietnam’s partner 
countries.  
Therefore, the issue “How does PCI actually help all Vietnam’s provinces attract more or less FDI” is 
valid. Based on the 10 PCI sub-indices, it is hypothesized that: 
(H2.1)  Provinces with better governance are strongly associated with registered FDI. 
3.5.2.2.2 The Effects of Policies on FDI 
As discussed at the beginning of the thesis, government IIP or institutional conditions have been used 
as subsidies that can affect FDI flows. Foreign investors make strategic decisions on where and how 
to set up their operations based on the institutional conditions (grants, tax preferences or holidays, 
free land or other inputs, and regulatory policy concessions) that vary not only among countries, but 
also within countries (Thomas, 2009).  
Some Chinese studies investigated the effects of policies on attracting FDI among the country’s 
provinces. At the provincial level, Sun (2002) finds that regional tax competition exists and taxation is 
an important factor affecting the spatial distribution of FDI but its role has weakened over time. The 
study by Li and Shen (2008) suggests that provincial competition strategies expanded from the pure 
tax price to government expenditure in China because of different levels of economic development. 
Wei and Li’s (2011) results show that a better EG performance rather than tax incentives is likely to 
be more significant in attracting FDI to central and eastern China than to the relatively 
underdeveloped western region. According to Zhu, Zhang, and Jiang (2011), in neighbouring 
municipalities, environmental policy can be taken into consideration in competing for FDI and is 
compared with regions with a high level of FDI. The study shows that the effect of the “race to the 
bottom” of environmental policy may be higher in the regions with lower level of FDI.  
 
15 Nguyen and Ho’s (2013) study is based on unbalanced data of 64 provinces and cities from 2000 to 2010 
(Vietnam had 64 provinces and cities between 2004 and 2007). 
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In Vietnam, to increase their competitive ability to attract FDI, many provinces issued extra legal 
documents or IIPs granting extra incentives to investment projects, which can be named “IIP-based” 
competition. The three fence-breaking areas in which provinces make offers are budget regulations, 
land incentives, and income tax regulations (Vu et al., 2007). 
However, studies about the effects of policies on FDI in Vietnam are limited and the results from the 
empirical studies are inconsistent. Provincial economic policies were identified as important factors 
in attracting FDI (Hoang & Goujon, 2014) and Vietnam made great efforts to regulate sub-national 
incentives to attract more FDI (Vu et al., 2009). However, based on a small survey of foreign firms, Vu 
(2007) reveals that provinces that adopted extra-legal incentives reduced the amount of FDI per 
capita they received in the year after the adoption of those incentives. Hence, the issue of whether 
IIP actually reduces or raises the amount of FDI is debatable.  
The following relationship is hypothesized:  
(H2.2)  Provinces with higher fiscal incentives attract less FDI. 
3.5.2.3 The Effects of Laws on FDI 
The effect of laws and agreements on FDI is another critical issue. Historically, after the 1986 
economic reforms, some important law and regulation milestones related to FDI in Vietnam were 
developed, e.g., the first FDI law in 1987, the BTA in 2000, the Unified Enterprise Law in 2005, the 
Common Investment Law in 2005, the WTO commitments in 2007, and the new Investment Law in 
2014. Among them, the 2005 laws and the WTO membership in 2007 were considered the first 
outstanding national commitments to treat private and foreign investors alike in Vietnam.  
A significant positive impact on inward FDI was found after Vietnam accessed the WTO (Nguyen, 
Zhang, et al., 2012; Pham, 2011). Further, the rule of law (the 2005 laws) positively contributed to 
attracting FDI to 14 provinces and cities of Vietnam (Nguyen, Zhang, et al., 2012). According to 
Nguyen, Zhang, et al. (2012, p. 214), the law factor exhibited “a more positive and stronger impact 
on FDI attraction of Vietnam than the WTO accession.”  
Although the positive effect of laws on FDI is consistent with most studies, the different studies were 
conducted in different research areas. For example, Pham (2011) studied the WTO’s effects at the 
national level (Vietnam and 17 partner countries), whereas Nguyen, Zhang, et al. (2012) used data 
from 14 provinces and cities in the NCSCC areas of Vietnam to investigate the effect of laws on FDI. 
To evaluate the impact of laws on FDI, the authors divided the data into two groups: before and after 
Vietnam joined the WTO. In the first data group (before joining the WTO), the study period was 18 
years (1990-2007) in Pham’s (2011) study and 7 years (2001-2007) in Nguyen, Zhang, et al.’s (2012) 
study. In the second data group (after joining the WTO), the study time is limited (1 year, 2008, for 
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Pham’s (2011) study and 3 years, 2008 to 2010, for Nguyen, Zhang, et al.’s (2012) study). There is a 
similar time problem in Nguyen and Ho’s (2013) study even though they included all Vietnam’s 64 
provinces and cities.  
International trade agreements include not only becoming members of WTO but also FTAs. To date, 
no empirical study has focused on the effect of Vietnam’s FTA membership on FDI attraction to 
Vietnam. As a result, it is important to test and compare the effects of the laws on FDI in Vietnam 
with an extended study time (2000 – 2015) at the provincial level. The following relationships are 
hypothesized:  
(H3.1)  There is a significant growth of FDI in Vietnam, especially in the first ranked provinces16, 
following the release of the new law of investment and enterprise in 2005; and  
(H3.2)  There is a significant growth of FDI in Vietnam, especially in the first ranked provinces, 
following Vietnam’s WTO and FTA membership. 
3.5.2.4 FDI Location Selection  
Identifying the determinants in selecting investment locations from the investors’ viewpoint is 
necessary for home countries to attract more FDI by improving their investment environment. 
However, the number of studies related to investors’ decisions about where to locate capital is 
limited. In addition, different researchers identify different factors that have significant effects on 
choosing investment locations. Some identified factors are improved democracy (Hasan & Mahvash, 
2015), higher education levels and lower delinquency rates (Escobar, 2013), and political stability and 
security (Castiglione et al., 2012). 
Investors’ subjective decisions in choosing the investment’s location are important to the EG and 
development of host countries. However, few researchers (Hoang & Goujon, 2014; Vu et al., 2009; 
Nguyen & Nguyen, 2007) have focused on this topic for Vietnam and their results are inconsistent.  
Hoang and Goujon (2014, p. 103) find “a dominance of the regional trade platform FDI and regional 
agglomeration effects”. Vu et al. (2009) investigated the determinants in selecting investment 
locations based on mining and quarrying industry data. The results do not show any factors 
impacting FDI projects’ location in all industries at the provincial level in Vietnam. Using spatial 
econometric models to investigate the determinants of the FDI distribution at the Vietnam provincial 
level, Nguyen and Nguyen (2007) find the concentration of foreign investors in certain locations is 
because of the market, labour availability, infrastructure and the investors’ nationalities. 
 
16 The first ranked provinces have extremely difficult socio-economic conditions and are listed as areas eligible 
for investment incentives (regulated by Appendix II promulgated together with the Government's Decree No. 




The following relationship is hypothesized: 
(H4.1)  The geographical concentration of FDI exists in certain locations affected by the determinants 
of the FDI-inflow distribution in Vietnam. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The literature review related to inward FDI shows gaps in the Vietnam context. These gaps include: 
(i) a lack of studies investigating the long-term two-way relationship between FDI and EG; (ii) 
inconsistent conclusions on FDI determinants (trade openness, exchange rate, and inflation); (iii) a 
limited number of studies exploring the determinants of investors’ decisions about where to locate 
their capital; (iv) in Vietnam, the five different research topics (the relationship between FDI and EG, 
FDI provincial competition, the effects of policies on FDI, the effects of laws on FDI, and the FDI 
location selection) have not been investigated in a single study; and (v) differences in research areas 
and duration on those same topics have generated inconsistent findings for Vietnam. 
To fill the gaps, the research directions that need to be addressed using a dataset at the national, 
regional, and provincial levels are: (i) examine the bi-directional relationship between FDI and EG in 
Vietnam; and (ii) analyse the FDI determinants as well as identifying the determinants affecting the 
FDI location selection from the investors’ viewpoint. This study focuses on five research topics: the 
relationship between FDI and EG, FDI provincial competition, the effects of policies on FDI, the 





Data and Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the data and methodologies employed in the study. Section 4.2 details the 
choice of study period and research area. Section 4.3 describes the selection and construction of the 
dependent and independent variables. The data are presented in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 discusses 
the research methodologies including the cointegration, OLS and ECM approaches and the OLS 
estimators. Section 4.6 illustrates the empirical models employed to investigate the relationship 
between FDI and EG, FDI provincial competition, the effects of policies on FDI, the effects of laws on 
FDI, and the FDI location selection. Section 4.7 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 Study Period and Area 
4.2.1 Study Period 
The study period is from 2000 to 2015. There are three reasons for choosing this period. First, most 
inward FDI flows into Vietnam were over that 16-year period (see Figure 4.1). Figure 4.1 shows the 
percentage of FDI projects during 1988-1999 (14.8%) and 2000-2015 (86.2%). Secondly, 75.85% of 
the total FDI registered capital and 86.83% of the total FDI implemented capital occurred during 
2000-2015. Thirdly, data from before 2000 at the provincial level were not well developed and 
updated compared with the data at the national level. 
 
Source: Data collected and computed from GSO (2016h) and GSO (2015b) 




















4.2.2 Research Area 
Vietnam comprises six regions from the North to South (GSO, 2016m). The north part comprises the 
Northern Midlands and Mountain Areas (NMMA) and the Red River Delta (RRD). The middle of the 
country includes the North Central and Central Coastal Areas (NCCCA), and the Central Highlands 
(CH). The two remaining areas in south Vietnam are the South East (SE) and the Mekong River Delta 
(MRD). 
According to GSO (2016m), as at 31 December, 2015, there were 63 administrative units (five cities 
and 58 provinces) in Vietnam. Appendix Table B.1 lists Vietnam’s administrative units at the 
provincial level by region. The NMMA (Region 1) is made up of 14 provinces, namely, Lai Chau, Dien 
Bien, Son La, Hoa Binh, Cao Bang, Lang Son, Bac Giang, Thai Nguyen, Bac Kan, Ha Giang, Tuyen 
Quang, Phu Tho, Lao Cai and Yen Bai. The RRD (Region 2) includes two cities (Ha Noi and Hai Phong) 
and nine provinces (Hai Duong, Hung Yen, Ninh Binh, Thai Binh, Ha Nam, Nam Dinh, Bac Ninh, Vinh 
Phuc and Quang Ninh). Region 3, NCCCA, includes one city (Da Nang) and 13 provinces (Thanh Hoa, 
Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Quang Binh, Quang Tri, Thua Thien Hue, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Phu 
Yen, Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan and Binh Thuan). Region 4, CH, has five provinces, Kon Tum, Gia Lai, Dak 
Lak, Dak Nong and Lam Dong. In the south, Region 5, SE, has one city (Ho Chi Minh city) and five 
provinces (Tay Ninh, Binh Phuoc, Binh Duong, Dong Nai and Ba Ria – Vung Tau). Region 6, MRD, has 
one city (Can Tho) and 12 provinces (Long An, Tien Giang, Ben Tre, Tra Vinh, Vinh Long, Dong Thap, 
An Giang, Kien Giang, Hau Giang, Soc Trang, Bac Lieu and Ca Mau). 
However, the number of administrative units has changed over time. The number rose from 38 in 
1976 to 44 in 1989, increased to 53 in 1991 and to 61 units in 1997 (VOER, 2017). In 2004, Can Tho 
city and Hau Giang province were established from Can Tho province, the old Lai Chau province was 
divided into new Lai Chau and Dien Bien, and old Dak Lak province was divided into new Dak Lak and 
Dak Nong (Assembly, 2008b). Therefore, the number of units increased to 64 in 2004. From 2008 
onwards, because Ha Tay province merged with Ha Noi city, the total reduced to 63 units. As a result, 
data recorded at the provincial level also changed, resulting in no available data either for the new 
administrative units (Hau Giang, Dien Bien and Dak Nong) before establishment in 2004 or for the old 
administrative unit, Ha Tay, after it merged with Ha Noi city in 2008. 
The study uses panel data at the provincial level from 2000 to 2015. However, as explained above, 
the number of provinces and cities increased from 61 units (2000-2003) to 64 units (2004-2008), but 
decreased then to 63 units (2008-2015). Therefore, if all 64 administrative units were included in the 
panel data, there will be missing data points. To minimise the number of missing data points at the 
provincial level, the data of 64 units are combined into the 60 cross-units listed in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 The Vietnam Administrative Cross-Units Included in the Panel Data at the Provincial 
Level 
No. Cross-units No. Cross-units No. Cross-units 
I Region 1. NMMA 21 Thai Binh 41 Dak Lak3 
1 Ha Giang 22 Ha Nam 42 Lam Dong 
2 Cao Bang 23 Nam Dinh V Region 5. SE 
3 Bac Kan 24 Ninh Binh 43 Binh Phuoc  
4 Tuyen Quang III Region 3. NCCCA 44 Tay Ninh 
5 Lao Cai 25 Thanh Hoa 45 Binh Duong 
6 Yen Bai 26 Nghe An 46 Dong Nai 
7 Thai Nguyen 27 Ha Tinh 47 Ba Ria - Vung Tau 
8 Lang Son 28 Quang Binh 48 Ho Chi Minh city 
9 Bac Giang 29 Quang Tri VI Region 6. MRD 
10 Phu Tho 30 Thua Thien Hue 49 Long An 
11 Lai Chau1 31 Da Nang city 50 Tien Giang 
12 Son La 32 Quang Nam 51 Ben Tre 
13 Hoa Binh 33 Quang Ngai 52 Tra Vinh 
II Region 2. RRD 34 Binh Dinh 53 Vinh Long 
14 Ha Noi city2 35 Phu Yen 54 Dong Thap 
15 Vinh Phuc 36 Khanh Hoa 55 An Giang 
16 Bac Ninh 37 Ninh Thuan 56 Kien Giang 
17 Quang Ninh 38 Binh Thuan 57 Can Tho city4 
18 Hai Duong IV Region 4. CH 58 Soc Trang 
19 Hai Phong city 39 Kon Tum 59 Bac Lieu 
20 Hung Yen 40 Gia Lai 60 Ca Mau 
Note: 1 Lai Chau province data include Dien Bien province’s data 
 2 Ha Noi city data include Ha Tay province’s data 
3 Dak Lak province data include Dak Nong province’s data 
4 Can Tho city data include Hau Giang province’s data 
Source: Information adapted from GSO (2016m) 
4.3 Variable Selection and Construction 
4.3.1 Dependent Variables 
To investigate the research questions, two dependent variables (EG and FDI attraction) are employed 
in multivariate regression models.  
4.3.1.1 Economic Growth 
In previous FDI studies, GDP is widely used to represent EG. Previous studies (see Chapter 3) that 
employed GDP to investigate the linkage between EG and FDI include Nguyen, Ho, et al. (2012), 
Hoang et al. (2010), Srinivasan et al. (2010), Thanyakhan (2008) and Kornecki and Rhoades (2007).  
GDP can be measured in three different ways: production (or output or value added), income, and 
expenditure (Pritzker, Arnold, & Moyer, 2015). In the production approach, GDP is the “sum of the 
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gross values added of all resident institutional units engaged in production (plus any taxes and minus 
any subsidies on products not included in the value of their outputs)” (OECD, 2002). The income 
approach estimates GDP by adding incomes that firms pay to households for operating activities 
(wages for labour, interest for capital, rent for land, and profits for entrepreneurship) (OECD, 2002). 
The expenditure approach measures GDP as the sum of personal consumption (C), business 
investment (I), government spending (G), and net exports (X) (Pritzker et al., 2015).  
However, using GDP at the provincial level has some limitations. First, GDP counts all outputs 
generated within the borders of a country (Callen, 2012), not at the province nor city level. Second, if 
GDP is calculated for provinces that are administrative units within the country, it may result in 
variances between GDP at the provincial level and GDP of the whole economy. This is because a 
calculation overlap may occur if product parts are manufactured in different provinces or the 
product or parts are made in one province but exported from another province (VnExpress, 2014). 
Furthermore, according to the WB (2016b), in developing countries, GDP may not report a share of 
the agricultural output (e.g., rice) that is consumed within households or not exchanged for money 
but other things such as bread or sugar. 
This study uses Retail Sales of Goods and Services (RS) to represent EG at the Vietnam provincial 
level. Mukherjee (2014) used RS to identify the relationship between growth in RS and FDI in India 
from 1975 to 2010. In Mukherjee’s study, private final consumption is employed as a proxy for retail 
sales17, which is an important component of GDP. Jude and Masca (2009) employed consumption to 
investigate the interdependence of FDI in Romania from 2000 to 2006. The results in that study show 
the impact of FDI on consumption indirectly affects EG. 
RS can represent EG for the following reasons. First, RS measures consumer spending that is a 
component of GDP. According to the US Census Bureau (2008), RS is defined as finished goods and 
services sold to consumers at the end of the supply chain, generally without transformation, over a 
specified period. As discussed in the expenditure approach, the GDP calculation is based on the final 
goods and services purchased by individuals, businesses, governments, and foreigners (Pritzker et al., 
2015). Hence, RS can reflect consumer spending patterns impacting the GDP of the economy. In 
other words, an increase or a decline in RS can be a positive or negative signal of EG, respectively. 
 
17 According to Mukherjee (2014), private final consumption includes household expenditure on durable and 
nondurable goods and services during a certain period. This shows the expenditure patterns of consumers in 
consumption goods, thus an increase or a decrease in the private final consumption directly relates to the 
increase or the decrease in retail sales. 
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Second, though GDP is calculated at the national level (VnExpress, 2014), RS can be used to measure 
the EG of regions, provinces or cities of one country. This is because RS calculates finished goods and 
services sold to retailers (US Census Bureau, 2008), which does not result in a calculation overlap. 
Third, RS highly correlates with GDP in Vietnam based on data collected from GSO (2016r) and GSO 
(2016i). A correlation of 0.9974 (nearly 1) is found between RS and GDP in Vietnam from 1990 to 
2015 (see Appendix Table B.2). Figure 4.2 shows that both RS and GDP have the same upward trend 
from 1990 to 2015. 
In this study, RS (at current prices in billion VND) is used to represent EG at the regional and 
provincial levels because it overcomes the limitations of regional and provincial GDP data. GDP (at 
current prices in billion VND) is used to represent EG at the national level because of the wide use of 
GDP in previous studies related to FDI across countries or economies. Notations for the variables are 
RSjt, RSit, and GDPt, where t stands for years, j stands for regions of Vietnam, i stands for provinces or 
cities of Vietnam; the absence of a subscript (such as GDPt) denotes national level data. 
 
Source: Data collected from GSO (2016r) and GSO (2016i) 
Figure 4.2 A Comparison of Retail Sales and GDP in Vietnam 1990-2015 
4.3.1.2 Foreign Direct Investment 
In terms of the dependent variable representing FDI attraction, two possible options are available: (i) 
the annual number of licensed inward FDI projects, and (ii) the total annual registered capital of 
licensed inward FDI projects (including the added capital of licensed projects of previous years). This 
study employs option (ii) because it represents FDI attraction from both current and new foreign 
investors, whereas option (i) measures only the number of new licensed FDI projects. Option (ii) is 
used to represent FDI attraction to Vietnam in previous studies such as Nguyen and Ho (2013), 


























































































































The total registered annual capital of licensed inward FDI projects (including the added capital of 
licensed projected of previous years) is also used as the dependent variable in the regression models 
to investigate the three remaining research questions related to FDI provincial competition, the 
effects of policies and laws on FDI, and FDI location selection. 
Notations for the variable used to represent FDI attraction are FDIt, FDIjt, and FDIit, where FDI stands 
for the total registered capital of licensed inward FDI projects including added capital of licensed 
projects in previous years (in million USD). 
4.3.2 Explanatory Variables 
Based on the literature review of FDI determinants (see Chapter 3), the determinants are categorised 
into groups based on their features. In this study, five groups: human capital, economic, 
infrastructure, policy and law related, and provincial competition and institutional factors, are 
employed to investigate the four research questions. The demographic and human capital group 
includes three variables: population, labour force and education level. The economic group includes 
nine variables: open trade, exchange rate, inflation, incremental capital output ratio, income, state-
owned investment, marketization, expenditure on science, technology and environment, and 
financial crisis. The infrastructure group is represented by four variables: good freight, patient beds, 
communication development and website quality. The policy and law related group is represented by 
five factors: introduction of new laws, participation in WTO, participation in FTAs, province ranking, 
and region ranking. The fifth group concerns provincial competition and institutional factors: 
investment incentive policies, provincial competitiveness index and its nine sub-indices, and country 
risk. 
4.3.2.1 Demographic and Human Capital Factors 
Population (POP), Labour Force (LF), and Education Level (EDU): According to the literature, the 
human resource is an important FDI determinant or an absorptive capacity factor that optimises the 
utilization of FDI and generates the multiplier effect of FDI on EG (Kumari, 2014). Demographic and 
human capital variables such as labour force and education level, have positive effects on attracting 
FDI (Hasan & Mahvash, 2015; Kumari, 2014; Omri & Kahouli, 2014; Escobar, 2013; Zhao & Xiang, 
2012; Huang & Chai, 2006; Sun, 2002). In this study, the demographic and human capital factors 
employed are the average population (POP) in thousands; the labour force at 15 years of age and 
above (LF) in thousands; and the education level (EDU) is the number of students in universities and 
colleges (STU) over POP (see Appendix Table B.3). Notations for the variables are: POPt, POPjt, POPit, 
LFt, LFjt, LFit, EDUt, EDUjt, and EDUit. 
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4.3.2.2 Economic Factors 
Open Trade (OT), Exchange Rate (ER), and Inflation (CPI – Consumer Price Index) are used as the 
first three economic factors to investigate their impact on FDI in Vietnam. Conclusions for FDI 
determinants of trade openness, exchange rate, and inflation in previous studies are mixed. Though 
trade openness exhibits a negative impact on FDI (Razmi & Behname, 2012), it positively affected FDI 
in the studies by Hasan and Mahvash (2015), Kinuthia and Murshed (2015), and Labes (2015). 
Exchange rate also impacts FDI both positively (Kinuthia & Murshed, 2015; Labes, 2015) and 
negatively (Kinuthia & Murshed, 2015; Haq, 2001). Hasan and Mahvash (2015) and Razmi and 
Behname (2012) show inflation rate and FDI exhibit a negative relationship, but the relationship is 
positive in Kinuthia and Murshed’s (2015) study. Our study uses OT (in billion VND) computed as the 
sum of export and import values for Vietnam18; ER (in thousand VND per USD) is the VND-USD yearly 
average exchange rate; and CPI is annual average consumer price index representing inflation in 
Vietnam19. The notations for the three variables are OTt, ERt, ERjt, ERit, CPIt, CPIjt, and CPIit. 
Incremental Capital Output Ratio (ICOR) measures the efficiency of the total capital invested in the 
development of an economy. This ratio represents the economy absorptive capacity including factors 
related to the economic climate (Kumari, 2014). ICOR is an aggregated indicator of the ratio of 
investment to growth, which equals 1 divided by the marginal product of capital or 𝐼𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑡 =
𝐼𝑡/(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 − 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1), where 𝐼 is the total capital invested in development of an economy and t is 
time (see Appendix Table A.5). ICOR data are the same at national, regional and provincial levels with 
the notations ICORt, ICORjt, and ICORit. 
Income (INC): According to Malesky (2010), FIEs have a strong interest in investing in countries with 
lower entry costs. One of these costs is the average wage or average income per capita. For example, 
Kinuthia and Murshed (2015) reveal that wages significantly, negatively affect FDI. Hence, another 
economic factor employed should be the monthly average income per capita. In this study, the 
monthly average income per employee in the state sector at current prices (INC) is employed as a 
general representative variable of labour cost. The notations for this variable are INCt, INCjt, and 
INCit. 
State-owned investment (STATE) and Marketization (MKT): Castiglione et al. (2012) and Pradhan 
(2012) find that domestic investment is a positive determinant of FDI. Domestic investment includes 
investment activities of the state-owned and non-state-owned sectors. The level of marketization or 
sectorial development is also believed to play an important role in attracting FDI (Kumari, 2014; Zhao 
& Xiang, 2012; Huang & Chai, 2006; Sun, 2002). Therefore, the share of the state-owned investment 
 
18 OT data are unavailable at regional and provincial levels. 
19 ER and CPI data are the same at national, regional and provincial levels. 
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over the total investment (STATE) and the share of the non-state-owned investment over the total 
investment, Marketization (MKT), are employed as economic explanatory variables in this study at 
the national level with the notations STATEt and MKTt, respectively. 
Expenditure on Science, Technology and Environment (SCI): According to Haq (2001), research and 
development expenditure is a significant, positive determinant of FDI in the US. Hence, this study 
employs the share of that state budget expenditure on Science, Technology and Environment (SCI) to 
investigate its relationship with FDI in Vietnam from 2000 to 2015 (with the notation SCIt). 
Financial Crisis (CRI): The world economy has faced financial crises affecting FDI flows. For Vietnam, 
the world financial crises in 1997 and 2008 significantly decreased the registered capital of licensed 
inward FDI projects (see Figure 1.3). Hence, financial crisis is employed as a dummy variable to 
address its effects on FDI in Vietnam. For the 2008 crisis, the dummy variable CRI is employed with 
CRI=1 after 2007, CRI=0 otherwise. The CRI data are the same at national, regional and provincial 
levels (with the notations CRIt, CRIjt, and CRIit). 
4.3.2.3 Infrastructure Factors 
Infrastructure development contributes to the absorptive capacity of the economy to stimulate FDI 
(Kumari, 2014). According to the literature, infrastructure development is a positive, significant 
determinant of FDI. Hasan and Mahvash (2015) show that infrastructure significantly supported FDI 
in Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Turkey from 1990 to 2012. Kinuthia and 
Murshed (2015) find that infrastructure development significantly determined FDI in Kenya between 
1960 and 2009. Castiglione et al. (2012) find that infrastructure improvements positively affected FDI 
in 79 Russian regions from 1996 to 2001. Pradhan (2012) identifies power availability as a key 
determinant of FDI in 16 Indian states between 2001 and 2010. This study employs four variables, 
goods freight (FRE), patient beds (BED), communication development (COM), and website quality 
(WEB) to represent infrastructure development in Vietnam. 
Goods Freight (FRE), Patient Beds (BED) and Communication Development (COM): The first three 
infrastructure variables are the volume of goods freight in thousand tonnes (FRE), the number of 
patient beds (BED), and the development of communication (COM), which is the number of 
telephone and internet subscribers (in thousands). FRE and BED are employed at national, regional 
and provincial levels. COM is used at the national level because of data limitation. Their notations are 
FREt, FREjt, FREit, BEDt, BEDjt, BEDit, and COMt. 
Website Quality (WEB): The ability to access information by investors (the category variable) is 
based on the quality of official websites or portals of state bodies (provinces and cities) in Vietnam 
from 2000 to 2015. WEB is evaluated by five factors: i) language availability (includes more than one 
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language); ii) availability of law documents; iii) economic and social information (on an English page); 
iv) documents for investment registration (on an English page); v) online registration and support (on 
an English page). If all five factors are available, WEB=5; if four factors are available, WEB=4; if three 
factors are available, WEB=3; if two factors are available, WEB=2; if one factor is available, WEB=1; 
and if no factor is available, WEB=0. WEB was evaluated in 2011 and 2016. In 2011, the first Vietnam 
regulation on providing online information and public services on electronic information pages or 
portals of state bodies (Decree No. 43/2011/NĐ-CP of the Government) was promulgated. According 
to the Government (2011), these electronic portals provide official information on the internet in all 
fields governed by the state bodies. Therefore, the results of the first evaluation are used for 2000-
2011 and the second evaluation is used for 2012-2015 (additional information on calculating WEB is 
provided in Appendix Tables B.4 and B.5). WEBit is the notation for this variable. 
4.3.2.4 Policy and Law Related Factors 
Introduction of New Laws (LAW), and Participation in World Trade Organization (WTO): The effects 
of policies and laws on FDI are documented in previous studies (Hoang & Goujon, 2014; Nguyen & 
Ho, 2013; Nguyen, Zhang, et al., 2012; Pham, 2011; Vu et al., 2009). For example, Nguyen and Ho 
(2013) show that both introducing new laws and joining the WTO positively impact FDI. Therefore, 
this study employs two dummy variables namely LAW and WTO to indicate “Vietnam’s new 
Investment and Enterprise Laws in 2005” (LAW = 1 for the period 2005-2015, LAW = 0 for the period 
2000-2004) and “Vietnam joined WTO in 2007” (WTO = 1 for 2008-2015, WTO = 0 for 2000-2007), 
respectively. The two dummy variables LAW and WTO are employed to investigate the effects of 
policies and laws on FDI. Data are at the national, regional and provincial levels (with notations LAWt, 
LAWjt, LAWit, WTOt, WTOjt, and WTOit). 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA): International trade agreements include not only becoming members of 
WTO but also Free Trade Agreements. Although Vietnam joined the AFTA in 1993, the ASEAN in 
1995, and the APEC in 1998, the study period is from 2000 to 2015. Therefore, the impacts of joining 
the AFTA, ASEAN and APEC in the years prior to 2000 (outside the study period) could not be 
investigated using dummy variables. In order to reflect the policies and laws’ effects on FDI, besides 
WTO, this study uses a category variable namely FTA or the number of Free Trade Agreements in 
which Vietnam is a member (signed and in effect). Vietnam has been a member of AFTA since 1993, 
the US - Vietnam BTA since 2001, the ASEAN - ACFTA since 2005, the ASEAN - AKFTA since 2007, the 
ASEAN - AJCEP since 2008, the Japan - Vietnam EPA since 2009, the ASEAN - India CECA and the 
ASEAN - ANZ FTA since 2010, the Chile - Vietnam FTA since 2012, and the Republic of Korea - 
Vietnam FTA since 2015. To take the effects of the above trade agreements into consideration, FTA is 
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constructed as a category variable based on data from ARIC (2016) (see Appendix Table B.6). Data 
are at the national, regional and provincial levels (with notations FTAt, FTAjt, and FTAit). 
Province Ranking (PR, PR2): Based on Vietnam’s investment laws, investors are encouraged to invest 
in provinces or cities under difficult and extremely difficult socio-economic conditions20 to decrease 
the inequality of development and income among remote and mountainous provinces and urban 
cities, and among the six regions in the country. Hence, to investigate the impact of regulations on 
the investment environment at the provincial level in Vietnam, a variable, Province Ranking (PR), is 
constructed as follows; PR=2 if the province or city is on the list of areas under the extremely 
difficult socio-economic conditions, PR = 1 if the province or city is on the list of areas under the 
difficult socio-economic condition, and PR = 0 otherwise (see Appendix Table B.7). From 2000 to 
2005, PR is based on Decree No. 24/2000/ND-CP (Government, 2000)21; from 2006 to 2015, PR is 
based on Decree No. 108/2006/ND-CP (Government, 2006)22. A dummy variable, PR2, is based on PR: 
PR2 = 1 if PR = 2, PR2 = 0 otherwise. Notations for these variables are PRit and PR2it. 
Region Ranking (RR, RR2): Region ranking (RR), is based on PR, which indicates the differences in 
investment conditions among the regions. Therefore, the Vietnam FDI-inflow distribution is 
investigated at both the provincial and regional levels. RR is based on PR as follows: RR = 2 if a region 
is under extremely difficult socio-economic conditions, which means that all provinces in the region 
are under the extremely difficult socio-economic conditions (PR = 2); RR = 0 if a region is not under 
extremely difficult and difficult socio-economic conditions, which means that the region has at least 
one province under neither extremely difficult nor difficult socio-economic conditions (PR = 0); RR = 1 
otherwise. The dummy variable, RR2, is based on RR: RR2 = 1 if the socio-economic conditions of a 
region are extremely difficult (RR=2), 0 otherwise23. The notations for these variables are RRjt and 
RR2jt. Ranking provinces and cities (PR and PR2) and ranking regions (RR and RR2) based on their 
socio-economic conditions are employed to investigate the different effects of FDI determinants in 




20 Provinces and cities in Vietnam are divided into areas under three socio-economic conditions: (1) extremely 
difficult, (2) difficult, and (3) neither extremely difficult nor difficult conditions. 
21 Information is adapted from Appendix I (a list of areas where investment is encouraged) of Decree No. 
24/2000/ND-CP guiding the Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam in 1996 and Law No. 18/2000/QH10 on 
Foreign Investment in Vietnam in 2000. 
22 Information is adapted from Appendix III (a list of areas where investment is encouraged) of Decree No. 
108/2006/ND-CP guiding Law No. 59/2005/QH11 on Investment in 2005. 
23 RR2 = 0 if the socio-economic condition of a region is not extremely difficult (either RR=1 or RR=0). 
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4.3.2.5 Provincial Competition and Institutional Factors 
Investment Incentive Policies (IIP) Index: According to the literature on the effects of policies on FDI, 
the IIP can affect FDI flows because foreign investors make strategic decisions on where and how to 
set up their operations using IIP (Thomas, 2009). In other words, the IIP (grants, tax preferences or 
holidays, free land or other inputs, and regulatory policy concessions) can be considered a 
competition factor (“IIP-based” competition) not only among countries but also among provinces 
and cities in a country. However, studies on IIP are limited because previous studies consider only tax 
incentives (Wei & Li, 2011; Li & Shen, 2008; Sun, 2002). In addition, the results of some empirical 
studies in Vietnam are inconsistent. For example, sub-national incentives attract more FDI in Vu et 
al.’s (2009) study, but Vu (2007) reveals that provinces that adopted extra-legal incentives, reduced 
the amount of FDI per capita they received in the year after adoption of those incentives. 
Therefore, a provincial competition variable, the IIP index, which is a combination of free land, 
income tax and import tax exemption, is constructed based on the regulations and laws at the 
provincial level in Vietnam from 2000 to 2015. Table 4.2 summarises the regulations and laws related 
to free land, income tax and import tax exemption in Vietnam. 
Table 4.2 The Regulations and Laws on IIP in Vietnam 2000-2015 
Note: x indicates that a regulation or law is used to evaluate IIP based on free land, income tax 
exemption, or import tax exemption. 
Source: Information adapted from the references listed in the Sources column. Regulations of the 
Vietnamese Government related to land include Decree No. 24/2000/ND-CP (Government, 2000), 
Decree No. 142/2005/ND-CP (Government, 2005a), Decree No. 121/2010/ND-CP (Government, 
2010b), and Decree No. 46/2014/ND-CP (Government, 2014). 
 
 











Government (2000) Decree No. 24/2000/ND-CP 31/07/2000 01/08/2000 x x x 
Government (2005a) Decree No. 142/2005/ND-CP 14/11/2005 29/11/2005 x   
Government (2010b) Decree No. 121/2010/ND-CP 30/12/2010 01/03/2013 x   
Government (2014) Decree No. 46/2014/ND-CP 15/05/2014 01/07/2014 x   
Assembly (2003) Law No. 09/2003/QH11 17/06/2003 01/01/2004  x  
Government (2003) Decree No. 164/2003/ND-CP 22/12/2003 06/01/2004  x  
Assembly (2008a) Law No. 14/2008/QH12 03/06/2008 01/01/2009  x  
Assembly (2013) Law No. 32/2013/QH13 19/06/2013 01/01/2014  x  
Government (2005b) Decree No. 149/2005/ND-CP 08/12/2005 01/01/2006   x 
Government (2010a) Decree No. 87/2010/ND-CP 13/08/2010 01/10/2010   x 
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0_Normal Not indicated 3 3 3 
1_Difficult Not indicated 11 15 15 
2_Extremely difficult Not indicated 15 15 Whole project life 
Year begins 2000 2005 2013 2014 
Year ends 2004 2012 2013 2015 
Note: “Not indicated” means provinces or cities determine the number of years applying for the free 
land. However, in this study, “Not indicated” equals 0. In addition, according to Law of the Vietnam 
National Assembly No. 67/2014/QH13 dated 26/11/2014 on Investment (Assembly, 2014): (i) the 
operation duration of an investment project inside an economic zone or in areas under difficult and 
extremely difficult socio-economic conditions shall not exceed 70 years. Therefore, in this study, 
“Whole project life” equals 70 years. 
Source: Information adapted from Government (2014), Government (2010b), Government (2005b), 
and Government (2000) 
The income tax related regulations and laws are the Decree of the Government No. 24/2000/ND-CP 
(Government, 2000), the Law of the Vietnam National Assembly No. 09/2003/QH11 (Assembly, 
2003), the Decree of the Government No. 164/2003/ND-CP (Government, 2003), the Law of the 
Vietnam National Assembly No. 14/2008/QH12 (Assembly, 2008a) and the Law of the Vietnam 
National Assembly No. 32/2013/QH13 (Assembly, 2013).  












0_Normal 1 0 2 0 2 
1_Difficult 2 0 3 2 2 
2_Extremely difficult 4 4 4 4 4 
Year begins 2000 2004 2004 2009 2014 
Year ends 2003 2008 2008 2013 2015 
Source: Information adapted from Assembly (2013), Assembly (2008a), Assembly (2003), 
Government (2003), and Government (2000)  
The regulations of the Vietnam Government related to import tax are Decree No. 24/2000/ND-CP 
(Government, 2000), Decree No. 149/2005/ND-CP (Government, 2005b) and Decree No. 
87/2010/ND-CP (Government, 2010a). 
There are four steps to compute the IIP index. First, the PR variable is used as an indicator of 
provinces and cities. Second, the number of years applying for the free land (see Table 4.3), the 
number of years applying for income tax exemption on profit (see Table 4.4), and the number of 
years applying for the import tax exemption on inputs for production since operation are from the 
regulations and laws from 2000 to 2015 (see Table 4.5). 
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Table 4.5 The Number of Years Applying for Import Tax Exemption on Inputs for Production 








0_Normal 0 0 0 
1_Difficult 0 0 0 
2_Extremely difficult 5 5 5 
Year begins 2000 2006 2010 
Year ends 2005 2009 2015 
Source: Information adapted from Government (2010a), Government (2005b), and Government 
(2000) 
Third, the data are standardised using equation (4.1)24 because: (i) the number of years (absolute 
value) applying for the type of investment incentives or investment preferences (free land, income 
tax exemption, and import tax exemption) in provinces and cities with different rankings (PR) are 
different, and (ii) the three types of investment incentives have different scales in years. Therefore, 
we use the standardised equation (4.1) to convert the absolute values with three different time 
scales into relative values within the scales for each province or city before computing the aggregate 








𝑝   (4.1) 
Where: 
 p stands for the type of investment preference, such as free land, income tax exemption, and 
import tax exemption; 
 t stands for years from 2000 to 2015; 
 i stands for provinces or cities; 
 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑝
 is a relative value of the type of investment preference p of province or city i in year t; 
 𝑈𝑖𝑡
𝑝
 is an absolute value of the type of investment preference p of province or city i in year t; and 
 𝑈𝑖𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝑝
 is a maximum value of types of investment preference p of province or city i in 2000-2015. 
Fourth, IIP is calculated using equation (4.2)25 where 𝑰𝑰𝑷𝒊𝒕 is a relative aggregate value for all types 
of investment preference of a province or city i in year t, and 𝑎𝑝 is a coefficient of importance level 
applying to each type of investment preference p with ∑ 𝑎𝑝 = 1.  
 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 = ∑(𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑝
× 𝑎𝑝)  (4.2) 
 
24 The equation is based on a method in calculating synthesis efficiency of investment projects by Nguyen and 
Tu (2007). 
25 The equation is based on a method calculating synthesis efficiency of investment projects according to 
Nguyen and Tu (2007). 
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In this study, the coefficient 𝑎𝑝 (0 ≤ ap ≤ 1) indicates how important the impact of investment 
incentives is on the FDI location selection by investors. It is assumed that the coefficients of free land, 
income tax exemption and import tax exemption are based on the average rates of revenue from 
land and houses, revenue from FDI enterprises, and export and import duties over the State budget 
revenue final accounts in Vietnam from 2000 to 2015, respectively. According to GSO (2017c), during 
2000-2015, on average, 23.75% of the State budget revenue included revenue from land and houses 
(7.65%), revenue from FDI enterprises (9.94%) and exports and import duties (6.17%). Therefore, the 
coefficients of free land, income tax and import tax exemption are 0.3, 0.4, and 0.3, respectively. 
Consequently, 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡  ranges from 0 to 1. 
Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI): Another provincial competition factor that attracts FDI is the 
economic governance evaluated by the PCI that has been available since 2005 (VCCI, 2016a). The PCI 
is used to evaluate and compare the competitiveness of FDI flows and the relationship between 
economic governance and FDI attraction in Vietnam as in Nguyen and Ho (2013), Nguyen, Ho, et al. 
(2012), Malesky (2010), and Nguyen and Nguyen (2007). However, their findings are mixed. For 
example, Malesky (2010) shows a significant positive linkage between the PCI and FDI flows for 
provinces and cities in Vietnam. On the other hand, Nguyen, Ho, et al. (2012) and Nguyen and 
Nguyen (2007) conclude that the PCI was not a strong FDI determinant in Vietnam. Therefore, this 
study uses both the PCI and its sub-indices26 from 2005 to 2015 to investigate the competition 
factors that attract FDI at the provincial level in Vietnam.  
According to VCCI (2016b), the PCI represents Vietnam’s business environment assessed by an 
annual business survey of economic governance quality in encouraging the development of the non-
state sector at the provincial level. Computation of the PCI is based on three steps: collecting data 
from a business survey and secondary data, calculating and standardising the 10 sub-indices to a 10-
point scale, and calibrating the PCI based on the 10 sub-indices with their weights (the PCI’s 
maximum score is 100). VCCI (2016b) provides detailed information on the measurement and 
assessment of each sub-index of PCI across Vietnam’s provinces and cities. 
The higher the PCI score the better is the business environment. This implies a province or city has: 
1) lower entry costs to start a business (entry costs); 2) easier access to land and better security for 
business premises (land access and security of tenure); 3) a more transparent business environment 
and more equitable business information (transparency and access to information); 4) less time 
required for bureaucratic procedures and inspections (time costs and regulatory compliance); 5) 
fewer informal charges; 6) less crowding of private activity by policy biases toward state, foreign, or 
connected firms (policy biases); 7) more proactive and creative provincial leadership in dealing with 
 
26 Nine of 10 sub-indices of PCI are employed in this study. 
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enterprise problems (proactivity); 8) higher quality and better developed business support services 
(business support); 9) better labour training policies (labour and training); and 10) fairer and more 
effective legal processes for dispute resolution (legal institutions). 
Table 4.6 The Sub-Indices of the PCI 
No. Sub-index Measure Abbreviation Note 





A firm’s ability to access land and the security of tenure since 




and access to 
information 
A firm’s ability to access proper planning and legal documents 
necessary to run the business, availability of those documents, 
predictable implementation of new policies and laws, and the 







The time wasted on bureaucratic compliance and suspension 





Differences in paying informal or extra fees for operating 
business and their expected outcomes 
CHARGE x 
6 Policy bias 
Bias in policies between private firms and state-owned, 






Ability of provinces and cities to implement central policies, 
working under some unclear national regulations, and taking 





The effort of provinces and cities to provide services to 
support private business, such as trade promotion, regulation 
provision to enterprises, co-business matchmaking, industrial 





Province efforts to promote vocational training and skills 






Confidence of firms in the local legal system; an effective 
mechanism to resolve disputes or appeal against corruption. 
LEGAL x 
Note: “Policy bias” is a new sub-index not employed in this study because of unavailable data. 
“Business support” called “Private sector development services” is used in this study; x indicates the 
sub-indexes used in this study.  
Source: VCCI (2016b) 
Table 4.6 shows nine of the PCI sub-indices are employed in this study, entry costs (ENTRY), land 
access and security of tenure (LAND), transparency and access to information (ACCESS), time cost 
and regulatory compliance (TIME), informal charges (CHARGE), proactivity (PROACT), business 
support (SUPPORT), labour and training (LABOUR), and legal institutions (LEGAL). These indices are 
considered institutional factors at the Vietnam provincial level. Their notations are: PCIit, ENTRYit, 
LANDit, ACCESSit, TIMEit, CHARGEit, PROACTit, SUPPORTit, LABOURit, and LEGALit. 
Country Risk (CR) Index: Institutional factors such as improved democracy (Hasan & Mahvash, 2015), 
lower delinquency rates (Escobar, 2013) and political stability and security (Castiglione et al., 2012) 
determine investors’ decisions where to locate capital. This study uses a political risk index that is 
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one of the three risk subcategories27 in the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) computed by the 
PRS Group to investigate the effects of institutional factors on FDI location in Vietnam. The political 
risk index consists of 12 components (see Table 4.7) measuring different dimensions of the political 
and business environment that enterprises face when operating in another country. The index is 
obtained annually from data in December reports. A variable, the CR index, is based on 10 of the 12 
components. These 10 components are divided into six sub-indexes including voice and 
accountability (VA) (military in politics and democratic accountability), political stability and absence 
of violence (PV) (government stability, internal conflict, external conflict, and ethnic tensions), 
government effectiveness (GE) (bureaucratic quality), regulatory quality (RQ) (investment profile), 
rule of law (RL) (law and order), and control of corruption (CC) (corruption). Measures of VA, PV, GE, 
RQ, RL, and CC are available from PRS (2017). 
Table 4.7 The Components of the Political Risk Index 




1 Military in politics 6 
1. Voice and Accountability VA 12 x 
2 Democratic accountability 6 
3 Government stability 12 
2. Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence 
PV 42 x 
4 Internal conflict 12 
5 External conflict 12 
6 Ethnic tensions 6 
7 Bureaucratic quality 4 3. Government Effectiveness GE 4 x 
8 Investment profile 12 4. Regulatory Quality RQ 12 x 
9 Law and order 6 5. Rule of Law RL 6 x 
10 Corruption 6 6. Control of Corruption CC 6 x 
11 Socioeconomic conditions 12 7. Socioeconomic Conditions SC 12   
12 Religious tensions 6 8. Religious Tensions RT 6   
Total 100   100  
Note: x indicates that sub-indexes are used in this study. 
Source: Information is collected from PRS (2017)  





Where: Point = points for each sub-index scored by PRS (2017); 
 Weight = the percentage of each sub-index proposed by PRS (2017) (see Table 4.7); and 
 s = sub-indexes including VA, PV, GE, RQ, RL, and CC. 
The risk levels of the CR index are similar to the risk levels of its sub-indices determined by PRS 
(2017). According to PRS (2017), the risk levels range from Very high (<50%), through High (50%-
 
27 The ICRG includes three subcategories of risk: political, financial, and economic (PRS, 2017). 
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60%), Moderate (60%-70%), and Low (70%-80%), to Very low (80%-100%). Appendix Table B.8 shows 
the construction of the CR index. The CR index is the same at the national, regional and provincial 
levels (with the notations CRt, CRjt, and CRit). 
In summary, 38 variables are used in this study (see Appendix Table B.9). FDI, GDP, and RS are used 
as the dependent and independent variables in different regression models. For example, FDI is the 
dependent one in Model 2 and independent in Model 3, whereas RS is independent in Model 2 and 
dependent in Model 3 (see Section 4.6). The independent variables are the three human capital 
factors (POP, LF and EDU), nine economic factors (OT, ER, CPI, ICOR, INC, STATE, MKT, SCI and CRI), 
four infrastructure factors (FRE, BED, COM, and WEB), seven policy and law related factors (FTA, 
WTO, LAW, PR, PR2, RR, and RR2), and 12 provincial competition and institutional factors (IIP; PCI 
and its sub-indices including ENTRY, LAND, ACCESS, TIME, CHARGE, PROACT, SUPPORT, LABOUR, and 
LEGAL; and CR). 
The number of variables differs at the three different levels (see Appendix Table B.9): 
(i) At the provincial level: 30 variables including FDI, RS, POP, LF, EDU, ER, CPI, ICOR, INC, 
CRI, FRE, BED, WEB, LAW, WTO, FTA, PR, PR2, IIP, PCI, ENTRY, LAND, ACCESS, TIME, 
CHARGE, PROACT, SUPPORT, LABOUR, LEGAL, and CR. 
(ii) At the regional level: 18 variables including FDI, RS, POP, LF, EDU, ER, CPI, ICOR, INC, CRI, 
FRE, BED, LAW, WTO, FTA, RR, RR2, and CR. 
(iii) At the national level: 21 variables including FDI, GDP, POP, LF, EDU, OT, ER, CPI, ICOR, 
INC, STATE, MKT, SCI, CRI, FRE, BED, COM, LAW, WTO, FTA, and CR. 
4.4 Data 
4.4.1 Data Levels 
In this study, data are grouped by provincial, regional, and national level. At the provincial and 
regional levels, two annual panel data sets of (i) the provinces and cities; and (ii) the regions in 
Vietnam (see Table 4.1) are used, respectively, from 2000 to 2015. 
At the national level, the time series data are from 1990 to 2015. Expanding the study time from 
2000-2015 (a duration of 16 years) to 1990-2015 (a duration of 26 years) enables me to evaluate the 
long-term relationship between FDI and EG. To examine the nexus in the long run, this study works 
with five variables, FDI, GDP, OT, ER and POP (see Appendix Table B.10). 
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4.4.2 Data Source 
The data used in this study are from the GSO of Vietnam, the FXTOP website (FXTOP, 2017), the PRS 
Group, and the VCCI. Appendix Table B.11 gives the definitions, units, and data sources in detail. FDI, 
GDP, RS, LF, POP, OT, CPI, MKT, INC, SCI, FRE, COM, and BED are from the GSO, and EDU, ICOR, CRI, 
WEB, FTA, WTO, LAW, PR, PR2, RR, RR2, IIP, and CR are computed by the author. The six political 
factors (VA, PV, GE, RQ, RL, and CC) are obtained from the PRS Group (PRS, 2017). The ER 
information is obtained from the FXTOP website (FXTOP, 2017). PCI, ENTRY, LAND, ACCESS, TIME, 
CHARGE, PROACT, SUPPORT, LABOUR, and LEGAL are obtained from the PCI website (VCCI, 2016a). 
4.5 Methodology 
The four research questions and hypotheses are: 
Research question 1 (what is the relationship between FDI and EG in the provinces and cities of 
Vietnam?). The hypotheses are: 
H1.1 - there is a strong long-term bi-directional link between FDI and EG in Vietnam; 
H1.2 - FDI significantly, positively affects EG at the provincial, regional, and national levels in Vietnam; 
and 
H1.3 - EG significantly, positively affects FDI attraction at the provincial, regional and national levels in 
Vietnam. 
Research question 2 (how does PCI-based and IIP-based competition affect FDI at the provincial level 
in Vietnam?). The hypotheses are: 
H2.1 - provinces with better governance are strongly associated with registered FDI; and 
H2.2 - provinces offering higher fiscal incentives attract less FDI. 
Research question 3 (does the rule of law matter in attracting FDI to Vietnam?). The hypotheses are: 
H3.1 - there is a significant growth of FDI in Vietnam, especially in the first ranked provinces, following 
the release of the new law of investment and enterprise in 2005; and  
H3.2 - there is a significant growth of FDI in Vietnam, especially in the first ranked provinces, following 
Vietnam’s WTO and FTA membership. 
Research question 4 (is there any geographical concentration of FDI in Vietnam?). The hypothesis is: 
H4.1 - the geographical concentration of FDI exists in certain locations affected by the determinants of 
the FDI-inflow distribution in Vietnam. 
To test H1.1 (the long-term bi-directional relationship between FDI and EG), I apply a procedure of 
three steps: (i) the long-term relationship between FDI and EG is evaluated using cointegration tests; 
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(ii) the relationship is re-evaluated using the OLS estimator; and (iii) the long-term relationship, its 
existence and the direction of causality between FDI and GDP are evaluated using the ECM method. 
This procedure is called a cointegration – OLS – ECM approach or a three-step approach.  
The OLS estimator is applied to test H1.2 and H1.3 on the relationship between FDI and EG (research 
question 1), H2.1 and H2.2 on the FDI provincial competition and effects of policies (research question 
2), H3.1 and H3.2 on the effects of laws on FDI (research question 3), and H4.1 on the geographical 
concentration of FDI in Vietnam (research question 4). This one-step approach uses the OLS 
estimation procedure. 
4.5.1 The Cointegration – OLS – ECM Approach 
To investigate the long-term bi-directional link between FDI and EG in Vietnam (H1.1), this study 
employs the cointegration – OLS – ECM or three-step approach of Li, Kuang, Huang, and Zhang 
(2013), Moudatsou and Kyrkilis (2011) and Srinivasan et al. (2010) at the provincial and national 
levels. However, data at the provincial (panel data) and national (time-series data) levels are 
different, which requires different approaches. Therefore, the cointegration – OLS – ECM approach is 
applied to evaluate the nexus between FDI and EG at the provincial and national levels differently as 
follows. 
4.5.1.1 Cointegration – OLS – ECM Approach at the Provincial Level 
First, three types of panel co-integrated test methods, Pedroni (2004), Kao (1999) and Johansen-
Fisher (Maddala & Wu, 1999), are used to evaluate the long-term relationship between FDI and EG. 
Second, the relationship is re-evaluated using the OLS estimator. Finally, the Panel Error Correction 
Model (PECM) is also used to evaluate not only the long-term relationship but also the existence and 
the direction of causality between FDI and EG at the provincial level. 
Step 1 - Evaluate the long-term relationship between FDI and EG: This step comprises: (i) examine the 
stationarity of the panel data and then (ii) examine the long-term relationship between FDI and EG 
(the panel cointegration test: the Pedroni, Kao and Johansen-Fisher tests). 
Testing the stationarity of the panel data ensures the effectiveness of the models. To test the 
stationarity of panel data, various unit root tests are available such as the Breitung (Breitung & Das, 
2005; Breitung, 2000), Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), Fisher-ADF 
(augmented Dickey–Fuller) (Choi, 2001; Maddala & Wu, 1999), and Harris–Tzavalis (1999) tests. 
Among them, only the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) test and the Fisher-ADF test do not require a 
strongly balanced panel dataset (each panel has the same number of observations and there are no 
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missing points in any panel series). In this study, the panel data consisting of 63 provinces and cities 
are not strongly balanced, therefore the IPS and Fisher-ADF tests are suitable to test the stationarity. 
In addition, the IPS and Fisher-ADF tests allow for panel-specific autoregressive parameters (or 
consider panel heterogeneity), while the others assume that all panels have the same parameter (or 
consider them as homogeneous panels) (Li et al., 2013; Breitung & Pesaran, 2005). With the 
assumption that different provinces and cities of Vietnam may have individual characteristics such as 
culture and geography, the IPS and Fisher-ADF tests enable us to consider panel heterogeneity. 
However, to ensure that our study can cover a reverse case (homogeneous panel data), employing 
one of the other unit root tests is necessary. Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC) (2002) recommend using their 
test if the panel size is moderate (between 10 and 250 panels and 25 to 250 observations per panel). 
Based on the recommendation of LLC, the size of panel dataset in our study is moderate, and 
therefore the LLC test is suitable. The Harris–Tzavalis (1999) test is not employed because it assumes 
that the number of time periods, T, is fixed and the number of panels, N, tends to infinity. However, 
this is not the case in our study as it is more likely to be able to add more years of data (unfixed T) 
rather than add more than 63 provinces and cities in Vietnam (fixed N). The fixed N also fails to 
employ the Breitung (Breitung & Das, 2005; Breitung, 2000) test because it uses sequential limit 
theory, that is T goes to infinity (‘large’ T), and then N goes to infinity. 
Choi (2001) develops the Fisher unit root test (Maddala & Wu, 1999) using four methods, such as 
inverse χ2, inverse-normal, inverse-logit transformation of p-values, and a modification of the inverse 
χ2 transformation. When T is finite, the inverse χ2 test is applicable (Choi, 2001). When T tends to 
infinite, for very large N (N is much greater than 100), Choi (2001) proposes the modified inverse χ2 
test. The inverse-normal and inverse-logit transformation use the sequential limit theory and are 
applied for finite or infinite N. Also, the Fisher-type tests (Choi, 2001) are appropriate to examine the 
stationarity of panel data when the time dimension of the sample (T) differs from panel to panel (To, 
Ha, Nguyen & Vo, 2019). In our study, the panel dataset consists of 60 panels (N=60) with the finite T. 
In addition, T is the same for all provinces and cities in our study. Therefore, the inverse χ2 is 
applicable. 
The above justification leads to using three panel unit root tests, the LLC test (Levin et al., 2002), the 
IPS test (Im et al., 2003), and the Fisher-ADF (augmented Dickey–Fuller) test (Maddala & Wu, 1999), 
to test the stationarity of the panel data at the provincial level in Vietnam. If variables or series are 
non-stationary at level and stationary after differenced (stationary at the first order), they are co-
integrated (Granger, 1981). This means the series might have relationships in the long term. To 
examine whether there are any long-term relations among the co-integrated variables, the next step 
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uses a cointegration test for the panel data of 60 provinces and cities in Vietnam. The long-term 
nexus between FDI and EG is examined using three types of panel cointegration tests, the Pedroni 
(Pedroni, 2004), Kao (Kao, 1999), and Johansen-Fisher (Maddala & Wu, 1999) cointegration tests (the 
Pedroni, Kao, and Johansen-Fisher tests hereafter). 
Step 2 - Re-evaluate the relationship between FDI and EG using the OLS estimator: Analysis of the 
long-run cointegrating relationships using panel data is supported by the residual-based panel Fully 
Modified OLS (FMOLS) estimators (Mark & Sul, 2003; Pedroni, 2001, 2000; Kao & Chiang, 2000;  
Phillips & Moon, 1999). The Panel FMOLS estimators can result in asymptotically unbiased, normally 
distributed coefficient estimates in cointegrating regressions. 
Employing the panel FMOLS estimators can minimize the shortcomings of the OLS estimation known 
as the static OLS (SOLS). According to Hamilton (1994), the estimates’ asymptotic distribution is an 
outstanding shortcoming of SOLS. This asymptotic distribution is bias, asymmetry, and non-Gaussian. 
If a long-term correlation between errors of a cointegrating equation and innovations of regressors, 
and cross-correlation between the errors and regressors exists, a SOLS’s asymptotic distribution can 
arise. If the regressors 𝑋𝑡 are strictly exogenous, the bias, asymmetry, and dependence on non-scalar 
nuisance parameters disappear, then the estimator of SOLS follows a fully efficient asymptotic 
Gaussian mixture distribution that allows a standard Wald test using conventional limiting 
distributions 𝜒2. To minimize the strictly exogenous 𝑋𝑡 case, the Panel FMOLS cointegration 
regressions allow data transformation or cointegrating equation specification modifications. By 
employing a semi-parametric correction as an estimator (Phillips and Hansen, 1990), the long-term 
correlation problems between the errors and the innovations are eliminated. This results in an 
asymptotic unbiased FMOLS estimator, which has full efficient mixture of normal asymptotes and 
allows for the standard Wald test using asymptotic Chi-square 𝜒2 statistical inference. 
Phillips and Moon (1999), Pedroni (2000), and Kao and Chiang (2000) offer extensions of the Phillips 
and Hansen (1990) FMOLS estimator to panel settings. Pedroni (2000) and Kao and Chiang (2000) 
describe feasible pooled FMOLS estimators for heterogeneous cointegrated panels where the long-
run variances differ across cross-sections. Both panel FMOLS and Dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimators 
account for potential endogeneity and serial correlation, thus they are asymptotically unbiased and 
normally distributed. Thus, they do not require exogeneity assumptions. The FMOLS is a non-
parametric approach, while the DOLS is a parametric approach using lags and leads. Therefore, the 
degrees of freedom decrease in the DOLS estimators, which is not preferred (To, Ha, Nguyen, & Vo, 
2019). In addition, the FMOLS estimator outperforms the DOLS estimator as variables are stationary 
in different levels (Al-mulali, Fereidouni, Lee, & Sab, 2013). The DOLS estimator can account for 
forms of cross-sectional dependence as it allows time-demeaning data. According to Baltagi (2008), 
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cross-sectional dependence is a problem in macro panel with long time series (T is over 20-30 years) 
and not a big problem in micro panels (few T and large N). Based on the Baltagi’s (2008) discussion, 
the panel data used in our study is not a macro panel (as T equals 16 years). Therefore, the cross-
sectional dependence may not be a great issue in our study. 
Step 3 - Investigate the causality direction between FDI and EG: The Granger Representation 
Theorem (Granger, 1988) shows that if the variables are co-integrated, at least one direction of their 
causal nexus must exist. Therefore, the Granger Causality test (the Panel ECM) is employed to 
investigate the causality direction between FDI and EG. Basically, if non-stationary variables are 
cointegrated, a Vector Error Correction (VEC) model known as a restricted Vector Autoregression 
(VAR) can be used because its cointegration correlation (cointegration term) is built into its 
specifications. This can restrict a convergence of endogenous regressors to their cointegrating 
relations in the long-term period as well as allow short-term dynamic adjustments. The cointegration 
term is also named the error correction term because a deviation in the long-run equilibrium is 
gradually modified by partial short-run adjustments. If the null hypotheses, i.e., the coefficients of 
panel error correction terms ecm(fdi) and ecm(eg) are greater than or equal to zero are rejected, it 
implies that FDI is Granger causal for EG and EG is Granger causal for FDI over the long run. 
4.5.1.2 Cointegration – OLS – ECM Approach at the National Level 
At the national level, the relationship between FDI and EG is evaluated using the cointegration – OLS 
– ECM approach: step 1 - evaluate the long-term relationship between FDI and EG; step 2 - re-
evaluate the relationship between FDI and EG using the OLS estimator; and step 3 - investigate the 
causality direction between FDI and EG.  
The rationale of using the cointegration – OLS – ECM approach to examine the FDI and EG nexus at 
the national level is the same at the provincial level. However, there are some differences because of 
the time-series data. In step 1, to test the stationarity of the time-series data, there are available unit 
root tests such as the ADF (Dickey & Fuller, 1979), Phillips-Perron (PP) (Phillips & Perron, 1988), 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) (Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, & Shin, 1992), Dickey-Fuller 
Generalized Least Squares (DF-GLS) detrending (Elliott, Rothenberg, & Stock, 1996), the Elliot-
Rothenberg-Stock (ERS) (Elliott et al., 1996), and Ng and Perron (NP) (Ng and Perron, 2001) tests. The 
ADF test is commonly used in previous studies such as Valera, Holmes, and Hassan (2017), 
Moudatsou and Kyrkilis (2011), Rao and Hassan (2011), and Srinivasan et al. (2010). In addition to the 
ADF test, the PP test is employed in Valera et al. (2017) and Srinivasan et al. (2010), and the DF-GLS 
test is used in Valera et al. (2017) and Rao and Hassan (2011). Therefore, the ADF, PP, and DF-GLS 
unit root tests with the nonstationary null are employed for time-series data at the national level in 
stead of the LLC, IPS and Fisher-ADF tests for panel data at the provincial level in our study. After 
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using the unit root tests, the long-term nexus between FDI and EG in Vietnam is examined using the 
Johansen cointegration test (Johansen, 1995, 1991) for time-series data instead of the Pedroni, Kao, 
and Johansen-Fisher tests for panel data. Although there are other two cointegration tests by Engle 
and Granger (1987) and Engle and Yoo (1987), a problem of these two tests is that they can deal with 
only one cointegrating relationship. The Johansen cointegration test (Johansen, 1995, 1991) is useful 
to cases having more than one cointegrating relationships because it allows the determination of up 
to r linearly independent cointegrating vectors (r ≤ g-1, where g is the number of variables tested for 
cointegration).  
In step 2, cointegrating regressions are re-estimated using the FMOLS estimator (Phillips & Hansen, 
1990) at the national level instead of the Panel FMOLS estimator at the provincial level to re-evaluate 
the relationship between FDI and EG. In step 3, instead of the Panel VEC models used for the panel 
data, the VEC models are employed to identify the causality direction between FDI and EG for the 
time-series data at the national level. If the null hypotheses, i.e., the coefficients of ecm(fdi) and 
ecm(eg) are greater than or equal to zero are rejected, this indicates that a long-run nexus exists 
from the independent variable to the dependent variable. 
4.5.2 OLS Estimation Procedure 
The OLS estimation procedure, or one-step approach, is used to examine the rest of research 
question 1 (H1.2 and H1.3 on the relationship between FDI and EG), research question 2 (the FDI 
provincial competition and the effects of policies), research question 3 (the effects of laws on FDI), 
and research question 4 (the geographical concentration of FDI in Vietnam). To take individual 
characteristics of different groups or cross-sections into account, the panel OLS estimation supported 
by the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) is used to test whether a fixed or random effect model is 
appropriate to estimate the panel data regression equations. The fixed effect model is appropriate 
with differences in intercepts across groups or times. Differences in error variances are explored 
using the random effect model. FDI-related studies employ the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) to 
select appropriate effects for regression models. For example, the Hausman test recommended the 
use of the fixed effect model in Hasan and Mahvash (2015) and Nguyen and Ho (2013), and the 
random effect model in Labes (2015) and Razmi and Behname (2012). The Hausman test’s the null 
hypothesis that the random effects model is preferred. If the differences across groups (between-
entity errors) are correlated with regressors, the null hypothesis is rejected. 
In conclusion, the cointegration – OLS – ECM approach is used to investigate the long-run nexus 
between FDI and EG (H1.1 – research question 1) at provincial and national levels. The OLS estimation 
procedure supported by the Hausman test is used to examine the FDI and EG relationship (H1.2 and 
H1.3 - research question 1), the FDI provincial competition and effects of policies (research question 
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2), the effects of laws on FDI (research question 3), and the geographical concentration of FDI in 
Vietnam (research question 4). 
4.6 Empirical Models 
This section provides the empirical models to investigate the relationship between FDI and EG, the 
FDI provincial competition, the effects of policies and the effects of laws on FDI, and FDI location 
selection in Vietnam. 
4.6.1 The Relationship between FDI and EG 
This section describes the empirical models used to answer research question 1 (What is the 
relationship between FDI and EG in the provinces and cities of Vietnam?). 
4.6.1.1 Hypothesis 1.1 
To test H1.1 (there is a strong long-term bi-directional link between FDI and EG in Vietnam), the 
cointegration – OLS – ECM approach is applied at the provincial and national levels. 
Provincial level: the cointegration – OLS – ECM approach is employed for the panel data using FDI, 
EG, ER, EDU, POP, and INC from 2000 to 2015. RS represents EG in the regression models at the 
provincial level. In the first step, the unit root tests (the LLC, the IPS and Fisher-ADF tests) are 
conducted and then the long-term nexus between FDI and EG in Vietnam is examined using three 
types of panel cointegration test (the Pedroni, Kao, and Johansen-Fisher tests) based on Model 1 (see 
Table 4.8).  
Table 4.8 Models to Investigate the Long-run Relationship between FDI and EG at the Provincial 
Level 
Test Model number Model 
Panel cointegration tests Model 1 Series: FDI, EG, ER, EDU, POP, INC 
Cointegrating 
Regression: FMOLS 
Model 2 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡 , 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 , 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡)  
Model 3 𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡, 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 , 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡, 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡)  
VECM 
Model 4 ∆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖(𝑡−𝑘), 𝐸𝐺𝑖(𝑡−𝑙))  
Model 5 ∆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖(𝑡−𝑘), 𝐸𝐺𝑖(𝑡−𝑙), 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 , 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡)  
Model 6 ∆𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐸𝐺𝑖(𝑡−𝑙), 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖(𝑡−𝑘)) 
Model 7 ∆𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐸𝐺𝑖(𝑡−𝑙), 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖(𝑡−𝑘), 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 , 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡, 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡)  
Note: i stands for provinces, t stands for years, 𝒌 and 𝒍 are lag orders; FDI is FDI registered capital, EG 
is Economic Growth represented by Retail Sales (RS), ER is Exchange Rate, EDU is education level, 
POP is average population, and INC is monthly average income (definitions and sources of variables 
used are presented in Appendix Table B.11). 
The Pedroni (Engle-Granger based) cointegration test (Pedroni, 2004) is based on an investigation of 
the error terms of a regression performed employing variables in order one 𝐼(1). It allows for 
heterogeneous intercepts and trend coefficients across cross-sections. If the variables are 
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cointegrated, the residuals should be 𝐼(0), otherwise 𝐼(1). The null hypothesis of no cointegration, 
𝐻0: all of the individuals 𝑖 of the panel are not cointegrated (the residuals 𝑒𝑖𝑡 will be 𝐼(1)), is tested 
by conducting the auxiliary regression for each cross-section. 
The Kao cointegration test is based on the Engle and Granger (1987) study that specifies the cross-
section specific intercepts and homogeneous coefficients on first-stage regressors. Kao (1999) uses 
the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test and an ADF test to test the null hypothesis of no cointegration. 
The Johansen-Fisher cointegration test (Fisher, 1932) uses the combined test results of individual 
independent tests. Maddala and Wu (1999) use the Fisher test to test for cointegration in panel data 
by combining cross-section individual tests to obtain a statistic parameter for the full panel. To 
combine p-values, the 𝝌𝟐 test statistic is employed to account for correlations among the test 
statistics of the individual cross-sections. The 𝝌𝟐 value is based on p-values for Johansen’s 
cointegration trace test and maximum eigenvalue test (MacKinnon, Haug, & Michelis, 1999). The 
idea behind this test is to break up the null hypothesis H0 of no cointegration into a set of sub-
hypotheses H0i of no cointegration in 𝒊 cross-sections. The H0 of no cointegration is rejected if and 
only if any of its component H0i of no cointegration tests in 𝒊 cross-sections is rejected. 
In the second step, the bi-directional link between FDI and EG is examined using the panel FMOLS 
cointegration regressions for the two models: 𝐹𝐷𝐼 = 𝑓(𝐸𝐺, 𝐸𝑅, 𝐸𝐷𝑈) and 𝐸𝐺 =
𝑓(𝐹𝐷𝐼, 𝐸𝑅, 𝐼𝑁𝐶, 𝑃𝑂𝑃) (see Models 2 and 3, Table 4.8). 
In the third step, four Panel VEC models are used to identify the existence and the direction of any 
causality between FDI and EG at the provincial level. The coefficient of ecm(FDI) is examined using 
Model 4 with FDI (as the dependent variable) and EG only, and then it is tested using Model 5 with 
other two variables namely ER and EDU. Similarly, Model 6 is used to evaluate the coefficient of 
ecm(EG) with EG (as the dependent variable) and FDI only; Model 7 includes the other three 
variables namely ER, INC and POP (see Table 4.8). 
The estimated Panel ECM takes the following form: 
∆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝜑𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖(𝑡−1) + ∑ 𝛼1𝑘∆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖(𝑡−𝑘) + ∑ 𝛼2𝑙∆𝐸𝐺𝑖(𝑡−𝑙) + 𝛾𝑚𝑋𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 1𝑖𝑡 (4.4) 
∆𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝜔𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖(𝑡−1) + ∑ 𝛽1𝑙∆𝐸𝐺𝑖(𝑡−𝑙) + ∑ 𝛽2𝑘∆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖(𝑡−𝑘) + 𝛿𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 2𝑖𝑡 (4.5) 
where ∆ is the difference operator, 𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖(𝑡−1) is the error correction term (ecm(FDI) and ecm(EG)), 
which shows the long-run causalities from regressors to dependent variables, 𝜑 and 𝜔 are 
coefficients of the ECT, 𝛼2𝑙 and 𝛽2𝑘 are coefficients, respectively showing the short-run causalities of 
EG on FDI and FDI on EG,  1𝑖𝑡 and 2𝑖𝑡 are the white noise error terms, i stands for provinces, t 
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stands for years, 𝑘 and 𝑙 are lag orders, 𝛾 and 𝛿 show the short-run causalities from 𝑚 and 𝑛 
independent variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡 to the dependent variables, respectively. 
First, equations (4.4) and (4.5) consider only two variables of FDI and EG. Next, the ER and EDU 
variables are added into equation (4.4) as 𝑋𝑚𝑖𝑡 with 𝑚 = 2. Similarly, ER, INC, and POP variables are 
then added into equation (4.5) as 𝑋𝑛𝑖𝑡 with 𝑛 = 3. The coefficients of the lagged 𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖(𝑡−1) test 
whether there is a long-run causal relationship between FDI and EG. It also indicates that the two 
variables adjust to their long-run equilibrium relationships. If 𝜑 is statistically significant but 𝜔 is not 
statistically significant, EG Granger causes FDI. If the opposite happens, FDI Granger causes EG. If 
both ϕ and 𝜔 are significant, there is a long-run bi-directional relationship at the provincial level. In 
the short run, ‘EG does not Granger cause FDI’ and ‘FDI does not Granger cause EG’ if and only if all 
the coefficients of 𝛼2𝑙 and 𝛽2𝑘 are equal to zero, respectively. 
The lag length selection is restricted in our study because the time span of the sample is short in 
terms of degrees of freedom. If three or more lags are used with five determinants and dependent, 
there will be at least 20 parameters (each of five variables has at least one current period and three 
lagged values). However, the time span is only 16 years (2000-2015) in our study. Therefore, the lag 
length of 2 is selected. Li et al. (2013) and Rao and Hassan (2011) select a lag length of 2 for a time 
span of 25 years (1982-2006) and 37 years (1971-2007), respectively.  
National level: the cointegration – OLS – ECM approach is employed for the time series data. The 
FDI, EG, ER, OT and POP variables are used for 1990 to 2015. GDP represents EG in the regression 
models. In the first step, after the unit root tests (the ADF, PP, and DF-GLS test) are conducted; the 
long-term nexus between FDI and EG in Vietnam is examined using the Johansen cointegration test 
(Johansen, 1991, 1995) (see Model 8, Table 4.9).   






Johansen Cointegration Test Model 8 Series: FDI, EG, ER, OT,POP 
Cointegrating Regression: FMOLS 
Model 9 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐸𝐺𝑡 , 𝐸𝑅𝑡 , 𝑂𝑇𝑡) 
Model 10 𝐸𝐺𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡, 𝐸𝑅𝑡 , 𝑂𝑇𝑡, 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑡) 
VECM 
Model 11 ∆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐹𝐷𝐼(𝑡−𝑘), 𝐸𝐺(𝑡−𝑙)) 
Model 12 ∆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐹𝐷𝐼(𝑡−𝑘), 𝐸𝐺(𝑡−𝑙), 𝐸𝑅𝑡 , 𝑂𝑇𝑡) 
Model 13 ∆𝐸𝐺𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐸𝐺(𝑡−𝑙), 𝐹𝐷𝐼(𝑡−𝑘)) 
Model 14 ∆𝐸𝐺𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐸𝐺(𝑡−𝑙), 𝐹𝐷𝐼(𝑡−𝑘), 𝐸𝑅𝑡 , 𝑂𝑇𝑡, 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑡) 
Note: t stands for years, 𝒌 and 𝒍 are lag orders, and ∆ is the difference operator; FDI is FDI registered 
capital, EG is economic growth represented by GDP, ER is exchange rate, OT is open trade, and POP is 
average population (definitions and sources of variables used are presented in Appendix Table B.11). 
68 
 
In the second step, the bi-directional link between FDI and EG is examined using the FMOLS 
cointegration regressions and the Wald test in two models: 𝐹𝐷𝐼 = 𝑓(𝐸𝐺, 𝐸𝑅, 𝑂𝑇) and 𝐸𝐺 =
𝑓(𝐹𝐷𝐼, 𝐸𝑅, 𝑂𝑇, 𝑃𝑂𝑃) (see Models 9 and 10, Table 4.9). In the third step, four VEC models are used to 
identify the causality direction between FDI and EG. The coefficient of ecm(FDI) is examined using 
Model 11 with FDI (as the dependent variable) and EG only, and tested using Model 12 with the FDI, 
EG, ER and OT variables. Similarly, Model 13 is used to evaluate the coefficient of ecm(EG) with EG 
(as the dependent variable) and FDI, whereas Model 14 includes the EG, FDI, ER, OT and POP 
variables (see Table 4.9). 
The estimated ECM takes the following form: 
∆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝜑𝐸𝐶𝑇(𝑡−1) + ∑ 𝛼1𝑘∆𝐹𝐷𝐼(𝑡−𝑘) + ∑ 𝛼2𝑙∆𝐸𝐺(𝑡−𝑙) + 𝛾𝑚𝑋𝑚𝑡 + 𝑢1𝑡  (4.6) 
∆𝐸𝐺𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝜔𝐸𝐶𝑇(𝑡−1) + ∑ 𝛽1𝑙∆𝐸𝐺(𝑡−𝑙) + ∑ 𝛽2𝑘∆𝐹𝐷𝐼(𝑡−𝑘) + 𝛿𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑡 + 𝑢2𝑡  (4.7) 
where ∆ is the difference operator, 𝐸𝐶𝑇(𝑡−1) is the error correction term (ecm(FDI) and ecm(EG)), 
which shows the long-run causalities from regressors to the dependent variables, 𝜑 and 𝜔 are 
coefficients of the ECT, 𝛼2𝑙 and 𝛽2𝑘 are coefficients, respectively showing the short-run causalities of 
EG on FDI and FDI on EG,  𝑢1𝑡 and 𝑢2𝑡 are the white noise error terms, t stands for Years, 𝑘 and 𝑙 are 
lag orders, 𝛾 and 𝛿 show exists of short run causalities from 𝑚 and 𝑛 independent variables 𝑋 to 
dependent variables, respectively. 
First, equations (4.6) and (4.7) have two variables, FDI and EG. Next, two economic variables (ER and 
OT) are added into equation (4.6) as 𝑋𝑚 with 𝑚 = 2. Similarly, the ER, OT, and POP variables are 
included into equation (4.7) as 𝑋𝑛 with 𝑛 = 3. The coefficients of the lagged ECT test whether there 
is a long-run causal relationship between FDI and EG. It also indicates that the two variables adjust to 
their long-run equilibrium relationships. If 𝜑 is statistically significant but 𝜔 is not statistically 
significant, EG Granger causes FDI. If the opposite happens, FDI Granger causes EG. If both ϕ and 𝜔 
are significant, there is a long-run bi-directional relationship. In the short run, ‘EG does not Granger 
cause FDI’ and ‘FDI does not Granger cause EG’ if and only if all the coefficients of 𝛼2𝑙 and 𝛽2𝑘 are 
equal to zero, respectively. 
4.6.1.2 Hypotheses 1.2 and 1.3 
The OLS estimators are used to test H1.2 and H1.3 at the national level. The Hausman test (Hausman, 
1978) is used to determine whether a fixed or random effects model is appropriate to estimate the 




Table 4.10 The Models to Evaluate the Impact of FDI on EG at Various Levels in Vietnam 
Variable group Variable 
Model 














GDP x x     
RS   x x x x 
Regressors 
FDI FDI x x x x x x 
Demographic factor POP x x x x x x 
Economic factors 
ER x x x x x x 
OT x x    x 
ICOR  x    x 
INC  x  x  x 
CPI  x  x  x 
STATE  x     
MKT  x     
SCI  x     
Note: GDP is Gross Domestic Product, RS is Retails Sales, FDI is FDI registered capital, POP is average 
population, ER is Exchange Rate, OT is Open Trade, ICOR is Incremental Capital Output Ratio, INC is 
monthly average income, CPI is average Consumer Price Index representing inflation, STATE is the 
share of the state-owned investment, MKT is the share of the non-state-owned investment 
presenting marketization, and SCI is the share of science, technology and environment expenditure 
(definitions and sources of variables used are presented in Appendix Table B.11). 
At the national level, the impact of FDI on EG in Vietnam is evaluated by testing H1.2 (FDI significantly, 
positively affects EG at the provincial, regional, and national levels in Vietnam) based on Models 15 
and 16 (see Table 4.10) with equation (4.8): 
 𝐸𝐺𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡 + 𝜇𝑚𝑋𝑚𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡 (4.8) 
where 𝛽 and 𝜇 are parameters, 𝑒 is the error term, t stands for years, 𝑋𝑚𝑡 are 𝑚 independent 
variables. For example, in Model 15, besides FDI, three variables, POP, ER, and OT, are included for 
1990-2015 (𝑚 = 3). Model 16 is an extension with other six regressors (ICOR, INC, CPI, STATE, MKT 
and SCI) added into Model 15 for 1995-2015. 
At the regional and provincial levels, H1.2 is tested using Models 17, 18, 19, and 20 (see Table 4.10) 
with equations (4.9) and (4.10): 
 𝐸𝐺𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑗𝑡 + 𝜇𝑚𝑋𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑒𝑗𝑡 (4.9) 
 𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑚𝑋𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡  (4.10) 
where 𝛽 and 𝜇 are parameters, 𝑒 is the error term, 𝑋𝑚𝑗𝑡 and 𝑋𝑚𝑖𝑡 are 𝑚 independent variables, j 
stands for regions, i stands for provinces, t stands for years, 𝛿 is the fixed effect for each cross-
section, and 𝛾 is the random effect for each period. For example, in Model 19, besides FDI, POP and 
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ER are included for 2000-2015 (𝑚 = 2). Model 20 is an extension with other three regressors, ICOR, 
INC and CPI (𝑚 = 5) added into Model 19. 
In terms of H1.3 (EG significantly, positively affects FDI attraction at the provincial, regional and 
national levels in Vietnam), the impact of EG on FDI at the national level is evaluated using the OLS 
estimators from Models 21, 22, and 23 (Table 4.11) with equation (4.11):  
 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐸𝐺𝑡 + 𝜇𝑚𝑋𝑚𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡 (4.11) 
where 𝛼 and 𝜇 are parameters, 𝑒 is the error term, 𝑋𝑚𝑡 are 𝑚 independent variables, and t stands 
for years. For example, Model 21 evaluates the effect of EG on attracting FDI with other independent 
variables, ER and OT, in Vietnam for 1990-2015 (𝑚 = 2); Model 22, extended from Model 21, 
includes other variables, ICOR, INC, CPI, STATE, MKT and SCI, for 1995-2015 (𝑚 = 8); and LF and EDU 
are included in Model 22 (𝑚 = 10) to examine how EG affects FDI in Vietnam for 2000-2015 (see 
Model 23, Table 4.11). 
Table 4.11 The Models to Evaluate the Impact of EG on FDI at Various Levels in Vietnam 
Variable group Variable 
Model 

























GDP x x x     
RS    x x x x 
Demographic and human 
capital factors 
LF   x     
EDU   x x x x x 
Economic factors 
ER x x x x x x x 
OT x x x     
ICOR  x x    x 
INC  x x  x  x 
CPI  x x  x  x 
STATE  x x     
MKT  x x     
SCI  x x     
Note: FDI is FDI registered capital, GDP is Gross Domestic Product, RS is Retails Sales, LF is Labour 
Force, EDU is Education Level, ER is Exchange Rate, OT is Open Trade, ICOR is Incremental Capital 
Output Ratio, INC is monthly average income, CPI is average Consumer Price Index representing 
inflation, STATE is the share of the state-owned investment, MKT is the share of the non-state-owned 
investment presenting marketization, and SCI is the share of science, technology and environment 
expenditure (definitions and sources of variables used are presented in Appendix Table B.11). 
At the regional and provincial levels, H1.3 is tested for 2000-2015. Models 24, 25, 26, and 27 (see 
Table 4.11) are employed with equations (4.12) and (4.13): 
 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐸𝐺𝑗𝑡 + 𝜇𝑚𝑋𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑒𝑗𝑡 (4.12) 
 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑚𝑋𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡  (4.13) 
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where 𝛼 and 𝜇 are parameters, 𝑒 is the error term, 𝑋𝑚𝑗𝑡 and 𝑋𝑚𝑖𝑡are 𝑚 independent variables, j 
stands for regions, i stands for provinces, t stands for years, 𝛿 is the fixed effect for each cross-
section, and 𝛾 is the random effect for each period. For example, in Models 24 and 26, besides EG, 
EDU and ER are included (𝑚 = 2). Model 25 is an extension of Model 24 with another two 
regressors, INC and CPI (𝑚 = 4). Model 27 is an extension with the other three regressors, ICOR, INC 
and CPI (𝑚 = 5) added into Model 26. 
4.6.2 FDI Provincial Competition and the Effects of Policies 
This section presents the empirical models to answer research question 2 (How does PCI-based and 
IIP-based competition affect FDI at the provincial level in Vietnam?). Panel data regression models 
are used to test H2.1 and H2.2 at the provincial level. The Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) is used to 
determine whether a fixed or random effect model is appropriate.  
Table 4.12 The Models to Evaluate FDI Provincial Competition in Vietnam 
Variable group Variable Model 28 Model 29 Model 30 









EG RS x x x 
Human capital factor EDU x x x 
Economic factors 
ER x x x 
ICOR x x x 
INC x x x 
CPI x x x 
Provincial competition 
and institutional factors 
PCI x  x 
ENTRY  x  
LAND  x  
ACCESS  x  
TIME  x  
CHARGE  x  
PROACT  x  
SUPPORT  x  
LABOUR  x  
LEGAL  x  
IIP   x 
Note: FDI is FDI registered capital, RS is Retails Sales, EDU is Education Level, ER is Exchange Rate, 
ICOR is Incremental Capital Output Ratio, INC is monthly average income, CPI is average Consumer 
Price Index representing inflation, PCI is Provincial Competitiveness Index, ENTRY is Entry Costs, 
LAND is Land Access and Security of Tenure, ACCESS is Transparency and Access to Information, TIME 
is Time Costs and Regulatory Compliance, CHARGE is Informal Charges, PROACT is Proactivity, 
SUPPORT is Business Support, LABOUR is Labour and Training, LEGAL is Legal Institutions, and IIP is 
Investment Incentive Policies index (definitions and sources of variables used are presented in 
Appendix Table B.11). 
At the provincial level, the issue of “how PCI helps Vietnamese provinces to attract more or less FDI” 
is evaluated by testing H2.1 (provinces with better governance are strongly associated with registered 
FDI). To test H2.1, Models 28 and 29 (see Table 4.12) are employed with equation (4.13). Besides EG, 
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EDU, ER, ICOR, INC, and CPI, Model 28 examines the effects of PCI on FDI, whereas Model 29 
investigates the effects of the nine PCI sub-indices on FDI. The IIP-based competition at the provincial 
level is investigated by testing H2.2 (provinces offering higher fiscal incentives attract less FDI). Model 
30 is regressed with one variable, IIP, added into Model 28 (see Table 4.12). 
4.6.3 The Effects of Laws on FDI 
To answer research question 3 (Does the rule of law matter in attracting FDI in Vietnam?), Models 
31, 32, 33a-c, 34a-c, 35a-c, 36a-c, and 37a-b are used to test the hypotheses related to the release of 
the new investment and enterprise laws in 2005 and Vietnam’s participation in the WTO and FTAs. 
Table 4.13 The Models to Evaluate the Effects of Laws on FDI at Vietnam’s National and Regional 
Levels 
Variable group Variable 





























GDP x x       
RS   x x x x x x 
Human 
capital factor 
EDU x x x x x x x x 
Economic 
factors 
ER x x x x x x x x 
ICOR x x x x x x x x 
INC x x x x x x x x 
CPI x x x x x x x x 




LAW x x x x x    
WTO  x    x x x 
FTA  x    x x x 
RR   x x  x x  
RR2     x   x 
LAW*RR    x     
LAW*RR2     x    
WTO*RR       x  
WTO*RR2        x 
FTA*RR       x  
FTA*RR2        x 
Note: FDI is FDI registered capital, GDP is Gross Domestic Product, RS is Retails Sales, EDU is 
Education Level, ER is Exchange Rate, ICOR is Incremental Capital Output Ratio, INC is monthly 
average income, CPI is average Consumer Price Index representing inflation, STATE is the share of the 
state-owned investment, LAW is the dummy variable of Laws of Investment and Enterprise in 2005, 
WTO is the dummy variable indicating Vietnam joined WTO in 2007, FTA is the number of Free Trade 
Agreements in which Vietnam is a member, RR is Region Ranking, and RR2 is the dummy variable 
based on RR (definitions and sources of variables used are presented in Appendix Table B.11). 
H3.1 (there is a significant growth of FDI in Vietnam, especially in the first ranked provinces following 
the release of the new law of investment and enterprise in 2005) is tested with equations (4.11), 
(4.12), and (4.13) to evaluate the impact of investment and enterprise laws on FDI at the national, 
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regional, and provincial levels, respectively. LAW (a dummy variable) is included in Models 31, 32, 
33a-c, 35a-c, and 37a-b (see Tables 4.13 and 4.14). 
It is likely that provinces and regions under more difficult socio-economic conditions experienced 
higher impacts on FDI from the release of the new laws in 2005. To investigate the effect of LAW in 
the different regions and provinces of Vietnam, RR, RR2 and their interaction terms28 with LAW 
(LAW*RR and LAW*RR2) are added into Models 33b and 33c; and PR, PR2 and their interaction terms 
with LAW (LAW*PR and LAW*PR2) are added into Models 35b and 35c. The use of interaction terms 
of region ranking (RR and RR2) and province ranking (PR and PR2) with LAW explores the different 
effects of the new investment and enterprise laws in 2005 on FDI in areas under different socio-
economic conditions. 
Table 4.14 The Models to Evaluate the Effects of Laws on FDI at the Vietnam Provincial Level 
Variable group Variable 
Model 
35a 35b 35c 36a 36b 36c 37a 37b 








EG RS x x x x x x x x 
Human capital factor EDU x x x x x x x x 
Economic factors 
ER x x x x x x x x 
ICOR x x x x x x x x 
INC x x x x x x x x 
CPI x x x x x x x x 
Policy and law related factors 
PR x x  x x  x  
PR2   x   x  x 
LAW x x x    x x 
LAW*PR  x     x  
LAW*PR2   x     x 
WTO    x x x x x 
FTA    x x x x x 
WTO*PR     x  x  
FTA*PR     x  x  
WTO*PR2      x  x 
FTA*PR2      x  x 
Note: FDI is FDI registered capital, RS is Retails Sales, EDU is Education Level, ER is Exchange Rate, 
ICOR is Incremental Capital Output Ratio, INC is monthly average income, CPI is average Consumer 
Price Index representing inflation, PR is Province Ranking, PR2 is the dummy variable based on PR, 
LAW is the dummy variable of Laws of Investment and Enterprise in 2005, WTO is the dummy 
variable indicating Vietnam joined WTO in 2007, and FTA is the number of Free Trade Agreements in 
which Vietnam is a member (definitions and sources of variables used are presented in Appendix 
Table B.11. 
 
28 An interaction term shows the different effects of an independent variable on a dependent variable 
depending on values of another independent variable. 
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Similarly, H3.2 (there is a significant growth of FDI in Vietnam, especially in the first ranked provinces 
following Vietnam’s WTO and FTA membership) is tested at the national, regional, and provincial 
levels through Models 32, 34a-c, 36a-c, and 37a-b (see Tables 4.13 and 4.14) with WTO and FTA. The 
interaction terms of WTO*RR, WTO*RR2, FTA*RR, FTA*RR2, WTO*PR, WTO*PR2, FTA*PR and 
FTA*PR2 are employed to identify the different impacts of joining WTO and FTA on inward FDI at 
regional and provincial levels in Vietnam. 
4.6.4 FDI Location Selection 
To identify the determinants that affect the FDI location selection (research question 4: Is there any 
geographical concentration of FDI in Vietnam?), other regressors including the effect of the 2008 
financial crisis (CRI), infrastructure conditions (FRE, BED, COM, and WEB), and institutional factors 
(CR) on attracting FDI in Vietnam are investigated using Models 38-52 (see Tables 4.15, 4.16, and 
4.17). H4.1 (geographical concentration of FDI exists in certain locations is affected by determinants of 
the FDI-inflow distribution in Vietnam) is tested as follows. 
Table 4.15 The Models to Evaluate FDI Location Selection at the Vietnam National Level 
Variable group Variables Model 38 Model 39 









EG GDP x x 
Human capital factor EDU x x 
Economic factors 
ER x x 
ICOR x x 
INC x x 
CPI x x 
STATE x x 
CRI x x 
Provincial competition and institutional factors CR x x 
Infrastructure factors 
COM  x 
FRE  x 
BED  x 
Note: FDI is FDI registered capital, GDP is Gross Domestic Product, EDU is Education Level, ER is 
Exchange Rate, ICOR is Incremental Capital Output Ratio, INC is monthly average income, CPI is 
average Consumer Price Index representing inflation, STATE is the share of the state-owned 
investment, CRI is the dummy variable reflecting the financial crisis in 2008, CR is Country Risk index, 
COM is Communication development, FRE is Volume of Goods Freight, and BED is the number of 
patient beds (definitions and sources of variables used are presented in Appendix Table B.11). 
First, the determinants related to the financial crisis and infrastructure conditions are regressed with 
CR. The variables representing the infrastructure conditions at the national level are COM, FRE, and 
BED (Model 39, Table 4.15), whereas those at the regional level are FRE and BED (Models 41 and 42, 




Table 4.16 The Models to Evaluate FDI Location Selection at the Vietnam Regional Level 
Variable group Variable Model 40 Model 41 Model 42 









EG RS x x x 
Human capital factor EDU x x x 
Economic factors 
ER x x x 
ICOR x x x 
INC x x x 
CPI x x x 
CRI x x x 
Provincial competition and institutional factors CR x x x 
Policy and law related factors 
RR  x  
RR2   x 
Infrastructure factors 
FRE  x x 
BED  x x 
Interaction terms 
CRI*RR2   x 
CR*RR2   x 
FRE*RR2   x 
BED*RR2   x 
Note: FDI is FDI registered capital, RS is Retail Sales, EDU is Education Level, ER is Exchange Rate, 
ICOR is Incremental Capital Output Ratio, INC is monthly average income, CPI is average Consumer 
Price Index representing inflation, CRI is the dummy variable reflecting the financial crisis in 2008, CR 
is Country Risk index, RR is Region Ranking, RR2 is the dummy variable based on RR, FRE is Volume of 
Goods Freight, and BED is the number of patient beds (definitions and sources of variables used are 
presented in Appendix Table B.11). 
Finally, to investigate the FDI-inflow distribution to different areas in Vietnam and its determinants, 
the interaction terms of RR2 with CRI, CR, FRE and BED at the regional level, and PR2 with CRI, CR, 
FRE, BED and WEB at the provincial level are included in Model 42 (see Table 4.16) and Models 45-47 
and 50-52 (see Table 4.17), respectively. Models 42, 44-47 and 50-52 test whether there are 
significant relationships between the variables and FDI, especially in the first ranked regions and 
provinces. The use of the interaction terms generates different impacts of the variables on FDI in the 




Table 4.17 The Models to Evaluate FDI Location Selection at the Vietnam Provincial Level 
Variable group Variable 
Models 
43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 









EG RS x x x x x x x x x x 
Human capital factor EDU x x x x x x x x x x 
Economic factors 
ER x x x x x x x x x x 
ICOR x x x x x x x x x x 
INC x x x x x x x x x x 
CPI x x x x x x x x x x 
CRI x x x x x x x x x x 
Provincial competition and 
institutional factors 
PCI      x x x x x 
IIP x x x x x x x x x x 
CR x x x x x x x x x x 
Policy and law related factors PR2  x x x x  x x x x 
Infrastructure factors 
FRE x x x x x x x x x x 
BED x x x x x x x x x x 
WEB x x x x x x x x x x 
Interaction terms 
CRI*PR2   x x    x x  
CR*PR2   x x    x x  
FRE*PR2   x  x   x  x 
BED*PR2   x  x   x  x 
WEB*PR2   x  x   x  x 
Note: FDI is FDI registered capital, RS is Retails Sales, EDU is Education Level, ER is Exchange Rate, 
ICOR is Incremental Capital Output Ratio, INC is monthly average income, CPI is average Consumer 
Price Index representing inflation, CRI is the dummy variable reflecting the financial crisis in 2008, PCI 
is Provincial Competitiveness Index, IIP is Investment Incentive Policies index, CR is Country Risk 
index, PR2 is the dummy variable based on Province Ranking PR, FRE is Volume of Goods Freight, and 
BED is the number of patient beds, and WEB is Website Quality (definitions and sources of variables 
used are presented in Appendix Table B.11). 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter presents the data and the methodologies used in the study. Vietnam comprises six 
regions with 63 provinces and cities (as at 31 December, 2015). Data from 2000 to 2015 are grouped 
into the national, regional, and provincial levels (see Appendix Table B.11 for data sources).  
There are 38 variables used in the study. The first three variables employed as dependent and 
independent variables in different regression models are FDI, GDP and RS. Although both GDP and RS 
represent EG, GDP represents EG at the national level, and RS represents it at regional and provincial 
levels. The independent variables include three demographic and human capital factors (POP, LF and 
EDU), nine economic factors (OT, ER, CPI, ICOR, INC, STATE, MKT, SCI and CRI), four infrastructure 
factors (FRE, BED, COM and WEB), seven policy and law related factors (FTA, WTO, LAW, PR, PR2, RR 
and RR2), and 12 provincial competition and institutional factors (IIP; PCI and its sub-indices including 
ENTRY, LAND, ACCESS, TIME, CHARGE, PROACT, SUPPORT, LABOUR, and LEGAL; and CR). EDU, ICOR, 
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CRI, WEB, FTA, WTO, LAW, PR, PR2, RR, RR2, IIP and CR are computed by the author (Appendix Table 
B.11 gives the definitions, units, and data sources). 
Two annual panel data sets are used at the provincial and regional levels from 2000 to 2015. At the 
national level, a time series data set is used. To evaluate the long-term relationship between FDI and 
EG at the national level, the study period is 1990 to 2015 for the five variables FDI, GDP, OT, ER and 
POP. 
The cointegration – OLS – ECM approach and the OLS estimation procedure are used to investigate 
the four research questions and hypotheses related to the relationship between FDI and EG, the FDI 
provincial competition and effects of policies, the effects of laws on FDI, and the geographical 
concentration of FDI in Vietnam. The cointegration – OLS – ECM approach is used to test H1.1 (the 
long-term bi-directional relationship between FDI and EG) at the provincial and national levels. The 
OLS estimation procedure is applied to test H1.2 and H1.3 on the relationship between FDI and EG 
(research question 1), H2.1 and H2.2 on the FDI provincial competition and effects of policies (research 
question 2), H3.1 and H3.2 on the effects of laws on FDI (research question 3), and H4.1 on the 
geographical concentration of FDI in Vietnam (research question 4). The Hausman test (Hausman, 
1978) is used to determine whether a fixed or random effect model is appropriate to estimate the 
panel data regression equations at the regional and provincial levels. 
There are 52 empirical models used in the study. To investigate the relationship between FDI and EG 
(research question 1), models 1-7 are used to examine the long-run relationship at the provincial 
level with the variables ER, EDU, POP and INC. At the national level, models 8-14 investigate the long-
run relationship between FDI and EG. Models 15-20 and Models 21-27 evaluate the impacts of FDI on 
EG and the impacts of EG on FDI, respectively, at the national, regional and provincial levels.  
The FDI provincial competition and the effects of policies (research question 2) are investigated using 
Models 28-30. The PCI-based competition is examined using Model 28 with the effects of PCI 
representing the economic governance as the provincial competition factor in attracting FDI. Model 
29 investigates the effects of the nine PCI sub-indices on FDI. IIP-based competition at the provincial 
level is examined using Model 30 with one more variable, IIP, added to Model 28. The IIP index, 
which is the combination of free land, income tax and import tax exemption, is constructed based on 
regulations and laws in Vietnam from 2000 to 2015 at the provincial level. 
The effects of laws on FDI (research question 3) are evaluated using Models 31-37b. LAW is included 
in Models 31, 32, 33a-c, 35a-c and 37a-b to test the impacts of investment and enterprise laws in 
2005 on FDI at the national, regional and provincial levels. To explore the different effects of LAW in 
areas under different socio-economic conditions, RR, RR2 and their interaction terms with LAW are 
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added into Models 33b and 33c; PR, PR2 and their interaction terms with LAW are added into Models 
35b and 35c. Similarly, WTO, FTA and their interaction terms with RR, RR2, PR and PR2 are employed 
in Models 32, 34a-c, 36a-c and 37a-b to identify the different impacts of joining WTO and FTA on 
inward FDI in different socio-economic conditions in Vietnam.  
The FDI location selection (research question 4) is analysed by including the effect of the 2008 
financial crisis (CRI), infrastructure conditions (FRE, BED, COM, and WEB), and institutional factors 
(CR) in regression Models 38-52. The variables representing the infrastructure conditions at the 
national level are FRE, BED and COM (in Models 38-39), whereas, at the regional level, FRE and BED 
are included in Models 40-42. COM is replaced by WEB at the provincial level in Models 43-52. To 
investigate the different impacts of the 2008 financial crisis, the infrastructure conditions and 
institutional factors on the FDI location selection in Vietnam, the interaction terms of RR2 with CRI, 
CR, FRE and BED at the regional level are included in Model 42; and the interaction terms of PR2 with 






This chapter presents the study’s empirical results. Section 5.2 provides the descriptive statistics of 
the continuous, category and dummy variables at the national, regional and provincial levels. Section 
5.3 details the empirical results of: (i) the relationship between FDI and EG at the national and 
provincial levels; (ii) the FDI competition and the effects of policies on FDI at the provincial level; (iii) 
the effects of laws on FDI at the national, regional and provincial levels; and (iv) the FDI location 
selection at the three levels. Section 5.4 summarises the chapter. 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
5.2.1 Dependent Variables 
FDI and EG are the two dependent variables in this study. GDP represents EG at the national level 
and RS represents EG at the regional and provincial levels. Figure 5.1 shows the upward trend of FDI, 
GDP, and RS in Vietnam between 1990 and 2015. At the national level, GDP and RS closely follow 
each other (see Figure 5.1). 
 
Note: Ln(X) is natural logarithm values of X representing FDI, GDP, and RS. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Figure 5.1 The Trends of FDI, GDP and RS in Vietnam 1990-2015 
Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics of FDI and EG at the national, regional and provincial 
levels. The number of observations at the levels is 26, 96 and 960, respectively. The table reports the 




























































































































and EG across the three data sets exhibit large SDs (see Table 5.1). A large SD indicates wide data 
dispersion among years in the different data sets and may show the heterogeneity of the variables. 
At the national level, the minimum value of FDI does not equal zero, which means that FDI flowed 
into Vietnam every year from 2000 to 2015. However, at the provincial level, FDI did not flow into a 
province or city every year during the period (the minimum value of FDI at the provincial level is 0). 
Appendix Figures C.1 to C.6 show the differences in FDI at the regional and provincial levels between 
2000 and 2015. 
Table 5.1 The Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variables 
Variable FDI (in million USD) EG (in billion VND) 
Level National Regional Provincial National (GDP) Regional (RS) Provincial (RS) 
Mean 12104.14 2683.03 438.52 1209868.73 212787.51 21278.75 
SD 14555.44 4672.06 1957.32 1302023.59 240706.52 56101.38 
Minimum 1284.4 1.6 0 41955 7599 289.6 
Maximum 71726.8 32957 32019.6 4192862 1070878.4 711206.7 
Source: Author’s calculations 
The trends in the FDI and RS of the six Vietnam regions are diverse between 2000 and 2015 (see 
Figure 5.2). Regions attracting more FDI (regions 2, 3, 5 and 6) experienced different RS trends from 
regions attracting less FDI (regions 1 and 4). For example, the FDI in regions 3 and 5 rose dramatically 
and peaked at 33 billion and 21.5 billion USD, respectively, in 2008; and RS in these two regions grew 
rapidly between 2008 and 2015. In contrast, the FDI in regions 1 and 4 did not have large fluctuations 
in 2008 and RS of the two regions increased gradually from 2008 to 2015. Appendix Figures C.1 and 
C.2 present scatterplots of the FDI and RS at the regional and provincial levels, respectively. At the 
provincial level, diversity among the trends in FDI and RS in 60 Vietnam provinces and cities 2000-
2015 are recorded in Appendix Figures C.3 to C.8. The diversity provides suitable panel data sets to 
conduct the empirical study on the long-run nexus between FDI and EG at the regional and provincial 
levels in Vietnam. Appendix Figure C.9 is a scatterplot of the FDI and RS of the six Vietnam regions. 
Appendix Figures C.10 - C.15 are scatterplots of the FDI and RS at the provincial level in each region 
of Vietnam. 
5.2.2 Explanatory Variables 
This study uses three data sets for the national, regional and provincial levels. The explanatory 
variables employed at the different levels are different in both quantity and study period. At the 
national level, there are 19 independent variables of which 15 (POP, LF, EDU, OT, ER, CPI, ICOR, INC, 
STATE, MKT, SCI, FRE, BED, COM and CR) are continuous. To investigate the two way nexus between 
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FDI and EG in the long run, five variables, FDI29, GDP, POP, OT and ER, are collected from 1990 to 
2015 (26 years). Some variables, such as CPI, ICOR, INC, STATE, MKT and COM, are available from 
1995, CR is available from 1996, EDU is available from 1999, and the remaining variables LF, SCI, FRE 
and BED are from 2000 to 2015. The other four variables including one categorical variable (FTA) and 
three dummy variables (CRI, LAW and WTO) are available between 1990 and 2015. Appendix Table 
B.10 shows the availability of the variables at the national level.  
  
Note:  Region 1: The Northern Midlands and Mountain Areas 
 Region 2: The Red River Delta 
 Region 3: The North Central and Central Coastal Areas 
 Region 4: The Central Highlands 
 Region 5: The South East 
 Region 6: The Mekong River Delta 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Figure 5.2 The FDI and RS for the Six Regions of Vietnam 2000-2015 
At the regional level, 16 independent variables are included in the panel data set over the 16 years 
from 2000 to 2015 (see Appendix Table B.10). Among them, 10 variables (POP, LF30, EDU, ER, CPI, 
ICOR, INC, FRE, BED and CR) are continuous; two categorical variables are FTA and RR; and the four 
dummy variables are CRI, LAW, WTO and RR2. 
At the provincial level, 21 of 28 independent variables are continuous (POP, LF, EDU, ER, CPI, ICOR, 
INC, FRE, BED, IIP, PCI, ENTRY, LAND, ACCESS, TIME, CHARGE, PROACT, SUPPORT, LABOUR, LEGAL 
 
29 The FDI data in 1990 include the FDI data for 1988 and 1990 
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and CR). There are three categorical variables, WEB, FTA and PR (see Appendix Table B.10). The 
remaining variables (CRI, LAW, WTO and PR2) are dummy. Most variables in the provincial data set 
are from 2000 to 2015; LF, PCI and its sub-indices (ENTRY, LAND, ACCESS, TIME, CHARGE, PROACT, 
SUPPORT, LABOUR and LEGAL) are available from 2005 to 2015. 
5.2.2.1 Continuous variables 
Tables 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 present the data’s descriptive statistics for the continuous variables at the 
provincial, regional, and national levels, respectively. The tables report the number of observations 
(Obs.), the mean, SD, and minimum (Min) and maximum (Max) values of the variables. 
Table 5.2 The Descriptive Statistics of the Continuous Variables at the Provincial Level 
Variable group Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Human capital 
POP 960 1417.346 1118.884 278.4 8146.3 
LF 660 834.4371 635.1635 168.4 4251.4 
EDU 960 2.40615 7.009913 0 53.9198 
Economic 
ER 960 17644.39 2584.304 14319.62 21920.68 
CPI 960 107.2444 5.821519 99.4 119.89 
ICOR 960 3.018775 0.990371 1.486202 5.361442 
INC 960 2321.848 1760.942 383.7 11895 
Infrastructure 
FRE 960 10015.16 13252.35 409.9 99443.1 




IIP 960 0.639705 0.258593 0.012857 1 
PCI 660 56.98156 6.10465 36.75945 77.2 
ENTRY 660 7.864706 0.988831 3.641016 9.6 
LAND 660 6.257119 0.895592 3.04 8.84 
ACCESS 660 5.773868 0.916615 2.456816 8.85 
TIME 660 6.035468 1.150954 2.638305 8.93 
CHARGE 660 6.218255 1.003321 3.24 8.94 
PROACT 660 5.052521 1.343661 1.39 9.39 
SUPPORT 660 5.255351 1.39278 1.048505 9.620202 
LABOUR 660 5.244591 1.151627 0.999717 9.999575 
LEGAL 660 4.990719 1.233769 2 8.268376 
CR 960 0.6720 0.0241 0.625416 0.710504 
Source: Author’s calculations 
CPI and ICOR (the economic factors), all variables in the provincial competition group and the 
institutional factors exhibit low SDs in the three data sets (see Tables 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4). In terms of 
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EDU (the human capital variable), low SD values are seen at the provincial and national levels (Tables 
5.2 and 5.4), whereas a high SD value is present at the regional level (Table 5.3). 
Table 5.3 The Descriptive Statistics of the Continuous Variables at the Regional Level 
Variable group Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Human capital 
POP 96 14110.18 5149.877 4246.4 20925.5 
LF 66 8344.637 2957.792 2548.9 12032.6 
EDU 96 17.60696 13.19968 3.49275 45.5232 
Economic 
ER 96 17672.77 2562.539 14505.62 21914.56 
CPI 96 107.2444 5.84903 99.4 119.89 
ICOR 96 3.018775 0.995051 1.486202 5.361442 
INC 96 2554.301 2031.019 551.2 9979 
Infrastructure 
FRE 96 100151.6 84700.27 4834 396258.9 
BED 96 33291.58 13308.33 7961 61758 
Institutional factors CR 96 0.671996 0.024166 0.625416 0.710504 
Source: Author’s calculations 
5.2.2.2 Categorical variables 
The study uses four categorical variables, WEB (the infrastructure variable at the provincial level), 
FTA (the policy and law related factor at the three levels), PR (at the provincial level) and RR (at the 
regional level). Table 5.5 summarises these variables. 
Table 5.4 The Descriptive Statistics of the Continuous Variables at the National Level 
Variable group Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Human capital 
POP 26 79548.75 7734.526 66016.7 91713.3 
LF 16 47167.8125 5241.897 38545.4 53984.2 
EDU 17 18.3287298 6.673139 5.501777492 26.0550056 
Economic 
OT 26 90174.9385 98923.48 4425.2 327587.1 
ER 26 15229.4841 4015.176 6105.321043 21914.5599 
CPI 21 106.952857 5.680385 99.4 119.89 
ICOR 21 2.86723163 0.98161 1.438639342 5.36144248 
INC 21 2291.99286 1736.256 478.2 5695.3 
STATE 21 46.1904762 8.347389 33.9 59.8 
MKT 21 32.0761905 6.648978 22.6 38.7 
SCI 16 0.930625 0.345089 0.6 1.9 
Infrastructure 
FRE 16 600909.656 306204.6 194326.7 1123943.5 
COM 21 56322.4334 61676.37 746.467 148548.6 
BED 16 199749.5 38052.8 158873 266395 
Institutional factors CR 20 0.67476441 0.03372 0.625415743 0.74002217 
Source: Author’s calculations 
In Table 5.5, 18 of 960 data points show that a website is very good (WEB = 5) and satisfied five 
conditions: i) availability of more than one language; ii) availability of law documents; iii) economics 
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and social information (on English language page); iv) documents on investment registration (on 
English language pages); v) online registration and support (on English language pages). However, 
the number of data points indicating very poor websites (WEB = 0) is the largest category (336 of 960 
data points). This implies that foreign investors may encounter difficulty accessing official 
information using the state bodies’ electronic portals. 
Table 5.5 A Summary of the Categorical Variables 
Variable 
group 
Variable Values Entries 
Count 
Provincial Regional National 
Infrastructure 
WEB1 0 No factors 336     
1 1 factor 124     
2 2 factors 62     
3 3 factors 255     
4 4 factors 165     
5 5 factors 18     
Total 960     
Policy and law 
related 
FTA2 0 0 FTA 0 0 3 
1 1 FTA 60 6 8 
2 2 FTAs 240 24 4 
3 3 FTAs 120 12 2 
4 4 FTAs 60 6 1 
5 5 FTAs 60 6 1 
6 6 FTAs 60 6 1 
7 7 FTAs 0 0 0 
8 8 FTAs 120 12 2 
9 9 FTAs 180 18 3 
10 10 FTAs 60 6 1 
Total 960 96 26 
PR3 0 None 90     
  1 Difficult 132     
  2 Extreme difficult  738     
  Total 960     
RR3 0 Own any province having PR = 0    30   
  2 Own only provinces having PR = 2    48   
  1 Otherwise   18   
  Total   96   
Note:  1 Appendix Tables B.4 and B.5 provide definitions of WEB 
 2 Appendix Table B.6 shows how to define FTA 
 3 Appendix Tables B.7 and B.8 present how to construct PR and RR, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
FTA is categorised from 0 to 10. Table 5.5 shows none of the FTA data points are either 0 or 7. The 
number of data points indicating FTA = 2 is the largest at the provincial, regional and national levels 
(see Table 5.5).  
From 2000 to 2015, most Vietnam provinces and cities are on the list of areas under extremely 
difficult socio-economic conditions, which shows in Table 5.5 with 738 of 960 data points indicating 
PR = 2. At the regional level, a half of the regions are under the extremely difficult socio-economic 
85 
 
condition (RR=2), which is reported in Table 5.5 with 48 of 96 data points showing that all provinces 
in the regions are under the extremely difficult socio-economic conditions. 
5.2.2.3 Dummy variables 
The summary of dummy variables is shown in Table 5.6. Three variables, CRI, LAW, and WTO, take a 
value of 0 or 1 at the provincial, regional, and national levels. Two variables, PR2 and RR2, are 
defined at the provincial and regional levels, respectively. 
Table 5.6 A Summary of the Dummy Variables 
Variable 
groups 
Variables Values Entries 
Count 
Provincial Regional National 
Economic CRI 
1 The financial crisis in 2008 480 48 8 
0 Before the financial crisis in 2008 480 48 18 






Vietnam had new Investment and 
Enterprise laws in 2005 
660 66 11 
0 
Before Vietnam had new Investment 
and Enterprise laws in 2005 
300 30 15 
Total 960 96 26 
WTO 
1 Vietnam joined in WTO in 2007 540 54 9 
0 Before Vietnam joined in WTO in 2007 420 42 17 
Total 960 96 26 
PR2 
1 PR = 2 738     
0 Otherwise 222     
Total 960     
RR2 
1 RR = 2   48   
0 Otherwise   48   
Total   96   
Source: Author’s calculations 
5.3 Empirical Results 
This section presents the empirical results of the FDI and EG relationship, the FDI competition and 
the effects of policies at the provincial level, the effects of laws on FDI, and the FDI location selection 
in Vietnam. 
5.3.1 The Relationship between FDI and EG 
The tests of H1.1, H1.2, and H1.3 are reported in sections 5.3.1.1 (Long-term nexus between FDI and 
EG), 5.3.1.2 (Impacts of FDI on EG), and 5.3.1.3 (Impacts of EG on FDI), respectively. 
5.3.1.1 Long-term Nexus between FDI and EG 
The long-term nexus between FDI and EG in Vietnam is investigated at the provincial and national 
level using the cointegration – OLS – ECM approaches. 
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5.3.1.1.1 Cointegration – OLS – ECM Approach at the Provincial Level 
The cointegration – OLS – ECM empirical results of the long-term nexus between FDI and EG at the 
provincial level are as follows. 
Step 1 - Evaluate the long-term relationship between FDI and EG 
Before evaluating the long-term relationship, the stationarity of the panel data is examined using the 
three panel unit root tests including the LLC, IPS, and Fisher-ADF tests. Table 5.7 shows that the null 
hypotheses of non-stationarity of all variables (FDI, EG, ER, EDU, POP, and INC) in equations (4.6) and 
(4.7) at the level in the panel series cannot be rejected, while the first difference panel series reject 
the null hypotheses of non-stationarity of all variables. 
Table 5.7 The Test Statistics of the Panel Unit Root Tests for FDI, EG, ER, EDU, POP, and INC   
 Levin, Lin & Chu t Im, Pesaran and Shin ADF-Fisher 
 Level 1st difference Level 1st difference Level 1st difference 
FDI -17.4722*** -32.5560*** -11.5033*** -30.6297*** 391.0360*** 845.1260*** 
EG 4.2469 -3.2943*** 7.6692 -2.9663*** 90.7047 145.7540** 
ER 13.0117 -7.7749*** 15.0365 -7.7689*** 1.3474 247.9880*** 
EDU -2.3976*** -21.8140*** 1.8366 -16.1955*** 98.2804 459.5170*** 
POP -7.5561*** -6.5706*** 3.5863 -2.5047*** 234.8040*** 166.4090*** 
INC 24.7446 -15.9679*** 27.0802 -16.8065*** 6.9339 563.2790*** 
Note: FDI is FDI registered capital, Retails Sales (RS) represents Economic Growth (EG), ER is 
Exchange Rate, INC is monthly average income, EDU is education level, and POP is average 
population; the automatic lag length selection is based on the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) 
with maximum lag; the spectral estimation is based on the Bartlett Kernel method and the Newey-
West automatic bandwidth selection; *** indicates that the null hypotheses of a unit root are 
rejected at the 1% significance level. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
However, in terms of individual series, there are mixed results of stationarity of EDU and POP shown 
in the three different panel unit root tests (see Table 5.7). For example, the null hypotheses of non-
stationarity of EDU and POP at the level are rejected in the LLC test but not rejected in the IPS test. 
The results indicate that most variables are non-stationary panel series at the level, and all variables 
are non-stationary panel series and integrated of first order 𝐼(1). The variables that are non-
stationary panel series and integrated of first order 𝐼(1) enables us to conduct the panel 
cointegration test to investigate the long-term nexus between FDI and EG. Three types of panel 
cointegration test employed are Pedroni (Pedroni, 2004), Kao (Kao, 1999) and Johansen-Fisher 




Table 5.8 The Panel Cointegration Tests for FDI, EG, ER, and INC  
Test Statistics 
Pedroni 
  v-St rho-St PP-St ADF-St 
Panel -2.6541 -2.2812** -40.7588*** -19.8824*** 
Panel weight -3.9303 -1.0027 -22.6665*** -15.2488 *** 
Group   0.8837 -39.4636*** -20.9859*** 
Kao t-Statistic -6.9117*** 
Fisher 
Fisher Statistics (from trace test) 1279.0*** 
Fisher Statistics (from max-eigen test) 888.1*** 
Note: The panel cointegration tests are conducted with a selection of individual intercept; the 
automatic lag length selection is based on the SIC with maximum lag; the spectral estimation is based 
on the Bartlett Kernel method and the Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection; *** indicate 
that the null hypotheses of no cointegration are rejected at the 1% significance level; St stands for 
Statistics. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
First, the three panel cointegration tests are conducted for FDI, EG, ER and INC, which have 
consistent results of the three panel unit root tests, LLC, IPS and ADF-Fisher (see Table 5.8). Next, 
similar tests are employed for FDI, EG, ER, INC and the other two variables (EDU and POP) that have 
mixed results in the unit root tests (see Table 5.9). 
Table 5.9 The Panel Cointegration Tests for FDI, EG, ER, INC, EDU, and POP 
Test Statistics 
Pedroni 
  v-St rho-St PP-St ADF-St 
Panel -4.5085 2.7285 -67.5182*** -18.2713*** 
Panel weight -6.9008 4.6754 -28.8356*** -16.7591*** 
Group   7.3655 -46.9385*** -21.4293*** 
Kao t-Statistic -7.291565*** 
Fisher 
Fisher Statistics (from trace test) 4789.0*** 
Fisher Statistics (from max-eigen test) 2197.0*** 
Note: The panel cointegration tests are conducted with a selection of individual intercept; the 
automatic lag length selection is based on the SIC with maximum lag; the spectral estimation is based 
on the Bartlett Kernel method and the Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection; *** indicate 
that the null hypotheses of no cointegration are rejected at the 1% significance level; St stands for 
Statistics. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
The results in Tables 5.8 and 5.9 show that all tests reject the null hypotheses of no cointegration 
among the six variables (FDI, EG, ER, EDU, POP and INC) at the 1% significance level, which suggests 
that there is at least a long-term cointegration relationship between FDI and EG.  
Step 2 - Re-evaluate the relationship between FDI and EG using the OLS estimator 
The bi-directional link between FDI and EG is examined using the Panel FMOLS cointegration 
regressions applied for Models 2 and 3, Table 4.8. The two models are extended into six sub-models 
2a, 2b, 2c, 3a, 3b and 3c as shown in Table 5.10. 
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Table 5.10 The Models Used in the Panel FMOLS Cointegration Regressions 
Model 2 3 
Sub-model 2a 2b 2c 3a 3b 3c 
Dependent variable 
FDI FDI x x x    
EG RS    x x x 
Regressor 
EG RS x x x    
FDI FDI    x x x 
Economic factors 
ER  x x  x x 
INC     x x 
Human capital and  
demographic factors 
EDU   x    
POP      x 
Note: FDI is FDI registered capital, Retails Sales (RS) represents Economic Growth (EG), ER is 
Exchange Rate, INC is Monthly Average Income, EDU is Education Level, and POP is Average 
Population (definitions and sources of variables used are presented in Appendix Table B.11).  
Table 5.11 shows the results of the panel FMOLS cointegration regressions (FDI is the dependent 
variable). The panel FMOLS cointegration regressions are conducted through a weighted estimation 
panel method with two cointegrating equation deterministics including a constant (level) option and 
a constant (level) and linear trend option. The results show that the hypothesis of no link running 
from EG to FDI are rejected in both the constant (level) option and the constant (linear) and linear 
trend option at the provincial level in Vietnam. 





Constant (level) Constant (level) and Linear Trend 
























EDU     
0.0212** 
(2.1145) 
    
-0.0195 
(-0.5668) 
R-squared 0.627581 0.627496 0.564073 0.691404 0.691601 0.58498 
Long-run 
variance 
2.110705 1.895423 1.773422 1.783068 1.590764 1.484018 
S.E. of 
regression 
1.5953 1.5964 1.7280 1.5071 1.5075 1.7500 
Note: FDI is the dependent variable; RS represents EG; FDI, RS, and ER are natural logarithm values; 
the total number of observations is 900 (15 periods from 2001 to 2015 and 60 cross-sections); Values 
in parentheses indicate t-statistics; *** and ** denote statistical significance at 1% and 5% level, 
respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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In addition, a significant link running from ER to FDI is found in Models 2b and 2c (see Table 5.11). 
EDU, the variable with mixed results in the unit root tests, has a significant link to FDI in the constant 
option and an insignificant link to FDI in the constant and linear trend option. 
The results of the panel FMOLS cointegrating regressions (EG is the dependent variable) are reported 
in Table 5.12. The results reject the hypothesis of no link running from FDI to EG in both the constant 
(level) option and the constant (linear) and linear trend option at the provincial level in Vietnam. 
Significant links from ER and INC to EG are found in Models 3b and 3c (see Table 5.12). POP, which is 
the variable with mixed results in the unit root tests, significantly links to EG. However, the POP-to-
EG links are positive in the constant option and negative in the constant and linear trend option (see 
results in Model 3c, Table 5.12). 
Therefore, the hypothesis of no bi-directional relationship between FDI and EG at the provincial level 
is rejected. The results (see Tables 5.11 and 5.12) show that there is a positive bi-directional link 
between FDI and ER at the provincial level in Vietnam. EDU has significant positive effect on 
attracting FDI, whereas POP and INC significantly impact EG at the provincial level in Vietnam. 





Constant (level) Constant (level) and Linear Trend 


































POP    
0.1586*** 
(57.9789) 
   
-0.2821*** 
(-12.8512) 
R-squared 0.627581 0.973512 0.917822 0.947608 0.961410 0.968222 
Long-run 
variance 
2.110705 0.034132 0.023884 0.014507 0.010690 0.009527 
S.E. of 
regression 
1.2397 0.2114 0.3725 0.3081 0.2648 0.2404 
Note: RS representing EG is a dependent variable; RS, FDI, ER, INC, and POP are natural logarithm 
values; the total number of observations is 900 (15 periods from 2001 to 2015 and 60 cross-
sections); Values in parentheses indicate t-statistics; *** denote statistical significance at 1% level. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Step 3 - Investigate the causality direction between FDI and EG 
The results (see Tables 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9) show that there is at least a long-term cointegration 
relationship between FDI and EG. Therefore, Panel VEC models are employed to investigate the 
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causality direction between FDI and EG. Four Panel VEC Models 4-7 (see Table 4.8) are used to 
identify the existence and the direction of causality between FDI and EG at the provincial level. 
The estimated results of the Panel VEC Models 4 and 6 are shown in Table 5.13. The results show no 
long-run bi-directional nexus between FDI and EG at the provincial level in Vietnam with only two 
endogenous variables of FDI and EG. The negative, significant ecm(RS) (see Model 6, Table 5.13) 
shows there is a long-run causality running from FDI to EG. In other words, the effect of FDI on EG is 
a long-term process. However, the positive, insignificant ecm(FDI) (see Model 4, Table 5.13) shows 
there is no long-run causality running from EG to FDI. 
In addition, the null hypotheses that the regression coefficients of D[RS(−1)] and D[RS(−2)] are equal 
to zero are not rejected (see Model 4, Table 5.13). This indicates that RS is not Granger causal for FDI 
in the short term. The significant coefficient of D[FDI(-1)] and insignificant coefficient of D[FDI(-2)] in 
Model 6 show that FDI is Granger causal for EG in the short term (the first lag). This means there is a 
short-term causality from FDI to EG at the provincial level in Vietnam. In other words, the short-term 
changes in FDI affect the EG changes, whereas short-term changes of EG may marginally affect FDI 
changes.  
Table 5.13 The Results of Panel VEC Models 4 and 6 without Exogenous Variables 
Model 4 - D(FDI) Model 6 - D(RS) 
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient 
c 0.2567 (1.4267) c 0.1173*** (11.8959) 
ecm(FDI) 0.0048 (0.3898) ecm(RS) -0.0313*** (-8.7601) 
D[FDI(-1)] -0.6331*** (-18.0350) D[FDI(-1)] -0.0058*** (-3.0003) 
D[FDI(-2)] -0.3947*** (-11.4288) D[FDI(-2)] -0.0030 (-1.6101) 
D[RS(-1)] 0.8792 (1.3174) D[RS(-1)] 0.1757*** (4.8033) 
D[RS(-2)] -0.2930 (-0.4713) D[RS(-2)] 0.1731*** (5.0822) 
Note: RS represents EG; FDI and RS are natural logarithm values; Values in parentheses indicate t-
statistics; ecm(FDI) and ecm(RS) are the panel error correction terms; the lag length is 2; the adjusted 
sample is for 2003-2015 with 780 observations after adjustments; D[FDI(−1)] and D[FDI(−2)] are the 
lag-1 and lag-2 first differential panel series of FDI respectively; D[RS(-1)] and D[RS(−2)] are the lag-1 
and lag-2 first differential panel series of RS respectively; *** indicates the null hypotheses that the 
coefficients of variables are equal to zero are rejected at the 1% significance level. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
The estimated results of the Panel VEC Models 5 and 7 are shown in Table 5.14. Interestingly, the 
results show a long-run interactive relationship between FDI and EG at the provincial level in Vietnam 
with the other exogenous variables. Both ecm(FDI) and ecm(RS) have negative, significant values (see 




Table 5.14 The Results of the Panel VEC Models 5 and 7 with Exogenous Variables 
Model 5 - D(FDI) Model 7 - D(RS) 
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient 
c 23.1442*** (4.9676) c 3.0324*** (6.7062) 
ecm(FDI) -0.2146*** (-5.7203) ecm(RS) -0.0120*** (-2.6752) 
D[FDI(-1)] -0.4944*** (-11.8776) D[FDI(-1)] -0.0065*** (-2.9354) 
D[FDI(-2)] -0.3264*** (-9.0506) D[FDI(-2)] -0.0045** (-2.3236) 
D[RS(-1)] 0.6225 (0.9582) D[RS(-1)] 0.1482*** (4.2459) 
D[RS(-2)] 0.0369 (0.0609) D[RS(-2)] 0.2012*** (6.1675) 
ER -2.3429*** (-4.9322) ER -0.3051*** (-5.8954) 
EDU 0.0013 (1.5101) INC 0.0036 (0.3102) 
  POP 0.0070 (1.0087) 
Note: RS represents EG; FDI, RS, ER, INC, and POP are natural logarithm values; Values in parentheses 
indicate t-statistics; ecm(FDI) and ecm(RS) are the panel error correction terms; the lag length is 2; 
the adjusted sample is for 2003-2015 with 780 observations after adjustments; D[FDI(−1)] and 
D[FDI(−2)] are the lag-1 and lag-2 first differential panel series of FDI, respectively; D[RS(-1)] and 
D[RS(−2)] are the lag-1 and lag-2 first differential panel series of RS, respectively; ** and *** indicate 
the null hypotheses that the coefficients of variables are equal to zero are rejected at 5% and 1% 
significance level, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
In the short term, the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients of D[RS(−1)] and D[RS(−2)] are 
equal to zero is not rejected. This indicates RS is not Granger causal for FDI (see Model 5, Table 5.14). 
However, FDI is Granger causal for EG in the short term with significant coefficients of D[FDI(-1)] and 
D[FDI(-2)] in Model 7 (see Table 5.14). The results also show that ER has significant effects on 
changes in both FDI and EG in the short term at the provincial level in Vietnam.  
In conclusion, there is a long-term nexus between FDI and EG at provincial level in Vietnam with both 
the endogenous and exogenous variables included in the empirical Panel VEC models. If the models 
include only FDI and EG, the effect of FDI on EG is a long-term process and there is no long-run 
causality running from EG to FDI. With and without exogenous variables, there is a short-term 
causality from FDI to EG at the provincial level in Vietnam. In other words, short-term changes of FDI 
affect EG changes, whereas short-term changes of EG may have marginal effects on FDI changes. 
5.3.1.1.2 Cointegration – OLS – ECM Approach at the National Level 
This section reports the cointegration – OLS – ECM approach’s empirical results of the long-term 
nexus between FDI and EG at the national level. 
Step 1: Evaluate the long-term relationship between FDI and EG 
The long-term nexus between FDI and EG in Vietnam is examined using the Johansen cointegration 




Table 5.15 The Test Statistics of the Unit Root Tests for the Time Series FDI, EG, ER, OT, and POP 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate that the null hypotheses of a unit root are rejected at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% significance levels, respectively; the sample is from 1990 to 2015; the automatic lag length 
selection is based on the SIC with maximum lag for the ADF and the DF-GLS tests; the bandwidth of 
the Bartlett Kernel method is chosen for the PP test (Newey and West, 1987). 
Source: Author’s calculations 
The results in Table 5.15 show that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity of all variables involved in 
equations (4.4) and (4.5) (FDI, EG, ER, OT and POP) at the level in the time series is not rejected. 
However, at the first difference, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity of all variables is rejected. 
This indicates that the variables are non-stationary at the level and integrated at the first order 𝐼(1). 
Table 5.16 The Johansen Cointegration Tests for FDI, EG, ER, OT and POP 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Eigenvalue Trace Statistic Max-Eigen Statistic 
None* 0.9986 271.4756*** (69.8189) 150.5867*** (33.8769) 
At most 1* 0.8962 120.8890*** (47.8561) 52.1063*** (27.5843) 
At most 2* 0.7291 68.7826*** (29.7971) 30.0383*** (21.1316) 
At most 3* 0.6236 38.7443*** (15.4947) 22.4754*** (14.2646) 
At most 4* 0.5070 16.2690*** (3.8415) 16.2690*** (3.8415) 
Note: The cointegration tests are conducted with cointegration test specifications of allowing for 
linear deterministic trend in data with Intercept (no trend) in CE and test VAR; CE is cointegrating 
equation(s); Trace and Max-eigenvalue tests indicate 5 cointegrating equations; 𝑟 = 0, 4̅̅ ̅̅̅; 𝑔 = 5; * 
denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at 5% significance level; *** indicates the null hypothesis is 
rejected at the 1% significance level; values in parentheses indicate 0.05 critical values. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Table 5.16 reports the results of the Johansen test. The results reject all null hypotheses of the 
number of cointegration vectors from “None” to “At most 4” among the five variables (FDI, EG, ER, 
OT and POP). This means that there is a long-term cointegration relationship at least between FDI 
and EG. 
  Level 1
st difference 






 FDI -1.79667* -2.73221* -3.56228* -6.81553*** -6.70623*** -6.55207*** 
GDP 0.996026 -1.67949 -2.92217 -0.74424 -1.53493 -2.41371 
OT 7.500129 4.793202 2.018677 0.52807 -0.51828 -4.70273*** 
ER 2.154077 -1.72043 -4.26877** -2.98212*** -7.2915*** -7.0044*** 






FDI -1.79667* -2.67353* -3.56228* -7.90526*** -8.37371*** -8.13132*** 
GDP 7.293286 4.603209 0.654348 -0.69134 -1.47768 -2.70224 
OT 10.13428 10.57179 3.493559 -1.83663* -2.73039* -5.4312*** 
ER 2.101398 -1.703 -4.30762** -5.70452*** -6.96913*** -6.82132*** 







t FDI  -2.72086** -3.71068***  -6.85427*** -6.85460*** 
GDP  -1.20687 -3.15468***  -1.65250 -2.78198** 
OT  -0.29566 -1.28937  -0.40915 -5.35943*** 
ER  -0.37163 -3.50931***  -1.37113 -2.37146** 
POP  1.60959 -3.21503***  -1.07769 -1.31757 
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Step 2: Re-evaluate the relationship between FDI and EG using the OLS estimator  
The bi-directional link between FDI and EG is examined using FMOLS estimators (Phillips & Hansen, 
1990) applied for Models 9 and 10, Table 4.9. The two models are extended into six sub-models, 9a, 
9b, 9c, 10a, 10b, and 10c, shown in Table 5.17. 
Table 5.17 The Models Used in the FMOLS Cointegration Regressions 
Model 9 10 
Sub-model 9a 9b 9c 10a 10b 10c 
Dependent variable 
FDI FDI x x x    
EG GDP    x x x 
Regressor 
EG GDP x x x    
FDI FDI    x x x 
Economic factors 
ER  x x  x x 
OT   x  x x 
Demographic factor POP      x 
Note: FDI is FDI registered capital, GDP represents economic growth (EG), ER is Exchange Rate, OT is 
Open Trade, and POP is average population (definitions and sources of variables used are presented 
in Appendix Table B.11).  
Table 5.18 reports the results of the FMOLS cointegration regressions (FDI is the dependent variable) 
using a weight estimation panel method with two cointegrating equation deterministics (a constant 
(level) option, and a constant (level) and linear trend option). The results show that with the constant 
(level) option, the hypothesis of no link running from EG to FDI at the national level is rejected (see 
Models 9a-c, Table 5.18). In terms of the constant and linear trend option, the hypothesis is also 
rejected (see Models 9a-c, Table 5.18). In addition, a significant link from ER to FDI is found in sub-
models 9b and 9c, but no significant link between OT and FDI is found in any models (see Table 5.18). 




Constant (level) Constant (level) and Linear Trend 






























R-squared 0.658178 0.855451 0.844428 0.703735 0.833827 0.832283 
Long-run variance 0.788085 0.357251 0.289950 0.729051 0.236887 0.237030 
Note: FDI is the dependent variable; GDP represents EG; FDI, GDP, ER, and OT are natural logarithm 
values; the total number of observations is 25 after adjustments (1991-2015); Values in parentheses 
indicate t-statistics; ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
The results of the FMOLS cointegrating regressions with the dependent variable EG are shown in 
94 
 
Table 5.19. The results reject the hypothesis of no link from FDI to EG in both the constant (level) 
option and the constant (linear) and linear trend option in Models 10a and 10b. In Models 10b (ER 
and OT are added) and 10c (ER, OT, and POP are added), significant links from ER and OT to EG are 
found, but the POP-to-EG link is negative and insignificant (see Table 5.19). POP will not be included 
in the VEC models in Step 3. 




Constant (level) Constant (level) and Linear Trend 








































R-squared 0.638849 0.994804 0.994474 0.992935 0.995261 0.994979 
Long-run variance 1.058011 0.008431 0.009862 0.026126 0.006526 0.005830 
Note: GDP representing EG is the dependent variable; GDP, FDI, ER, OT, and POP are natural 
logarithm values; the total number of observations is 25 after adjustments (1991-2015); values in 
parentheses indicate t-statistics; *** and ** denote statistical significance at 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Step 3: Investigate the causality direction between FDI and EG 
In Step 3, the VEC models are employed to identify the causality direction between FDI and EG. The 
estimated results of VEC Models 11 and 13 are shown in Table 5.20. With only two endogenous 
variables (FDI and EG), no long-run bi-directional nexus between FDI and EG at Vietnam’s national  
Table 5.20 The Estimated Results of VEC Models 11 and 13 without Exogenous Variables 
Model 11 - D(FDI) Model 13 - D(GDP) 
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient 
c -0.2966 (-0.9865) c 0.0807* (2.0231) 
ecm(FDI) -0.5904*** (-2.8424) ecm(GDP) -0.0041 (-0.1779) 
D[FDI(-1)] 0.3120 (1.3190) D[FDI(-1)] -0.0090 (-0.2867) 
D[FDI(-2)] 0.3675 (1.6131) D[FDI(-2)] 0.0024 (0.0794) 
D[GDP(-1)] 0.7346 (0.3135) D[GDP(-1)] 0.4062 (1.3064) 
D[GDP(-2)] 1.0175 (0.8033) D[GDP(-2)] 0.0448 (0.2663) 
Note: GDP represents EG; FDI and GDP are natural logarithm values; values in parentheses indicate t-
statistics; ecm(FDI) and ecm(GDP) are the error correction terms; the lag length is 2; the total 
number of observations is 23 after adjustments (1993-2015); D[FDI(−1)] and D[FDI(−2)] are the lag-1 
and lag-2 first differential series of FDI, respectively; D[GDP(-1)]and D[GDP(−2)] are the lag-1 and lag-
2 first differential series of GDP, respectively; *** and * indicate the null hypotheses that the 
coefficients of variables are equal to zero are rejected at 1% and 10% level, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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level is found. The negative, significant ecm(FDI) (see Model 11, Table 5.20) shows that there is long-
run causality running from EG to FDI. However, there is no long-run causality running from FDI to EG 
because of the negative, insignificant ecm(GDP) (see Model 13, Table 5.20). 
In addition, the null hypotheses that the regression coefficients of D[GDP(−1)] and D[GDP(−2)] in 
Model 11, D[FDI(-1)] and D[FDI(-2)] in Model 13 are equal to zero are not rejected. This means that 
GDP is not Granger causal for FDI and FDI is not Granger causal for GDP in the short term in Vietnam 
(see Table 5.20). In other words, short-term changes of FDI and EG affect changes in EG and FDI 
marginally, respectively. 
Table 5.21 The Estimated Results of VEC Models 12 and 14 with Exogenous Variables  
Model 12 - D(FDI) Model 14 - D(GDP) 
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient 
c 26.3779*** (2.8105) c 4.1554* (2.0160) 
ecm(FDI) -0.4674*** (-5.5736) ecm(GDP) -0.0317 (-0.8358) 
D[FDI(-1)] -0.0779 (-0.6025) D[FDI(-1)] -0.0369 (-1.2973) 
D[FDI(-2)] -0.1628 (-1.2066) D[FDI(-2)] -0.0296 (-0.9997) 
D[GDP(-1)] -0.7467 (-0.6267) D[GDP(-1)] 0.3624 (1.3849) 
D[GDP(-2)] 1.6238** (2.3998) D[GDP(-2)] 0.0570 (0.3836) 
ER -5.2553*** (-4.8965) ER -0.5844** (-2.4792) 
OT 2.2161*** (9.0711) OT 0.1440** (3.6834) 
Note: GDP represents EG; FDI, GDP, ER, and OT are natural logarithm values; values in parentheses 
indicate t-statistics; ecm(FDI) and ecm(GDP) are the error correction terms; the lag length is 2; the 
total number of observations is 23 after adjustments (1993-2015); D[FDI(−1)] and D[FDI(−2)] are the 
lag-1 and lag-2 first differential series of FDI respectively; D[GDP(-1)]and D[GDP(−2)] are the lag-1 
and lag-2 first differential series of GDP respectively; *, **, and *** indicate the null hypotheses that 
the coefficients of variables are equal to zero are rejected at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, 
respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
The estimated results of VEC Models 12 and 14 with the exogenous variables ER and OT are shown in 
Table 5.21. A long-run one-way relationship from EG to FDI is found in Vietnam. The ecm(FDI) has a 
negative, significant effect (see Model 12, Table 5.21), but ecm(GDP) is negative but insignificant (see 
Model 14, Table 5.21). In other words, the hypothesis of a long-term two-way nexus between FDI 
and EG in Vietnam is rejected. 
In the short term, the null hypothesis that the regression coefficient D[GDP(-2)] is equal to zero is 
rejected (see Model 12, Table 5.21). This means that GDP is Granger causal for FDI in the second lag. 
However, FDI is not Granger causal for EG in the short term with insignificant coefficients of D[FDI(-
1)] and D[FDI(-2)] in Model 14 (see Table 5.21). In terms of the exogenous variables, the results show 
that ER and OT exhibit significant effects on changes of both FDI and EG in the short term at the 
national level (see Models 12 and 14, Table 5.21). 
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In conclusion, the results show that there is long-term causality from EG to FDI and that EG is 
Granger causal for FDI in the short term as estimating the VEC models with the exogenous variables 
at the national level. However, long-term and short-term causality from FDI to EG at the national 
level from 1990 to 2015 is not found. Therefore, the hypothesis of a long-term two-way nexus 
between FDI and EG in Vietnam is not accepted. This result does not align with Srinivasan et al.’s 
(2010) findings that reveal the existence of a long-run two-way nexus between FDI and EG in 
Vietnam from 1991 to 2007. This is because the short-term and long-term changes of FDI may have 
had marginal effects on the EG changes in Vietnam from 1990 to 2015, which is similar to Wei and 
Li’s (2011) findings of the less important role of FDI in promoting EG.  
5.3.1.2 Impacts of FDI on EG 
This section evaluates the impacts of FDI on EG at Vietnam’s provincial, regional and national levels 
using the OLS estimation methods. The OLS estimations are employed at the national level, whereas 
the Panel OLS estimations are used at the regional and provincial levels.  
Table 5.22 The FDI-to-EG Impact at the National Level 
Without a 
time lag 
Coefficient (Dependent variable: EG) 
Variable Model 15 Model 16 
c -18.6788 (-0.5813) -16.0628 (-0.4094) 
FDI 0.1246*** (3.0230) 0.1839 (1.7703) 
POP 1.1028 (0.3474) 0.0074 (0.0019) 
ER 1.3600*** (5.8047) 2.6472* (2.5287) 
OT 0.5087** (2.3558) 0.0755 (0.3300) 
ICOR  -0.0432* (-2.0674) 
INC  0.3464 (1.1704) 
CPI  -0.0102 (-1.7940) 
STATE  0.0011 (0.1578) 
MKT  0.0038 (0.4667) 
SCI  0.0315 (0.6469) 
Adjusted R2 0.995023 0.998701 
F-statistic 1250.442*** 1153.873*** 
Obs. 26 (1990 – 2015) 16 (2000 – 2015) 
With a 
time lag 
Coefficient (Dependent variable: EG) 
Variable Model 15 Model 16 
c 4.2400 (0.1446) 39.1410 (1.2489) 
FDI(-1) 0.0596 (1.6904) 0.1384* (2.3926) 
POP -0.6377 (-0.2184) -5.5588 (-1.7018) 
ER 0.7903** (2.4677) 2.9963*** (4.9400) 
OT 0.7687*** (4.0102) -0.1221 (-0.5648) 
ICOR  -0.0061 (-0.4956) 
INC  1.0117** (3.7759) 
CPI(-1)  -0.0037 (-1.1040) 
STATE(-1)  0.0110 (1.1900) 
MKT(-1)  0.0254** (3.0131) 
SCI(-1)  0.1512** (3.3287) 
Adjusted R2 0.994409 0.999159 
F-statistic 1068.193*** 1664.369*** 
Obs. 25 (1991 – 2015) 15 (2001 – 2015) 
Note: EG is the dependent variable; GDP represents EG; GDP, FDI, POP, ER, OT, and INC are natural 
logarithm values; values in parentheses indicate t-statistics; ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively; Obs. stands for the number of observations. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
According to Nguyen, Ho, et al. (2012), the impact of investments on EG has a time lag. In this study, 
the investment sources include FDI, STATE, MKT and SCI. The lag term in human capital (EDU), 
economic growth (RS), and inflation (CPI) is adapted from Escobari and Vacaflores (2014) and 
Nguyen, Ho, et al. (2012). Models 15 and 16 are first regressed without any time lag and then with a 
lag term in FDI, STATE, MKT, SCI and CPI to re-examine the FDI-to-EG link at the national level. 
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The empirical results of the FDI-to-EG impact at the national level without and with the time lag are 
reported in Table 5.22. A mixed result for the FDI-to-EG impact is reported without and with time 
lags. For example, FDI significantly, positively affects EG in Model 15 but the impact is insignificant in 
Model 16 (without a time lag in Table 5.22). The impact of FDI on EG with a time lag is insignificant in 
Model 15 but significant in Model 16. 
At the regional and provincial levels, the results of the Hausman test show that cross-section random 
effect31 models are appropriate. The empirical results of the FDI-to-EG link without and with a time 
lag are shown in Tables 5.23 and 5.24, respectively.  
The regression results show that FDI significantly, positively affects EG at the regional level in 
Vietnam. This is because the null hypotheses that the coefficients of FDI are equal to zero are all 
rejected in Models 17 and 18. 
At the provincial level, the mixed results of the effect of FDI on EG are reported in Tables 5.23 and 
5.24. The coefficients of FDI in Model 19 are positive and significant, which confirms the result of FDI-
to-EG causality at the provincial level in Tables 5.12 and 5.13. However, FDI negatively and 
insignificantly impacts EG in Model 20 (see Tables 5.23 and 5.24). POP, ER, ICOR, INC, and CPI exhibit 
significant effects on EG at the regional and provincial levels without and with a time lag (see Tables 
5.23 and 5.24). 
Table 5.23 The FDI-to-EG Impact without a Time Lag at Vietnam’s Regional and Provincial Levels 
Variable 
Model (Dependent variable: EG) 
Regional level Provincial level 
17 18 19 20 
c -51.4915***(-22.1287) -35.3982*** (-12.7074) -54.8164*** (-69.8800) -39.4626*** (-36.2104) 
FDI 0.1390*** (9.0059) 0.0514*** (3.1917) 0.0361*** (6.6713) -0.0037 (-0.8952) 
POP 1.5579*** (5.2899) 1.0607*** (6.4728) 1.1898*** (14.0388) 0.9655*** (15.8682) 
ER 4.8606*** (26.4810) 3.2419*** (11.3637) 5.6617*** (78.2808) 3.6630*** (33.0198) 
ICOR    0.0178* (1.7729) 
INC  0.4854*** (7.4084)  0.4999*** (21.5018) 
CPI  0.0121*** (4.4480)  0.0194*** (10.4129) 
Adjusted R2 0.965812 0.976781 0.919544 0.955917 
F-statistic 895.5764*** 800.3122*** 3654.497*** 3466.912*** 
Periods 16 (2000 - 2015) 16 (2000 - 2015) 16 (2000 - 2015) 16 (2000 - 2015) 
Cross-sections 6 6 60 60 
Obs. 96 96 960 960 
Note: EG is the dependent variable; RS represents EG; RS, FDI, POP, ER, and INC are natural logarithm 
values; values in parentheses indicate t-statistics; *** and * denote statistical significance at 1% and 
10% level, respectively; Obs. stands for the number of observations. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
31 The cross-section random effect models are regressed with selections of cross-section: random; period: 
none; weight: no weights; and coef. covariance method: OLS. 
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The scatterplots of FDI and RS at the provincial level in Vietnam by regions (see Figure 5.3) show 
different FDI-to-EG impacts in different regions. Unbalanced provincial and regional economic 
development and the effects of policies and laws in areas under different socio-economic conditions  
Table 5.24 The FDI-to-EG Impact with a Time Lag at Vietnam’s Regional and Provincial Levels  
Variables 
Model (Dependent variable: EG) 
Regional level Provincial level 
17 18 19 20 
c -50.3758*** (-19.7214) -32.7275*** (-11.0228) -53.6179*** (-63.6241) -37.2766*** (-35.1295) 
FDI(-1) 0.1393*** (8.5232) 0.0765*** (4.8175) 0.0345*** (6.1348) -0.0067 (-1.5174) 
POP 1.7056*** (5.4427) 1.0846*** (6.0019) 1.2197*** (14.0882) 1.0367*** (16.6703) 
ER 4.6066*** (23.3086) 2.9859*** (10.3117) 5.5198*** (71.2382) 3.4828*** (31.2558) 
ICOR    -0.0384*** (-5.0326) 
INC  0.4734*** (7.1919)  0.5250*** (20.9695) 
CPI(-1)  0.0080** (2.5684)  0.0106*** (6.8441) 
Adjusted R2 0.960937 0.973769 0.911506 0.949193 
F-statistic 730.7806*** 661.7920*** 3087.630*** 2800.231*** 
Periods 15 (2001 - 2015) 15 (2001 - 2015) 15 (2001 - 2015) 15 (2001 - 2015) 
Cross-sections 6 6 60 60 
Obs. 90 90 900 900 
Note: EG is the dependent variable; RS represents EG; RS, FDI, POP, ER, and INC are natural logarithm 
values; values in parentheses indicate t-statistics; *** and ** denote statistical significance at 1% and 
5% level, respectively; Obs. stands for the number of observations. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
can cause the different effects of FDI in Vietnam. Therefore, the scatterplots of FDI and RS with the 
regression line and the Kernel Fit line are drawn for two areas (see Figures 5.4 and 5.5). The first area 
includes five city administrative units (Hanoi, Hai Phong, Da Nang, Ho Chi Minh city and Can Tho), 
and the second area includes five provinces under the extremely difficult socio-economic 
conditions32 (Bac Kan, Lao Cai, Lai Chau, Gia Lai, and Kon Tum). Figure 5.4 shows a positive, strong 
relationship between FDI and RS for the five cities, but the relationship is fairly weak for the five 
provinces under the extremely difficult conditions (see Figure 5.5). 
 
32 Bac Kan, Lao Cai, Lai Chau, Gia Lai, and Kon Tum were under the extremely difficult socio-economic 
conditions (PR=2) over 2000-2015. 
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Note:  The scatterplots are stack cross sections with the regression lines (in red). 
 L_RS and L_FDI indicate that RS and FDI are natural logarithm values. 
 Region 1 is the Northern Midlands and Mountain Areas 
 Region 2 is the Red River Delta 
 Region 3 is the North Central and Central Coastal Areas 
 Region 4 is the Central Highlands 
 Region 5 the South East  
 Region 6 is the Mekong River Delta 
Source: Author’s calculations  












































































Note: The scatterplots are stack cross sections with the regression line (left) and the Kernel Fit line 
(right). L_RS and L_FDI indicate that RS and FDI are natural logarithm values. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Figure 5.4 Scatterplots of FDI and RS for Five Cities in Vietnam 
   
  
Note: The scatterplots are stack cross sections with the regression line (left) and the Kernel Fit line 
(right). L_RS and L_FDI indicate that RS and FDI are natural logarithm values. 
Source: Author’s calculations 




















































5.3.1.3 Impacts of EG on FDI 
In terms of H1.3, the EG-to-FDI link is examined at the national level using regression Models 21, 22, 
and 23. The results are reported in Tables 5.25 and 5.26. Table 5.25 shows the inconsistent results for  
Table 5.25 The EG-to-FDI Impact without a Time Lag at the Vietnam National Level  
 Coefficient (Dependent variable: FDI) 
Variable Model 21 (1990-2015) Model 22 (1995-2015) Model 23 (2000-2015) 
c 32.9050*** (4.4444) 77.8784*** (12.2080) 92.2913 (1.2050) 
EG 3.0036*** (3.4488) 2.1018* (1.9446) 2.1958 (1.3297) 
ER -5.4651*** (-4.2801) -11.2815*** (-8.1351) -11.7493*** (-6.0775) 
OT -1.0943* (-1.7387) 0.8066 (1.2843) 1.1727 (1.0849) 
ICOR  0.1342* (2.3516) 0.1517* (2.2841) 
INC  0.0474 (0.0544) -0.3622 (-0.2914) 
CPI  0.0422** (2.9363) 0.0421* (2.6232) 
STATE  -0.0169 (-0.8060) -0.0102 (-0.4504) 
MKT  -0.0488*** (-3.8563) -0.0540* (-2.3106) 
SCI  -0.2768** (-2.7231) -0.3480** (-2.6559) 
LF   -1.1945 (-0.1619) 
EDU   0.0270 (1.0610) 
Adjusted R2 0.814651 0.991898 0.991277 
F-statistic 37.62693*** 205.0506*** 155.9557*** 
Obs. 26 16 16 
Note: FDI is the dependent variable; GDP represents EG; FDI, GDP, ER, OT, INC, and LF are natural 
logarithm values; values in parentheses indicate t-statistics; ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively; Obs. stands for the number of observations. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
the EG-to-FDI link at the national level without a lag term in EG, STATE, MKT, SCI, CPI and EDU. EG 
positively affects FDI at 1% and 10% significance level in Models 21 and 22, respectively (see Table 
5.25). However, the relationship is insignificant in Model 23 (see Table 5.25). 
Table 5.26 reports the results of the EG-to-FDI relationship with a lag term in EG, STATE, MKT, SCI, 
CPI and EDU adapted from Escobari and Vacaflores (2014) and Nguyen, Ho, et al. (2012). The results 
show the mixed effects of EG on FDI attraction at the national level in Vietnam from 2000 to 2015. 
The coefficient of EG(-1) is negative and insignificant in Model 21, but positive and significant at the 




Table 5.26 The EG-to-FDI Impact with a Time Lag at the Vietnam National Level 
 Coefficient (Dependent variable: FDI) 
Variable Model 21 (1990-2015) Model 22 (1995-2015) Model 23 (2000-2015) 
c 46.3212*** (5.1552) 97.5056*** (6.5964) 178.5945 (2.2589) 
EG(-1) -0.1828 (-0.2931) 4.2928* (2.4387) 5.4770* (3.1039) 
ER -5.6114*** (-4.7036) -13.1117*** (-4.6566) -14.3798** (-5.3192) 
OT 1.7712*** (3.0933) 2.2475 (1.4956) 0.9962 (0.6369) 
ICOR  -0.1605* (-2.0865) -0.2296* (-2.5820) 
INC  -4.5706 (-1.5199) -3.8472 (-1.2903) 
CPI(-1)  -0.0404 (-1.9886) -0.0594* (-2.6630) 
STATE(-1)  -0.0924*** (-4.2689) -0.1082** (-4.3860) 
MKT(-1)  -0.0546* (-2.2088) -0.0459 (-1.8276) 
SCI(-1)  0.2489 (1.1146) 0.1185 (0.5075) 
LF   -6.9538 (-0.9133) 
EDU(-1)   0.0654 (1.6766) 
Adjusted R2 0.828849 0.980027 0.983072 
F-statistic 39.74225*** 77.3265*** 74.91399*** 
Obs. 25 15 15 
Note: FDI is the dependent variable; GDP represents EG; FDI, GDP, ER, OT, INC, and LF are natural 
logarithm values; values in parentheses indicate t-statistics; ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively; Obs. stands for the number of observations.  
Source: Author’s calculations 
Tables 5.25 and 5.26 show the high adjusted R2 values with several significant variables in Model 23 
compared with Models 21 and 22. The higher number of regressors in Model 23 may lead to the 
higher value of adjusted R2. The different study periods of the estimations (1990-2015 in Model 21, 
1995-2015 in Model 22, and 2000-2015 in Model 23) may be a possible reason for the different 
estimation results (see Table 5.26). 
Table 5.27 The EG-to-FDI Impact without a Time Lag at Vietnam’s Regional and Provincial Levels 
Variable 
Model (Dependent variable: FDI) 
Regional level Provincial level 
24 25 26 27 
c 69.8601*** (4.3546) 57.9931***(3.0688) -4.0617 (-0.5188) -43.7352*** (-4.9191) 
EG 2.2806*** (6.6711) 1.4546*** (3.2250) 1.1222*** (8.2560) 0.5372*** (3.3834) 
EDU 0.0404* (1.7659) 0.0207 (0.8619) 0.0049*** (4.0450) 0.0035*** (3.1063) 
ER -9.2872*** (-4.6534) -8.3739*** (-3.7104) -0.3154 (-0.3446) 2.9625*** (2.9739) 
ICOR    0.1449* (1.8405) 
INC  0.9743** (2.0285)  -0.0382 (-0.1866) 
CPI  0.0513*** (2.9781)  0.1195*** (8.4411) 
Adjusted R2 0.653781 0.687300 0.315660 0.393011 
F-statistic 60.79755*** 42.76118*** 148.4501*** 104.4884*** 
Periods 16 (2000 - 2015) 16 (2000 - 2015) 16 (2000 - 2015) 16 (2000 - 2015) 
Cross-sections 6 6 60 60 
Obs. 96 96 960 960 
Note: EG is the dependent variable; RS represents EG; FDI, RS, ER, and INC are natural logarithm 
values; values in parentheses indicate t-statistics; ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively; Obs. stands for the number of observations. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 5.28 The EG-to-FDI Impact with a Time Lag at Vietnam’s Regional and Provincial Levels  
Variable 
Model (Dependent variable: FDI) 
Regional level Provincial level 
24 25 26 27 
c 76.1956*** (4.2971) 78.1236*** (3.9393) -4.2103 (-0.4880) -2.1113 (-0.2290) 
EG(-1) 2.0217*** (5.3997) 1.6685*** (3.5094) 0.9888*** (6.6717) 0.8805*** (5.2638) 
EDU(-1) 0.0598** (2.5990) 0.0513** (2.0748) 0.0037*** (2.8715) 0.0027** (2.1574) 
ER -9.6128*** (-4.3647) -9.9844*** (-4.1505) -0.1516 (-0.1509) 0.0138 (0.0129) 
ICOR    -0.5003*** (-8.0058) 
INC  0.5879 (1.1761)  0.2784 (1.2320) 
CPI(-1)  0.0133 (0.7541)  -0.0310** (-2.5475) 
Adjusted R2 0.585883 0.586294 0.249691 0.301487 
F-statistic 42.97167*** 26.22573*** 100.7244*** 65.67004*** 
Periods 15 (2001 - 2015) 15 (2001 - 2015) 15 (2001 - 2015) 15 (2001 - 2015) 
Cross-sections 6 6 60 60 
Obs. 90 90 900 900 
Note: EG is the dependent variable; RS represents EG; FDI, RS, ER, and INC are natural logarithm 
values; values in parentheses indicate t-statistics; *** and ** indicate significance at 1% and 5% level, 
respectively; Obs. stands for the number of observations. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
At the regional and provincial levels, the EG-to-FDI link is investigated using Models 24-27 (see Table 
4.11). The results of the Hausman test show that cross-section random effect models33 are 
appropriate. The consistent results of a significant, positive effect of EG on FDI at the 1% level are 
shown in Tables 5.27 and 5.28 (without and with a lag term in EG, EDU, and CPI, respectively). 
Table 5.29 A Summary of the Relationships between FDI and EG in Vietnam 
No. Hypotheses 
Findings 
National Regional Provincial 
H1.1 
There is a strong long-term bi-directional link 
between FDI and EG in Vietnam 
No - Yes 
H1.2 
FDI significantly, positively affects EG at the 
provincial, regional, and national levels in Vietnam  
No Yes Mixed 
H1.3 
EG significantly, positively affects FDI attraction at the 
provincial, regional and national levels in Vietnam 
Mixed Yes Yes 
Q1. What is the relationship between FDI and EG in the provinces and cities of Vietnam? 
1. At the national level, there is no two-way nexus between FDI and EG. 
2. At the regional level, there is a bi-directional positive nexus between FDI and EG. 
3. At the provincial level, there is/are: 
i. a long-term bi-directional positive relationship between FDI and EG; 
ii. mixed results for the FDI-to-EG impact; and 
iii. a positive link from EG to FDI. 
 
In conclusion, the two-way nexus between FDI and EG does not exist at the national level. At the 
provincial level, there is a long-term bi-directional link between FDI and EG. However, the findings on 
 
33 The cross-section random effect models are regressed with selections of cross-section: random; period: 
none; weight: no weights; and coef. covariance method: OLS. 
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the effects of FDI on EG and EG on FDI at the provincial level are mixed. At the regional level, a bi-
directional relationship between FDI and EG exists. The findings are summarised in Table 5.29.  
5.3.2 FDI Provincial Competition and the Effects of Policies 
The results of the PCI-based and IIP-based competition in FDI attraction at the provincial level in 
Vietnam are shown in Table 5.30 (without a time lag) and Table 5.31 (with a lag term in EG, EDU and 
CPI34). The Hausman test confirms the random effects model is appropriate.  
PCI-based Competition in FDI Attraction 
The coefficient of PCI is positive and significant at 1% level (see Models 28 and 30 in Tables 5.30 and 
5.31). Therefore, H2.1 cannot be rejected because provinces and cities with better governance are 
strongly associated with FDI attraction. In other words, foreign investors are more likely to invest in 
Vietnam provinces and cities with better governance (higher PCI). 
Table 5.30 The Vietnam FDI Provincial Competition and the Effects of Policies without a Time Lag 
 Model (Dependent variable: FDI) 
Variable 28 29 30 
c -40.4238*** (-3.9760) -25.9559** (-2.3564) -40.1546*** (-4.0143) 
EG 0.7753*** (3.8300) 0.9513*** (5.0188) 0.7753*** (3.9856) 
EDU 0.0033*** (2.6452) 0.0033*** (2.7564) 0.0033*** (2.6837) 
ER 2.1245* (1.8078) 0.5494 (0.4347) 2.1412* (1.8413) 
ICOR 0.1258 (1.3441) 0.0680 (0.6497) 0.1479 (1.5449) 
INC -0.1247 (-0.4204) -0.1042 (-0.3431) -0.1080 (-0.3661) 
CPI 0.1299*** (7.8729) 0.1312*** (6.7728) 0.1269*** (7.6949) 
PCI 0.0396*** (2.6749)  0.0404*** (2.7575) 
ENTRY  0.2188*** (2.9260)  
LAND  -0.2311** (-2.4528)  
ACCESS  0.1025 (1.0859)  
TIME  0.0082 (0.1132)  
CHARGE  -0.0315 (-0.3598)  
PROACT  0.0580 (0.8405)  
SUPPORT  -0.1285** (-2.2172)  
LABOUR  0.1194* (1.7286)  
LEGAL  0.0970 (1.5605)  
IIP   -0.6101 (-1.3836) 
Adjusted R2 0.244086 0.259649 0.247994 
F-statistic 31.39887*** 16.40789*** 28.16539*** 
Periods 11 (2005-2015) 11 (2005-2015) 11 (2005-2015) 
Cross-sections 60 60 60 
Obs. 660 660 660 
Note: The random effects models are appropriate; FDI is the dependent variable; RS represents EG; 
FDI, RS, ER, and INC are natural logarithm values; values in parentheses indicate t-statistics; ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively; Obs. stands for the 
number of observations. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 




However, Nguyen, Ho, et al. (2012) argue that better governance was not strongly associated with 
higher FDI in Vietnam. Therefore, the effects of the nine PCI sub-indices on FDI at the provincial level 
are investigated using Model 29. The results in Tables 5.30 and 5.31 show only one sub-index 
(ENTRY) consistently exhibits a positive, significant effect (at the 1% level) on FDI attraction at the 
provincial level. This implies lower entry costs to start a business are more likely to improve FDI 
provincial competition. The coefficient of ENTRY in the model with a lag term (0.4196 in Table 5.31) is 
nearly double that in the model without a lag term (0.2188 in Table 5.30). This means ENTRY is more 
likely to be an important PCI sub-index contributing to better governance (higher PCI) and is strongly 
associated with higher FDI at the provincial level in Vietnam from 2005 to 2015. 
Table 5.31 The Vietnam FDI Provincial Competition and the Effect of Policies with a Time Lag  
 Model (Dependent variable: FDI) 
Variable 28 29 30 
c 3.0588 (0.2999) 16.2228 (1.4367) -0.4330 (-0.0432) 
EG(-1) 0.9647*** (4.7304) 1.0244*** (5.3854) 0.8687*** (4.4264) 
EDU(-1) 0.0029** (2.1143) 0.0027** (2.1170) 0.0028** (2.0909) 
ER -0.7237 (-0.5889) -1.7363 (-1.3236) -0.1199 (-0.0984) 
ICOR -0.5370*** (-7.1022) -0.5990*** (-7.5355) -0.4707*** (-5.9669) 
INC 0.1448 (0.4610) -0.1066 (-0.3435) 0.1763 (0.5638) 
CPI(-1) -0.0388*** (-2.8601) -0.0688*** (-4.6887) -0.0494*** (-3.5361) 
PCI 0.0581*** (3.7001)  0.0586*** (3.7627) 
ENTRY  0.4196*** (5.2443)  
LAND  -0.1278 (-1.3141)  
ACCESS  0.2924*** (3.1328)  
TIME  0.1152 (1.5753)  
CHARGE  0.0810 (0.9196)  
PROACT  -0.0392 (-0.5639)  
SUPPORT  -0.0775 (-1.3265)  
LABOUR  -0.0850 (-1.2241)  
LEGAL  0.1339 ** (2.1165)  
IIP   -1.4448*** (-3.0538) 
Adjusted R2 0.1802 0.2281 0.196351 
F-statistic 21.6973*** 13.9833*** 21.12621*** 
Periods 11 (2005-2015) 11 (2005-2015) 11 (2005-2015) 
Cross-sections 60 60 60 
Obs. 660 660 660 
Note: The random effects models are appropriate; FDI is the dependent variable; RS represents EG; 
FDI, RS, ER, and INC are natural logarithm values; values in parentheses indicate t-statistics; ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively; Obs. stands for the 
number of observations. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
The results on the effects of other PCI sub-indices such as LAND, SUPPORT, LABOUR, ACCESS and 
LEGAL on FDI attraction are mixed. The coefficients of LAND and SUPPORT are negative (see Tables 
5.30 and 5.31), and significant only at the 5% level without a lag term (see Table 5.30). LABOUR 
affects FDI positively and significantly at the 10% level without a lag term (see Table 5.30), but the 
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effect is negative and insignificant with a lag term (see Table 5.31). The coefficients of ACCESS and 
LEGAL are positive and significant at 5% level with a lag term in EG, EDU and CPI (see Table 5.31). 
The results in Tables 5.30 and 5.31 imply that lower entry costs to start a business (ENTRY), easy 
access to information (ACCESS), and fairer and more effective legal processes for dispute resolution 
(LEGAL) are more likely to increase the FDI provincial competition. The three sub-indices (ENTRY, 
ACCESS, and LEGAL) contribute to the positive, significant coefficient of PCI in Models 28 and 30 
(Tables 5.30 and 5.31). However, the mixed results of LAND, SUPPORT and LABOUR, and the 
insignificant coefficients of TIME, CHARGE and PROACT support the argument of a negative 
relationship between governance and FDI in the Nguyen, Ho, et al.’s (2012) study. This means that 
the ability to access land (LAND), the time required for bureaucratic procedures and inspections 
(TIME), informal charges (CHARGE), proactive and creative provincial leadership (PROACT), business 
support services (SUPPORT), and labour training policies (LABOUR) are less likely to determine 
investors’ decisions about where to locate their capital in Vietnam. 
IIP-based Competition in FDI Attraction  
The coefficients of IIP are negative (see Tables 5.30 and 5.31) and significant at 1% level with a lag 
term in EG, EDU and CPI. Therefore, H2.2 cannot be rejected, which means our findings do not 
conform to Thomas’s (2009) and Vu et al.’s (2009) results that more investment incentives attract 
more FDI. In other words, offering free land, income tax and import tax exemption is less likely to 
attract more FDI at the provincial level in Vietnam over 2000-2015. 
Table 5.32 A Summary of the PCI-based and IIP-based competition in FDI attraction for Vietnam 
No. Hypotheses 
Finding 
PCI PCI sub- indices IIP 
H2.1 
Provinces with better governance are 
strongly associated with registered FDI. 
Yes Mixed - 
H2.2 
Provinces offering higher fiscal 
incentives attract less FDI. 
- - Yes 
Q2. How does PCI-based and IIP-based competition affect FDI at the provincial level in Vietnam? 
1. PCI-based competition over 2005-2015 shows: 
i. Provinces with better governance (higher PCI) are strongly associated with registered 
FDI. 
ii. Three PCI sub-indices (ENTRY, ACCESS, and LEGAL) are more likely to determine 
investors’ decisions where to locate their capital in Vietnam than other sub-indices 
(LAND, TIME, CHARGE, PROACT, SUPPORT, and LABOUR). 
2. IIP-based competition over 2000-2015 shows: Provinces offering higher fiscal incentives 




In conclusion, H2.1 and H2.2 cannot be rejected. This implies that there is PCI-based and IIP-based 
competition in FDI attraction at the provincial level in Vietnam. Provinces and cities with higher PCI 
(better governance) attract more FDI, which aligns with Nguyen and Ho’s (2013) and Malesky’s 
(2010) studies. However, the PCI sub-indices differently affect the FDI provincial competition, and not 
all PCI sub-indices significantly affect FDI in Vietnam (see Table 5.32), which explains the weak PCI - 
FDI link found in Nguyen, Ho, et al. (2012) and Nguyen and Nguyen (2007) studies. In addition, 
provinces offering higher fiscal incentives (a higher IIP index) attract less FDI, which aligns with the 
Vu’s (2007) conclusion on the negative effect of incentives on FDI flows in Vietnam. Table 5.32 
summarises the PCI-based and IIP-based competition in FDI attraction at the provincial level in 
Vietnam. 
5.3.3 The Effects of Laws on FDI 
This section reports the effects of laws on FDI at Vietnam’s national, regional and provincial levels in 
Tables 5.33 - 5.40. At the national level, Table 5.33 shows that the new investment and enterprise 
laws in 2005 (LAW) and participation in WTO and FTAs by Vietnam insignificantly affected FDI 
attraction without and with a lag term in EG, EDU, CPI, and STATE. The insignificant effect of WTO on 
FDI at the national level does not align with the findings of Nguyen, Zhang, et al. (2012) and Pham 
(2011). This may be because the study period after Vietnam joined the WTO (eight years from 2008 
to 2015) is longer than the study periods in the previous studies. 
At regional level, the results of the Hausman test show that fixed effect models are appropriate. The 
results of insignificant coefficients for LAW, WTO, FTA, and their interaction terms with RR and RR2 
are reported in Tables 5.34 and 5.35. They imply that the law changes were less likely to affect FDI 
attraction at the regional level; the effects are not different among the six regions ranked differently 
in Vietnam over 2000-2015. In Models 33a-c and 34a-c (see the Tables 5.34 and 5.35), the adjusted 
R2 values are high with few significant variables identified. The possible reason to explain this is that 
using the fixed effect model may show impacts of only variables that vary over time, and omit time-
invariant characteristics of regions such as geography and culture. 
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Table 5.33 The Effects of Laws on FDI at the Vietnam National Level
 
Without 
a time lag 
Coefficient (Dependent variable: FDI) 
Variable Model 31 Model 32 
c 75.1309*** (3.4588) 84.6961** (2.7579) 
EG 6.1875** (2.2825) 4.7393 (1.4830) 
EDU -0.0186 (-0.4338) -0.0276 (-0.5856) 
ER -12.7662** (-3.1670) -12.5604** (-2.8236) 
ICOR 0.1979 (1.8322) 0.1378 (1.0792) 
INC -3.8705 (-1.4662) -2.6935 (-0.8976) 
CPI 0.0300 (1.0791) 0.0240 (0.7944) 
STATE -0.0424 (-1.2741) -0.0402 (-0.9726) 
LAW -0.2003 (-0.4627) -0.1092 (-0.2331) 
WTO  0.1702 (0.4378) 
FTA  0.1016 (0.5459) 
Adjusted R2 0.957202 0.952199 
F-statistic 45.73138*** 32.87191*** 
Obs. 17 (1999-2015) 17 (1999-2015) 
 
With 
a time lag 
Coefficient (Dependent variable: FDI) 
Variable Model 31 Model 32 
c 104.4300*** (5.5693) 139.4970*** (4.2405) 
EG(-1) 3.7806 (1.7521) 2.7420 (1.3832) 
EDU(-1) 0.0713 (1.3721) 0.0702 (1.5206) 
ER -12.1974*** (-3.6891) -15.5191** (-3.7584) 
ICOR -0.1535 (-1.4116) -0.1410 (-1.4483) 
INC -2.2795 (-0.9698) -1.2694 (-0.5904) 
CPI(-1) -0.0627** (-2.8349) -0.0493* (-2.3642) 
STATE(-1) -0.1085** (-3.4050) -0.0811* (-2.5009) 
LAW -0.4102 (-1.1832) -0.4476 (-1.2898) 
WTO  0.0179 (0.0517) 
FTA  0.2658 (1.4884) 
Adjusted R2 0.948167 0.959317 
F-statistic 35.29921*** 36.37074*** 
Obs. 16 (2000-2015) 16 (2000-2015) 
 
Note: FDI is the dependent variable; GDP represents EG; FDI, GDP, ER, and INC are natural logarithm values; values in parentheses indicate t-statistics; ***, **, and 
* denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively; Obs. stands for the number of observations. 






Table 5.34 The Effects of the New Laws on FDI at the Vietnam Regional Level
 
Without 
a time lag 
Coefficient (Dependent variable: FDI) 
Variable Model 33a Model 33b Model 33c 
c 26.0971 (0.8987) 25.7311 (0.8805) 23.9747 (0.8155) 
EG 0.5308 (0.6497) 0.4790 (0.5710) 0.4227 (0.4965) 
EDU 0.0116 (0.3776) 0.0186 (0.4827) 0.0140 (0.3668) 
ER -4.7238 (-1.3366) -4.6351 (-1.2998) -4.3491 (-1.2116) 
ICOR 0.2288 (1.4846) 0.2338 (1.5000) 0.2188 (1.4096) 
INC 1.2074* (1.9019) 1.2269* (1.9123) 1.2188 (1.4096) 
CPI 0.0883*** (2.9957) 0.0886*** (2.9858) 0.0868*** (2.9384) 
RR 0.2164 (1.1665) 0.0837 (0.1762)  
RR2   0.1233 (0.2568) 
LAW 0.6430 (1.3428) 0.4084 (0.4489) 0.4590 (0.8048) 
LAW*RR  0.1510 (0.3039)  
LAW*RR2   0.3031 (0.5447) 
Adjusted R2 0.859231 0.857656 0.857439 
F-statistic 45.60500*** 41.88536*** 41.81295*** 
Periods 16 (2000-2015) 16 (2000-2015) 16 (2000-2015) 
Cross-sections 6 6 6 
Obs. 96 96 96 
  
With 
a time lag 
Coefficient (Dependent variable: FDI) 
Variable Model 33a Model 33b Model 33c 
c 87.3881*** (2.8676) 86.1363*** (2.8008) 84.2445*** (2.7286) 
EG(-1) 1.9237** (2.2270) 1.8185** (2.0255) 1.7426* (1.9275) 
EDU(-1) 0.0520 (1.6536) 0.0646 (1.5449) 0.0645 (1.5721) 
ER -10.6172*** (-2.7719) -10.3749*** (-2.6698) -10.1435** (-2.6021) 
ICOR -0.1739 (-1.4686) -0.1636 (-1.3511) -0.1646 (-1.3649) 
INC 0.2928 (0.4406) 0.3158 (0.4714) 0.3560 (0.5345) 
CPI(-1) -0.0206 (-0.9385) -0.020 (-0.9211) -0.0205 (-0.9308) 
RR 0.0517 (0.2652) -0.1790 (-0.3327)  
RR2   -0.1386 (-0.2561) 
LAW 0.4623 (0.9694) 0.0650 (0.0658) 0.2397 (0.4122) 
LAW*RR  0.2605 (0.4605)  
LAW*RR2   0.4079 (0.6571) 
Adjusted R2 0.842846 0.841199 0.841885 
F-statistic 37.71708*** 34.67504*** 34.84864*** 
Periods 15 (2001-2015) 15 (2001-2015) 15 (2001-2015) 
Cross-sections 6 6 6 
Obs. 90 90 90 
Note: The fixed effects models are appropriate; FDI is the dependent variable; GDP represents EG; FDI, GDP, ER, and INC are natural logarithm values; values in 
parentheses indicate t-statistics; ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively; Obs. stands for the number of observations. 




Table 5.35 The Effects of the WTO and FTA Membership on FDI at the Vietnam Regional Level
 
Without 
a time lag 
Coefficient (Dependent variable: FDI) 
Variable Model 34a Model 34b Model 34c 
c 99.8506** (2.2852) 85.9306* (1.9557) 91.0927* (2.0871) 
EG 1.0089 (1.2836) -0.2198 (-0.2148) -0.0543 (-0.0543) 
EDU 0.0230 (0.7508) 0.0363 (1.1475) 0.0399 (1.1455) 
ER -13.0028*** (-2.7521) -10.8068** (-2.2394) -11.5103* (-2.4235) 
ICOR 0.1811 (1.0997) 0.1628 (0.9959) 0.1715 (1.044354) 
INC 1.2168* (1.8977) 2.0748**  (2.5761) 1.9906* (2.4552) 
CPI 0.0913*** (2.7567) 0.0963*** (2.9240) 0.0976*** (2.9419) 
RR 0.2020 (1.0821) -0.3591 (-1.0238)  
RR2   -0.4871 (-0.8918) 
WTO -0.5841 (-0.9564) -0.5503 (-0.7270) -0.5965 (-0.8228) 
FTA 0.3693 (1.3719) 0.2944 (1.0663) 0.3234 (1.1794) 
WTO*RR  0.0449 (0.1129)  
FTA*RR  0.0951 (1.3397)  
WTO*RR2   0.0702 (0.0939) 
FTA*RR2   0.1634 (1.1546) 
Adjusted R2 0.857729 0.860391 0.859492 
F-statistic 41.91000*** 37.59198*** 37.32003*** 
Periods 16 (2000-2015) 16 (2000-2015) 16 (2000-2015) 
Cross-sections 6 6 6 
Obs. 96 96 96 
 
With 
a time lag 
Coefficient (Dependent variable: FDI) 
Variable Model 34a Model 34b Model 34c 
c 112.0232** (2.4714) 95.6002* (1.9911) 101.0429* (2.1412) 
EG(-1) 1.3487 (1.5793) 0.5456 (0.4635) 0.7289 (0.6343) 
EDU(-1) 0.0388 (1.2255) 0.0527 (1.5680) 0.0524 (1.4119) 
ER -12.7204** (-2.5486) -10.4561* (-1.9266) -11.2037* (-2.1173) 
ICOR -0.2339** (-2.1362) -0.2216** (-2.0126) -0.2243* (-2.0183) 
INC 0.5693 (0.8582) 1.0635 (1.1687) 0.9929 (1.0935) 
CPI(-1) -0.0233 (-1.0819) -0.0237 (-1.1015) -0.0232 (-1.0710) 
RR 0.0876 (0.4558) -0.2902 (-0.7760)  
RR2   -0.2454 (-0.4038) 
WTO 0.6245 (1.1955) 0.3492 (0.4934) 0.4517 (0.6700) 
FTA 0.1959 (0.7692) 0.1537 (0.5700) 0.1673 (0.6249) 
WTO*RR  0.2783 (0.6882)  
FTA*RR  0.0331 (0.4349)  
WTO*RR2   0.3752 (0.4932) 
FTA*RR2   0.0517 (0.3416) 
Adjusted R2 0.848647 0.848261 0.847351 
F-statistic 36.64507*** 32.09591*** 31.87729*** 
Periods 15 (2001-2015) 15 (2001-2015) 15 (2001-2015) 
Cross-sections 6 6 6 
Obs. 90 90 90 
Note: Fixed effects models are appropriate; FDI is the dependent variable; GDP represents EG; FDI, GDP, ER, and INC are natural logarithm values; values in 
parentheses indicate t-statistics; ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively; Obs. stands for the number of observations. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 5.36 The Effects of the New Laws on FDI at the Vietnam Provincial Level 
 
Without 
a time lag 
Coefficient (Dependent variable: FDI) 
Variable Model 35a Model 35b Model 35c 
c -41.7645*** (-4.7960) -44.0050*** (-5.0219) -44.6187*** (-5.0496) 
EG 0.5489*** (3.6246) 0.5854*** (3.8077) 0.5762*** (3.6660) 
EDU 0.0037*** (3.3940) 0.0036*** (3.2532) 0.0036*** (3.2393) 
ER 2.8255*** (2.8221) 3.0071*** (2.9933) 3.0398*** (3.0041) 
ICOR 0.1140 (1.4109) 0.1207 (1.4959) 0.1304 (1.6162) 
INC 0.0344 (0.1481) -0.0808 (-0.3393) -0.0592 (-0.2483) 
CPI 0.1180*** (8.3627) 0.1184*** (8.4016) 0.1203*** (8.5319) 
PR -0.5250*** (-3.9839) -0.0147 (-0.0539)  
PR2   -0.0390 (-0.1413) 
LAW -0.2331 (-1.1405) 0.7815 (1.5133) 0.5512* (1.7522) 
LAW*PR  -0.5410** (-2.1292)  
LAW*PR2   -0.8835*** (-3.2107) 
Adjusted R2 0.400890 0.402838 0.403251 
F-statistic 81.21339*** 72.88103*** 73.00450*** 
Periods 16 (2000-2015) 16 (2000-2015) 16 (2000-2015) 
Cross-sections 60 60 60 
Obs. 960 960 960 
 
With 
a time lag 
Coefficient (Dependent variable: FDI) 
Variable Model 35a Model 35b Model 35c 
c -5.3719 (-0.5965) -7.1676 (-0.7903) -6.6128 (-0.7236) 
EG(-1) 0.7759*** (4.8751) 0.8058*** (4.9939) 0.8194*** (4.9662) 
EDU(-1) 0.0031** (2.5579) 0.0030** (2.4555) 0.0030** (2.4216) 
ER 0.6660 (0.6211) 0.7997 (0.7431) 0.6931 (0.6398) 
ICOR -0.4837*** (-7.4313) -0.4796*** (-7.3744) -0.4778*** (-7.3434) 
INC 0.1482 (0.5866) 0.0550 (0.2130) 0.0854 (0.3306) 
CPI(-1) -0.0350*** (-2.7579) -0.0346*** (-2.7321) -0.0341*** (-2.6916) 
PR -0.5705*** (-3.9401) -0.0982 (-0.3156)  
PR2   -0.0910 (-0.2884) 
LAW 0.1624 (0.7155) 1.0899* (1.8508) 0.8866** (2.5087) 
LAW*PR  -0.4980* (-1.7013)  
LAW*PR2   -0.8296*** (-2.6323) 
Adjusted R2 0.314657 0.315596 0.313173 
F-statistic 52.59409*** 47.06122*** 46.54641*** 
Periods 15 (2001-2015) 15 (2001-2015) 15 (2001-2015) 
Cross-sections 60 60 60 
Obs. 900 900 900 
Note: The random effects models are appropriate; FDI is the dependent variable; RS represents EG; FDI, RS, ER, and INC are natural logarithm values; values in 




At the provincial level, the results of the Hausman test show that the random effect models are 
appropriate for Models 35a-c, 36a-c, and 37a-b. The effects of new laws on FDI attraction at the 
provincial level are shown in Tables 5.36 and 5.37. The coefficients of LAW are insignificant in Models 
35a-b without and with a time lag. This implies that the 2005 new investment and enterprise laws 
have no impact on attracting FDI. However, the ranking of provinces based on the Decrees35 guiding 
the investment laws has a significant link with FDI attraction at the provincial level in Vietnam. The 
coefficients of PR in Model 35a (see Table 5.36) are negative and significant at 1% level, which shows 
provinces ranked with a higher PR (under more difficult socio-economic conditions) attract less FDI. 
The positive and significant effects of LAW on FDI are found at the provincial level in Models 35b-c 
(see Table 5.36). This agrees with the Nguyen, Zhang, et al.’s (2012) finding of a positive impact of the 
2005 new laws on FDI. In addition, the results of the interaction terms of LAW with PR and PR2 show 
the different effects of LAW on FDI attraction in provinces and cities ranked differently (see Models 
35b-c, Table 5.36). The effect of new laws in 2005 on FDI decreases in provinces under more difficult 
socio-economic conditions (see the summary of the effect of LAW on FDI with PR in Table 5.37). 
Table 5.37 The Effects of the New Laws on FDI with PR at the Vietnam Provincial Level 
PR Without a time lag With a time lag 
FDI change e0.7815 – 0.5410*PR e1.0899 – 0.4980*PR 
PR = 0 2.1847 2.9740 
PR = 1 1.2719 1.8074 
PR = 2 0.7404 1.0984 
Note: The effect of LAW on FDI (FDI change in million USD, on average) is computed as the inverse of 
the natural logarithm of the number (Ln) because FDI in the regression models is a natural logarithm 
value. The values of 0.7815 and 1.0899 are the coefficients of LAW in Model 35b without and with a 
lag term, respectively (see Table 5.36). The values of -0.5410 and -0.4980 are the coefficients of 
interaction terms of LAW with PR in Model 35b (without and with a lag term, respectively). 
Source: Author’s calculations 
If LAW = 1, the change in FDI on average during 2005-2015 compared with FDI before 2005 is 
reported in Table 5.37 (without and with a time lag, respectively) as follows:  
- the FDI in provinces with PR = 0 (not difficult) increases 2.1847 and 2.9740 million USD; 
- the FDI in provinces with PR = 1 (difficult) increases 1.2719 and 1.8074 million USD; and 
- the FDI in provinces with PR = 2 (extremely difficult) increases 0.7404 and 1.0984 million USD. 
 





Source: Author’s calculations 
Figure 5.6 The Decreasing Effect of LAW on FDI with PR at the Vietnam Provincial Level 
The negative, significant coefficients of the interaction of LAW with PR (see Table 5.37, Figures 5.6 
and 5.7) show the decreasing effect of LAW on FDI in provinces and cities under the socio-economic 
conditions from “less difficult” to “more difficult”. 
       
Note: FDI is in natural logarithm values. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Figure 5.7 The Regression Lines for the Effect of LAW on FDI with PR at the Vietnam Provincial 
Level 
The regression line slopes of the effect of LAW on FDI are different for different PRs (see Figure 5.7). 
The coefficients of the interaction term indicate differences in the slopes. Figure 5.7 shows that 
changes in laws may marginally impact on FDI attraction in provinces and cities under more difficult 
socio-economic conditions. The effect of LAW on FDI at the provincial level is re-checked using Model 
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interaction term (see Table 5.36) confirms the decreasing effect of LAW on FDI in provinces under 
more difficult socio-economic conditions (see the summary of the effect of LAW on FDI with PR in 
Table 5.37 and PR2 in Table 5.38). 
Table 5.38 The Effects of the New Laws on FDI with PR2 at the Vietnam Provincial Level 
PR2 Without a time lag With a time lag 
FDI change e0.5512 – 0.8835*PR2 e0.8866 – 0.8296*PR2 
PR2 = 0 0.5512 0.8866 
PR2 = 1 -0.3323 0.0570 
Note: The effect of LAW on FDI (FDI change in million USD on average) is computed as the inverse of 
the natural logarithm of number (Ln) because FDI in the regression models is a natural logarithm 
value. The values of 0.5512 and 0.8866 are the coefficients of LAW in Model 35c without and with a 
lag term, respectively (see Table 5.36). The values of -0.8835 and -0.8296 are the coefficients of 
interaction terms of LAW with PR2 in Model 35c (without and with a lag term, respectively). 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Figure 5.8 shows the new laws in 2005 may have led to a drop in FDI flows into provinces under 
extremely difficult socio-economic conditions (PR2=1). Figure 5.9 presents the different regression 
lines on the effect of LAW on FDI with PR2 from 2000 to 2015. This implies that the effects of LAW in 
attracting FDI are not the same in areas ranked differently and changes in laws may not benefit 
foreign investors in areas under extremely difficult socio-economic conditions. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 




















Effect of LAW on FDI with PR2
Without a time lag: e^0.5512 – 0.8835*PR2 With a time lag: e^0.8866 – 0.8296*PR2
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Note: FDI is in natural logarithm values. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Figure 5.9 Regression Lines for the Effect of LAW on FDI with PR2 at the Vietnam Provincial Level  
The effects of WTO and FTA on FDI attraction at the provincial level are reported in Table 5.39. The 
coefficients of FTA in Models 36a-c are negative and significant at the 1% level without and with a 
time lag. The increase in the number of FTAs Vietnam joined does not bring in more FDI into 
provinces and cities. The coefficients of WTO are positive and significant at 1% level only with a lag 
term (see Table 5.39). Neither WTO nor FTA has any significant coefficient for the interaction term 
with PR or PR2 (see Models 36b-c in Table 5.39). This implies that there is no difference in the effects 
of WTO and FTA on provinces and cities ranked differently. 
The effects of laws including LAW, WTO and FTA at the provincial level are reported in Table 5.40. 
The regressed results from Models 37a-b (see Table 5.40) provide results consistent with the findings 
of the effects of LAW in Table 5.36 and the effects of WTO and FTA in Table 5.39. The new laws in 
2005 have a positive, significant effect on FDI attraction at the provincial level and the effects of LAW 
are different in provinces and cities under different socio-economic conditions (see the negative, 
significant coefficients of the interaction terms of LAW with PR and PR2 in Tables 5.36 and 5.40). FTA 
negatively and significantly affects FDI attraction at the provincial level in Vietnam (see Tables 5.39 
and 5.40). WTO positively affects FDI attraction; the effect of WTO is significant at the 1% level with a 
lag term in EG, EDU, and CPI (see Tables 5.39 and 5.40). However, the effects of WTO and FTA are not 
different for provinces and cities ranked differently (see the insignificant coefficients of their 
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Table 5.39 The Effects of WTO and FTA on FDI at the Vietnam Provincial Level 
 
Without a  
Time Lag 
Coefficient – FDI is a dependent variable 
Variable Model 36a Model 36b Model 36c 
c -148.9571*** (-6.3939) -149.0758*** (-6.3932) -148.2869*** (-6.3565) 
EG 0.5841*** (3.8824) 0.5791*** (3.7741) 0.6080*** (3.8744) 
EDU 0.0036*** (3.3464) 0.0037*** (3.3432) 0.0035*** (3.2047) 
ER 13.8613*** (5.6240) 13.8674*** (5.6200) 13.7084*** (5.5562) 
ICOR 0.2009** (2.3113) 0.2013** (2.3149) 0.2020** (2.3223) 
INC 0.1887 (0.8849) 0.2015 (0.9108) 0.1646 (0.7361) 
CPI 0.1237*** (6.9889) 0.1237*** (6.9830) 0.1247*** (7.0364) 
PR -0.5170*** (-3.9411) -0.5148** (-2.2255)  
PR2   -0.3334 (-1.1236) 
WTO 0.4953 (1.5638) 0.8537 (1.5148) 0.8917* (1.9194) 
FTA -0.6545*** (-4.5979) -0.6993*** (-4.3240) -0.6391*** (-4.1410) 
WTO*PR  -0.2186 (-0.7683)  
FTA*PR  0.0271 (0.6265)  
WTO*PR2   -0.4730 (-1.0525) 
FTA*PR2   -0.0075 (-0.1041) 
Adjusted R2 0.414572 0.413600 0.412763 
F-statistic 76.45743*** 62.49124*** 62.27910*** 
Periods 16 (2000-2015) 16 (2000-2015) 16 (2000-2015) 
Cross-sections 60 60 60 
Obs. 960 960 960 
 
With a  
Time Lag 
Coefficient – FDI is a dependent variable 
Variable Model 36a Model 36b Model 36c 
c -129.7905*** (-5.3412) -130.1479*** (-5.3493) -128.9084*** (-5.2950) 
EG(-1) 0.7058*** (4.5042) 0.6933*** (4.3501) 0.7318*** (4.4866) 
EDU(-1) 0.0029** (2.3916) 0.0029** (2.4215) 0.0028** (2.2648) 
ER 13.9975*** (5.4596) 14.0370*** (5.4666) 13.8129*** (5.3790) 
ICOR -0.4500*** (-7.4266) -0.4499*** (-7.4180) -0.4502*** (-7.4204) 
INC 0.0967 (0.4158) 0.1332 (0.5503) 0.0850 (0.3486) 
CPI(-1) -0.0500*** (-4.1208) -0.0504*** (-4.1357) -0.0489*** (-4.0155) 
PR -0.5392*** (-3.8266) -0.6167** (2.4215)  
PR2   -0.3943 (-1.2037) 
WTO 2.0786*** (7.4445) 2.3367*** (4.1864) 2.4670*** (5.4961) 
FTA -0.8446*** (-5.8198) -0.9013*** (-5.4185) -0.8375*** (-5.2818) 
WTO*PR  -0.1627 (-0.5507)  
FTA*PR  0.0322 (0.7100)  
WTO*PR2   -0.4588 (-0.9841) 
FTA*PR2   -0.0004 (-0.0005) 
Adjusted R2 0.351510 0.350174 0.347719 
F-statistic 55.14422*** 45.04058*** 44.56721*** 
Periods 15 (2001-2015) 15 (2001-2015) 15 (2001-2015) 
Cross-sections 60 60 60 
Obs. 900 900 900 
Notes: The random effects models are appropriate; FDI is the dependent variable; RS represents EG; FDI, RS, ER, and INC are natural logarithm values; Values in 
parentheses indicate t-statistics; ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively; Obs. stands for the number of observations. 
Source: Author’s calculations  
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Table 5.40 The Effects of Laws on FDI at the Vietnam Provincial Level 
 
Without a Time Lag Coefficient (Dependent variable: FDI) 
Variable Model 37a Model 37b 
c -160.3972*** (-6.3005) -163.1349*** (-6.4060) 
EG 0.5788*** (3.7467) 0.5774*** (3.6533) 
EDU 0.0036*** (3.2697) 0.0035*** (3.1759) 
ER 15.0995*** (5.5382) 15.3854*** (5.6387) 
ICOR 0.2257** (2.4989) 0.2369*** (2.6274) 
INC 0.0333 (0.1342) -0.0029 (-0.0117) 
CPI 0.1219*** (6.9457) 0.1230*** (7.0095) 
PR -0.0957 (-0.3361)  
PR2  -0.0707 (-0.2287) 
LAW 1.4968** (2.4989) 1.0172*** (2.7059) 
WTO 0.4799 (0.8119) 0.6430 (1.3410) 
FTA -0.7648*** (-4.5879) -0.7340*** (-4.5541) 
LAW*PR -0.7129** (-2.2619)  
WTO*PR 0.0325 (0.1074)  
FTA*PR 0.0338 (0.7731)  
LAW*PR2  -0.9002** (-2.3294) 
WTO*PR2  -0.0700 (-0.1474) 
FTA*PR2  0.0177 (0.2408) 
Adjusted R2 0.415906 0.415799 
F-statistic 53.52765*** 53.50452*** 
Periods 16 (2000-2015) 16 (2000-2015) 
Cross-sections 60 60 
Obs. 960 960 
 
With a Time Lag Coefficient (Dependent variable: FDI) 
Variable Model 37a Model 37b 
c -160.4883*** (-6.0714) -163.0528*** (-6.1635) 
EG(-1) 0.6540*** (4.0836) 0.6548*** (3.9937) 
EDU(-1) 0.0028** (2.3307) 0.0027** (2.2395) 
ER 17.4566*** (6.1546) 17.7342*** (6.2455) 
ICOR -0.3864*** (-6.0071) -0.3785*** (-5.8906) 
INC -0.2098 (-0.7971) -0.2477 (-0.9451) 
CPI(-1) -0.0597*** (-4.7888) -0.0595*** (-4.7741) 
PR -0.0838 (-0.2655)  
PR2  -0.0321 (-0.0932) 
LAW 1.9279*** (2.9813) 1.4048*** (3.5040) 
WTO 2.0829*** (3.5584) 2.3180*** (4.9881) 
FTA -1.0475*** (-6.1173) -1.0214*** (-6.1732) 
LAW*PR -0.7218** (-2.1265)  
WTO*PR 0.0764 (0.2449)  
FTA*PR 0.0253 (0.5584)  
LAW*PR2  -0.8664** (-2.1218) 
WTO*PR2  -0.0541 (-0.1102) 
FTA*PR2  0.0041 (0.0537) 
Adjusted R2 0.356265 0.355219 
F-statistic 39.27207*** 39.09791*** 
Periods 15 (2001-2015) 15 (2001-2015) 
Cross-sections 60 60 
Obs. 900 900 
Note: The random effects models are appropriate; FDI is the dependent variable; RS represents EG; FDI, RS, ER, and INC are natural logarithm values; values in 




Table 5.41 A Summary of the Effects of Laws on FDI in Vietnam  
No. Hypothesis 
Finding 
National Regional Provincial 
H3.1 
There is a significant growth of FDI in Vietnam, 
especially in the first ranked provinces following the 
release of the new law of investment and enterprise 
in 2005. 
No No Yes 
H3.2 
There is a significant growth of FDI in Vietnam, 
especially in the first ranked provinces following 
Vietnam’s WTO and FTA membership. 
No No Mixed 
Q3. Does the rule of laws matter in attracting FDI to Vietnam? 
1. At the national level, the effects of laws on FDI attraction are insignificant.  
2. At the regional level, the effects of laws on FDI attraction are insignificant and not 
different among different regions. 
3. At the provincial level: 
i. The release of new laws in 2005 significantly, positively impacts FDI, especially in 
the first ranked provinces without difficulties in socio-economics conditions. 
ii. The positive effect of new laws in 2005 on FDI decreases in provinces under more 
difficult socio-economic conditions. 
iii. Provinces ranked with higher PR (under more difficult socio-economic conditions) 
attract less FDI. 
iv. Vietnam’s FTA membership significantly, negatively affected FDI attraction. 
v. Vietnam’s WTO membership significantly, positively affected FDI attraction. 
vi. The effects of WTO and FTA membership are not different in provinces and cities 
ranked differently. 
 
In conclusion, H3.1 and H3.2 cannot be accepted at the national and regional levels for Vietnam (see 
Table 5.41). At the provincial level, the rule of law significantly affected FDI attraction in Vietnam 
over 2000-2015. The effects of the new laws in 2005 on FDI are different in different provinces and 
cities. The impact of Vietnam’s WTO and FTA membership is not different in provinces and cities 
under different socio-economic conditions. Table 5.41 summarises the effects of laws on FDI at the 
national, regional and provincial levels. 
5.3.4 FDI Location Selection 
This section reports the results on the determinants affecting FDI location selection from the 
investors’ viewpoint at national, regional, and provincial levels in Vietnam (see Tables 5.42 - 5.47). 
The results in Table 5.42 show how significantly the education factor (EDU), the economic factors 
(EG, ER, ICOR, INC, CPI, STATE and CRI), the institutional factor (CR), and infrastructure development 
(COM, FRE and BED) affected foreign investors’ decisions on investing in Vietnam at the national 
level. Models 38 and 39 are regressed without and with a time lag in EG, EDU, CPI and STATE.  
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In general, the education factor significantly, positively affected FDI in both Models 38 and 39. The 
coefficients of ER are negative and significant only in Model 38. This implies that the higher VND/USD 
exchange rate negatively impacts the investment decisions of foreign investors. The results of the 
effects of ICOR, INC and CR on FDI are mixed (see Models 38 and 39, Table 5.44). The positive, 
significant coefficient of CR with a time lag shows that political risk is more likely to affect investment 
decisions. The higher value of CR (representing the lower risk level of CR) brings more FDI to 
Vietnam. The coefficients of CPI and STATE are insignificant (see Table 5.44). Interestingly, the 
positive, significant coefficients of CRI in Table 5.44 show there was an increase in FDI flows into 
Vietnam after the financial crisis in 2008. In terms of infrastructure development, COM, FRE, and BED 
have insignificant effects on FDI attraction to Vietnam (see Model 39, Table 5.44); the coefficient of 
FRE is negative and significant at the 5% level with a lag term. This implies that infrastructure 
development is not a determinant affecting foreign investors’ decisions on investing in Vietnam. 
The results of FDI location selection at the regional level are shown in Table 5.43. In general, the 
results of the regressors EG, EDU, ER, ICOR, INC, CPI, CRI, CR, FRE and BED are mixed in Models 40-42 
(see Table 5.43). The coefficients of CR with a time lag are positive and significant. This implies that 
political risk is more likely to impact on investment decisions. The insignificant coefficients of the 
interaction terms of CRI, CR, FRE, and BED with RR2 (see Table 5.43) show the effects of the variables 
are not different in the different Vietnam regions. 
The results of the Hausman test show that random effects models are appropriate at the provincial 
level. The empirical results of the determinants of FDI location selection are reported in Tables 5.44 - 
5.45 (2000-2015) and Tables 5.46 - 5.47 (2005-2015). The results in Tables 5.44 - 5.47 show that 
provincial competition and institutional factors including IIP, PCI, and CR, are determinants that 
affect FDI location selection by foreign investors at the Vietnam provincial level. The negative 
coefficients of IIP (see Models 43-52) show foreign investors are less interested in provinces offering 
more investment incentives (higher IIP). The positive, significant coefficients of PCI in Models 48-52 
(see Tables 5.46 - 5.47) confirm that foreign investors are more likely to invest in provinces and cities 
with better governance (higher PCI) in Vietnam. CR positively affects the FDI location selection, the 
coefficients of CR are especially positive and significant at the 1% level with a time lag (see Tables 
5.45 - 5.47). This implies that political stability is more likely to attract the interest of investors. 
However, the effects of CR on the FDI location decision are not different in different provinces and 
cities (see the insignificant coefficients of the interaction terms of CR with PR2 in Models 45, 46, 50, 
and 51 in Tables 5.44, 5.45, 5.46, and 5.47). 
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Table 5.42 FDI Location Selection at the Vietnam National Level 
 
Without 
a time lag 
Coefficient (Dependent variable: FDI) 
Variable Model 38 Model 39 
c 141.6098*** (7.0896) 130.3617** (3.1391) 
EG 7.8240*** (5.5092) 5.6803 (1.9425) 
EDU 0.0772** (2.4967) 0.0848 (1.4657) 
ER -19.8111*** (-7.0453) -17.4726 (-2.1578) 
ICOR 0.4151*** (4.6567) 0.2778 (1.5168) 
INC -5.8220*** (-4.1634) -2.1434 (-0.4357) 
CPI 0.0279* (1.9078) 0.0330 (1.2191) 
STATE -0.0331 (-1.8936) -0.0266 (-0.5520) 
CRI 0.5752*** (3.5822) 0.7178 (2.3211) 
CR -13.0642*** (-3.6181) -7.5516 (-0.6838) 
COM  -0.2126 (-0.7432) 
FRE  -1.4324 (-0.4852) 
BED  0.5687 (0.1035) 
Adjusted R2 0.988069 0.982415 
F-statistic 148.2210*** 70.83229*** 
Obs. 17 (1999-2015) 16 (2000-2015) 
 
With 
a time lag 
Coefficient (Dependent variable: FDI) 
Variable Model 38 Model 39 
c 84.9647*** (3.9883) 125.4328*** (6.2043) 
EG(-1) 1.9923 (1.4560) -0.2005 (-0.1587) 
EDU(-1) 0.0911** (2.5409) 0.0851** (4.2758) 
ER -10.9645*** (-4.8468) -0.0721 (-0.0250) 
ICOR -0.0982 (-1.4799) -0.1920** (-4.1236) 
INC -0.1350 (-0.0848) 8.0918** (3.6115) 
CPI(-1) -0.0219 (-0.9162) -0.0283 (-1.8931) 
STATE(-1) 0.0099 (0.1988) 0.0127 (0.4637) 
CRI 1.0794** (3.3930) 1.1705** (4.8964) 
CR 6.9104 (1.2216) 19.8744** (3.5655) 
COM  0.0594 (0.3725) 
FRE  -5.8402** (-4.4127) 
BED  -9.1555* (-2.9664) 
Adjusted R2 0.977679 0.994129 
F-statistic 74.00179*** 212.6576*** 
Obs. 16 (2000-2015) 16 (2000-2015) 
 
Note: FDI is the dependent variable; GDP represents EG; FDI, GDP, ER, and INC are natural logarithm values; Values in parentheses indicate t-statistics; ***, **, 





In terms of the effects of infrastructure development (FRE, BED, and WEB) on the FDI location 
selection, infrastructure development in health care (such as BED) and official electronic information 
(such as WEB) are not significant (see the insignificant coefficients of BED and WEB in Tables 5.44 - 
5.47). The insignificant coefficients of the interaction terms of BED and WEB with PR2 (see Models 45 
and 47 in Tables 5.44 and 5.45, and Models 50 and 52 in Tables 5.46 and 5.47) show the effects of 
the variables on the FDI location selection are not different in different Vietnam provinces and cities. 
However, the coefficients of FRE are positive and significant at the 1% level (see Models 43-52 in 
Tables 5.44 - 5.47). This implies infrastructure development supporting goods freight is likely very 
important in attracting the interest of foreign investors at the Vietnam provincial level. The 
coefficients of the interaction terms of FRE with PR2 are significant at the 5% and 10% level in Tables 
5.44 and 5.45, respectively from 2000 to 2015. The regression results of the sample 2005-2015 show 
the coefficients of the interaction terms are significant at the 5% level in Model 50 (see Table 5.46), 
and at the 10% level in Model 52 (see Table 5.47). Therefore, the effect of FRE is likely different in 
different areas, which shows that there is a geographical concentration of FDI at the Vietnam 
provincial level. The negative, significant coefficients of the interaction term (see Tables 5.44 - 5.47) 
show the decreasing effect of FRE on the FDI location selection in provinces under more difficult 
socio-economic conditions (see the summary of the effect of FRE on the FDI location selection with 
PR2 in Appendix Table C.1). Figure 5.10 shows the different effects of FRE on FDI location selection in 
different Vietnam provinces and cities.  
Source: Author’s calculations 
































































Table 5.48 summarises the coefficients of the regressors in Models 43-52 without and with a lag. 
Consistently, RS representing EG and the human capital factor (EDU) positively and significantly 
affects FDI attraction at the provincial level (see Table 5.48). For the economic factors, the positive, 
significant coefficients of ER show foreign investors tend to invest more into Vietnam as the USD is 
stronger. The positive coefficients of ICOR without a time lag correctly explain the positive 
relationship between ICOR and the total capital including FDI in the formula 𝐼𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡/(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 −
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1). However, the negative, significant coefficients of ICOR with a time lag show that the 
efficiency of the total capital invested negatively affects the investment decisions of foreign investors 
(see Table 5.48). This implies that investors tend to invest more into Vietnam as capital is more 
efficient (or ICOR is smaller). The insignificant coefficients of INC (see Table 5.48) imply that monthly 
average income is not a determinant of FDI attraction. Inflation rate has a positive, significant effect 
on FDI attraction without a time lag (see the coefficients of CPI in Tables 5.44 and 5.46), but it has 
negative, significant effect on FDI attraction with a time lag (see the coefficients of CPI(-1) in Tables 
5.45 and 5.47). This implies a lower inflation rate in the previous year is likely to encourage foreign 
investors to invest more into Vietnam the following year. The financial crisis in 2008 negatively 
impacted FDI flows into Vietnam without a time lag (see the negative, significant coefficients of CRI in 
Tables 5.44 and 5.46), but the impact is not significant with a lag term (see Tables 5.45, 5.47 and 
5.48). The insignificant coefficients of the interaction terms of CRI with PR2 (see Tables 5.44 - 5.48) 




Table 5.43 The Empirical Results of FDI Location Selection at the Vietnam Regional Level
Without 
a time lag 
Coefficient – FDI is a dependent variable 
Variable Model 40 Model 41 Model 42 
c 19.9836 (0.4733) 70.7126 (1.3415) 84.5585 (1.5609) 
EG 1.2405 (1.5458) 3.6436** (2.1076) 2.2772 (1.1733) 
EDU 0.0040 (0.1204) 0.0056 (0.1694) 0.0485 (0.9418) 
ER -5.0024 (-1.1213) -5.4909 (-1.0695) -6.3227 (-1.2409) 
ICOR 0.1161 (0.6750) 0.1940 (1.1124) 0.2178 (1.2124) 
INC 1.0780* (1.7265) 0.8901 (1.3522) 2.0857** (2.3751) 
CPI 0.0810*** (2.6729) 0.0819*** (2.7043) 0.0920*** (2.9929) 
CRI -0.4916 (-1.1796) -0.7689 (-1.5777) -0.4412 (-0.6252) 
CR 5.6305 (0.6704) 6.1847 (0.7088) 5.8362 (0.5380) 
RR  0.0154 (0.0662)  
RR2   -16.7946 (-0.7578) 
FRE  -1.6079 (-1.2005) -2.1033 (-1.3718) 
BED  -5.3567** (-1.9963) -4.8441*(-1.7213) 
CRI*RR2   -0.1802 (-0.2521) 
CR*RR2   -11.4503 (-1.1100) 
FRE*RR2   0.2833 (0.2377) 
BED*RR2   2.0437 (0.8328) 
Adjusted R2 0.85748 0.861791 0.863233 
F-statistic 44.96713*** 38.02267*** 30.98055*** 
Periods 16 (2000-2015) 16 (2000-2015) 16 (2000-2015) 
Cross-sections 6 6 6 
Obs. 96 96 96 
 
With 
a time lag 
Coefficient – FDI is a dependent variable 
Variable Model 40 Model 41 Model 42 
c 30.9340 (0.7399) 100.4115* (1.8979) 94.0571* (1.7861) 
EG(-1) 1.4318* (1.7521) 4.6965*** (2.7161) 2.5865 (1.3102) 
EDU(-1) 0.0421 (1.3625) 0.0515* (1.6694) 0.0845* (1.8235) 
ER -5.3007 (-1.1740) -9.6460* (-1.8659) -8.1998 (-1.5144) 
ICOR -0.2828** (-2.5468) -0.4000*** (-3.2330) -0.3519** (-2.6206) 
INC 0.3476 (0.5463) -0.0706 (-0.1029) 1.1355 (1.1997) 
CPI(-1) -0.0234 (-1.0286) -0.0275 (-1.1852) -0.0264 (-1.1470) 
CRI 0.2641 (0.6435) 0.0433 (0.1004) 0.1363 (0.2349) 
CR 16.0366** (2.2756) 18.7320** (2.6089) 14.9033 (1.5763) 
RR  0.0962 (0.4028)  
RR2   -33.8697 (-1.5107) 
FRE  -2.6943** (-2.0255) -2.4223 (-1.5682) 
BED  -3.1454 (-1.1036) -2.4998 (-0.8289) 
CRI*RR2   -0.0078 (-0.0110) 
CR*RR2   -4.3891 (-0.4225) 
FRE*RR2   -0.2635 (-0.1866) 
BED*RR2   3.8087 (1.3845) 
Adjusted R2 0.851833 0.855621 0.858902 
F-statistic 40.35953*** 33.96452*** 28.08841*** 
Periods 15 (2001-2015) 15 (2001-2015) 15 (2001-2015) 
Cross-sections 6 6 6 
Obs. 90 90 90 
Notes: The fixed effects models are appropriate; FDI is the dependent variable; RS represents EG; FDI, RS, ER, and INC are natural logarithm values; Values in 




Table 5.44 FDI Location Selection without a Time Lag at the Vietnam Provincial Level 2000-2015  
 Coefficient (Dependent variable: FDI) 
Variable Model 43 Model 44 Model 45 Model 46 Model 47 
c -60.2664*** (-3.8376) -57.8730*** (-3.6163) -67.9927*** (-4.0469) -59.0780*** (-3.6447) -64.5098*** (-3.9458) 
EG 0.3767** (2.0385) 0.3884** (2.1286) 0.3478* (1.8643) 0.3916** (2.1404) 0.3592** (1.9242) 
EDU 0.0357*** (3.2710) 0.0363*** (3.3360) 0.0036*** (3.3002) 0.0366*** (3.3516) 0.0342*** (3.1200) 
ER 4.4604*** (2.9012) 4.2390*** (2.7237) 4.6303*** (2.9063) 4.2027*** (2.6990) 4.6705*** (2.9735) 
ICOR 0.2050** (2.3181) 0.2043** (2.3083) 0.2119** (2.4007) 0.2038** (2.2944) 0.1965** (2.2208) 
INC -0.0285 (-0.1262) -0.0275 (-0.1217) -0.1372 (-0.5733) -0.0250 (-0.1056) -0.0838 (-0.3675) 
CPI 0.1326*** (8.1783) 0.1329*** (8.1664) 0.1342*** (8.2231) 0.1329*** (8.1557) 0.1345*** (8.2651) 
CRI -0.7577*** (-3.5551) -0.7475*** (-3.4596) -1.0137*** (-2.9124) -0.6435* (-1.9127) -0.7432*** (-3.4224) 
IIP  -0.8167*** (-2.5840) -0.6251 (-0.9522) -0.069 (-0.1135) -0.5905 (-0.7588) -0.4818 (-0.6788) 
CR -0.1319 (-0.0337) -0.6281 (-0.1561) 1.9678 (0.3334) 1.5647 (0.2693) 0.0924 (0.0229) 
PR2  -0.1537 (-0.3631) 8.6449* (1.7525) 1.8776 (0.4883) 0.0849 (0.1777) 
FRE 0.6363*** (4.2959) 0.6362*** (4.3321) 1.3057*** (4.1882) 0.6311*** (4.2918) 0.4472*** (2.6262) 
BED -0.3630 (-1.2267) -0.3692 (-1.2672) -0.4553 (-0.9395) -0.3667 (-1.2599) 0.1607 (0.4015) 
WEB 0.0384 (0.7345) 0.0391 (0.7522) 0.0181 (0.2030) 0.0409 (0.7814) 0.0300 (0.3527) 
CRI*PR2   0.3945 (1.1298) -0.1352 (-0.4328)  
CR*PR2   -3.2828 (-0.5881) -2.9572 (-0.5372)  
FRE*PR2   -0.7630** (-2.3892)  0.0000** (2.4848) 
BED*PR2   -0.0103 (-0.0196)  -0.0002* (-1.9598) 
WEB*PR2   0.0344 (0.3509)  -0.0105 (-0.1111) 
Adjusted R2 0.415386 0.415562 0.418706 0.414628 0.417066 
F-statistic 57.78321*** 53.45327*** 39.37602*** 46.28491*** 43.88293*** 
Periods 16 (2000-2015) 16 (2000-2015) 16 (2000-2015) 16 (2000-2015) 16 (2000-2015) 
Cross-sections 60 60 60 60 60 
Obs. 960 960 960 960 960 
Note: The random effects models are appropriate; FDI is the dependent variable; RS represents EG; FDI, GDP, ER, and INC are natural logarithm values; values in 
parentheses indicate t-statistics; ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively; Obs. stands for the number of observations. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 5.45 FDI Location Selection with a Time Lag at the Vietnam Provincial Level 2000-2015 
 Coefficient (Dependent variable: FDI) 
Variable Model 43 Model 44 Model 45 Model 46 Model 47 
c -49.7994*** (-2.9691) -51.5082*** (-3.0342) -58.9679*** (-3.3529) -53.0733*** (-3.0867) -56.5058*** (-3.2503) 
EG(-1) 0.4902** (2.5251) 0.5212*** (2.7174) 0.4863** (2.4624) 0.5084*** (2.6430) 0.5169*** (2.6344) 
EDU(-1) 0.0302** (2.5153) 0.0294** (2.4571) 0.0281** (2.3238) 0.0296** (2.4676) 0.0286** (2.3695) 
ER 4.5753*** (2.8033) 4.6962*** (2.8575) 5.0505*** (3.0329) 4.6218*** (2.8078) 4.9575*** (2.9921) 
ICOR -0.5221*** (-8.2302) -0.5161*** (-8.0965) -0.5176*** (-8.0726) -0.5121*** (-8.0028) -0.5218*** (-8.1909) 
INC -0.1844 (-0.7428) -0.1801 (-0.7259) -0.1718 (-0.6486) -0.0955 (-0.3645) -0.3263 (-1.2630) 
CPI(-1) -0.0497*** (-3.7517) -0.0518*** (-3.8581) -0.0518*** (-3.7927) -0.0539*** (-3.9597) -0.0483*** (-3.5786) 
CRI 0.1474 (0.6242) 0.1199 (0.5041) -0.0126 (-0.0347) -0.0198 (-0.0550) 0.1522 (0.6381) 
IIP -1.0365*** (-3.0160) -1.5995** (-2.2700) -1.8662** (-2.1529) -2.0383** (-2.4095) -0.9186 (-1.1390) 
CR 15.3720*** (4.0234) 16.1077*** (4.0927) 19.4434*** (3.2205) 19.3272*** (3.2467) 15.8938*** (4.0398) 
PR2  0.4052 (0.8856) 2.9988 (0.7067) 3.3007 (0.8084) 3.9583 (1.2805) 
FRE 0.7422*** (4.6602) 0.7599*** (4.8096) 0.5988*** (3.2012) 0.7617*** (4.8057) 1.2034*** (3.8022) 
BED -0.5079 (-1.5937) -0.5280* (-1.6820) -0.0677 (-0.1566) -0.5330* (-1.6972) -0.6378 (-1.2206) 
WEB 0.0055 (0.0991) 0.0040 (0.0734) -0.0057 (-0.0605) 0.0110 (0.1986) -0.0486 (-0.5261) 
CRI*PR2   0.1562 (0.4582) 0.1560 (0.4648)  
CR*PR2   -3.3558 (-0.5583) -4.0623 (-0.6950)  
FRE*PR2   0.0000* (1.8960)  -0.5413* (-1.6650) 
BED*PR2   -0.0002 (-1.5775)  0.1191 (0.2083) 
WEB*PR2   0.0043 (0.0408)  0.0712 (0.6905) 
Adjusted R2 0.339182 0.340543 0.33943 0.339933 0.34011 
F-statistic 39.45296*** 36.71099*** 26.66364*** 31.86552*** 29.95932*** 
Periods 15 (2001-2015) 15 (2001-2015) 15 (2001-2015) 15 (2001-2015) 15 (2001-2015) 
Cross-sections 60 60 60 60 60 
Obs. 900 900 900 900 900 
Note: The random effects models are appropriate; FDI is the dependent variable; RS represents EG; FDI, GDP, ER, and INC are natural logarithm values; values in 
parentheses indicate t-statistics; ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively; Obs. stands for the number of observations. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 5.46 FDI Location Selection without a Time Lag at the Vietnam Provincial Level 2005-2015 
 Coefficient (Dependent variable: FDI) 
Variable Model 48 Model 49 Model 50 Model 51 Model 52 
c -95.2882*** (-4.4163) -90.8442*** (-4.2026) -99.4935*** (-4.4297) -89.9999*** (-4.1081) -92.8997*** (-4.2165) 
EG 0.5108** (2.0343) 0.5100** (2.0636) 0.3859 (1.4941) 0.5071** (2.0387) 0.5180** (2.0246) 
EDU 0.0315*** (2.6118) 0.0333*** (2.7738) 0.0034*** (2.7988) 0.0333*** (2.7566) 0.0316*** (2.6096) 
ER 6.4831*** (3.2672) 6.1552*** (3.1056) 6.2734*** (3.1215) 6.2043*** (3.1232) 6.3909*** (3.1922) 
ICOR 0.1004 (0.7983) 0.0789 (0.6263) 0.1093 (0.8717) 0.0826 (0.6539) 0.0780 (0.6192) 
INC 0.3763 (1.2097) 0.3811 (1.2289) 0.2970 (0.9177) 0.3896 (1.2150) 0.3222 (1.0215) 
CPI 0.1709*** (8.2743) 0.1738*** (8.4079) 0.1785*** (8.6080) 0.1731*** (8.3544) 0.1734*** (8.3818) 
CRI -1.4813*** (-5.7078) -1.4312*** (-5.4949) -1.9240*** (-4.6170) -1.6974*** (-4.0512) -1.4125*** (-5.3962) 
PCI 0.0411*** (2.7930) 0.0394*** (2.6830) 0.0398*** (2.6529) 0.0385*** (2.5900) 0.0392*** (2.6495) 
IIP -0.5621 (-1.2393) 0.5570 (0.7262) 0.9005 (1.3042) 0.3268 (0.3750) 0.5223 (0.6335) 
CR 6.6083 (1.0117) 5.3315 (0.8136) 5.7579 (0.6790) 3.6895 (0.4444) 5.9678 (0.9082) 
PR2  -1.0165* (-1.8269) 10.0911 (1.3902) -2.7059 (-0.5680) -0.9672 (-1.4315) 
FRE 0.8581*** (4.2644) 0.8031*** (4.0065) 1.8764*** (3.7206) 0.8131*** (4.0301) 0.6484*** (2.6346) 
BED -0.5682 (-1.4391) -0.5776 (-1.4846) -0.7875 (-1.1581) -0.5805 (-1.4856) -0.4344 (-0.8046) 
WEB 0.0136 (0.2205) 0.0153 (0.2503) 0.0307 (0.2756) 0.0162 (0.2607) 0.0442 (0.4254) 
CRI*PR2   0.6863 (1.6062) 0.3388 (0.8123)  
CR*PR2   -1.9901 (-0.2779) 2.4089 (0.3574)  
FRE*PR2   -1.1294** (-2.1346)  0.0000 (1.1493) 
BED*PR2   0.0580 (0.0765)  -0.0001 (-0.4639) 
WEB*PR2   -0.0139 (-0.1077)  -0.0525 (-0.4328) 
Adjusted R2 0.304248 0.308457 0.309964 0.30659 0.304772 
F-statistic 23.16745*** 21.99579*** 16.5801*** 19.21099*** 17.99353*** 
Periods 11 (2005-2015) 11 (2005-2015) 11 (2005-2015) 11 (2005-2015) 11 (2005-2015) 
Cross-sections 60 60 60 60 60 
Obs. 660 660 660 660 660 
Note: The random effects models are appropriate; Over 2005-2015, Vietnam had new investment and enterprise laws in 2005 (LAW=1) and PCI data were 
available; FDI is the dependent variable; RS represents EG; FDI, GDP, ER, and INC are natural logarithm values; values in parentheses indicate t-statistics; ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively; Obs. stands for the number of observations. 
Source: Author’s calculations   
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Table 5.47 FDI Location Selection with a Time Lag at the Vietnam Provincial Level 2005-2015  
 Coefficient (Dependent variable: FDI) 
Variable Model 48 Model 49 Model 50 Model 51 Model 52 
c -96.6887*** (-4.0280) -96.3497*** (-4.0159) -94.9515*** (-3.8510) -93.7258*** (-3.8656) -101.5633*** (-4.1468) 
EG(-1) 0.6012** (2.3870) 0.6052** (2.4383) 0.6215** (2.4067) 0.5963** (2.3899) 0.5819** (2.2633) 
EDU(-1) 0.0306** (2.3328) 0.0315** (2.4041) 0.0300** (2.2721) 0.0312** (2.3720) 0.0310** (2.3438) 
ER 7.8355*** (3.6631) 7.8005*** (3.6518) 8.0436*** (3.7289) 7.7789*** (3.6351) 7.9563*** (3.6969) 
ICOR -0.7166*** (-7.8787) -0.7263*** (-7.8166) -0.7117*** (-7.6132) -0.7145*** (-7.6462) -0.7353*** (-7.8784) 
INC -0.0550 (-0.1683) -0.0493 (-0.1510) -0.1092 (-0.3177) -0.0263 (-0.0780) -0.1777 (-0.5326) 
CPI(-1) -0.0372** (-2.3843) -0.0353** (-2.1882) -0.0377** (-2.3109) -0.0379** (-2.3178) -0.0317* (-1.9442) 
CRI -0.2834 (-0.9903) -0.2848 (-0.9952) -0.7027 (-1.5795) -0.7316* (-1.6477) -0.2581 (-0.8987) 
PCI 0.0434*** (2.7903) 0.0430*** (2.7570) 0.0412*** (2.6042) 0.0417*** (2.6447) 0.0443*** (2.7967) 
IIP -1.0833** (-2.2625) -0.7522 (-0.8796) -1.2892 (-1.2827) -1.2143 (-1.2359) -0.0025 (-0.0025) 
CR 29.5729*** (4.6291) 29.4660*** (4.6084) 26.1541*** (3.0434) 26.6180*** (3.1697) 29.1225*** (4.5478) 
PR2  -0.2916 (-0.4821) -3.9330 (-0.7232) -2.8852 (-0.5700) 4.4560 (1.0024) 
FRE 0.8290*** (4.0418) 0.8156*** (3.9963) 0.6343** (2.4843) 0.8318*** (4.0512) 1.5664*** (3.2123) 
BED -0.5677 (-1.4065) -0.5731 (-1.4399) -0.4205 (-0.7612) -0.5787 (-1.4482) -0.9015 (-1.3033) 
WEB 0.0014 (0.0222) 0.0022 (0.0344) -0.0059 (-0.0505) 0.0041 (0.0637) -0.0328 (-0.2935) 
CRI*PR2   0.5716 (1.2758) 0.5845 (1.3127)  
CR*PR2   5.1152 (0.6777) 3.7255 (0.5216)  
FRE*PR2   0.0000 (1.2931)  -0.8583* (-1.6749) 
BED*PR2   -0.0001 (-0.4590)  0.3557 (0.4572) 
WEB*PR2   0.0001 (0.0006)  0.0494 (0.3817) 
Adjusted R2 0.240727 0.242655 0.237859 0.241686 0.239825 
F-statistic 17.07195*** 16.08179*** 11.82472*** 14.12707*** 13.22971*** 
Periods 11 (2005-2015) 11 (2005-2015) 11 (2005-2015) 11 (2005-2015) 11 (2005-2015) 
Cross-sections 60 60 60 60 60 
Obs. 660 660 660 660 660 
Note: The random effects models are appropriate; Over 2005-2015, Vietnam had new investment and enterprise laws in 2005 (LAW=1) and PCI data were 
available; FDI is the dependent variable; RS represents EG; FDI, GDP, ER, and INC are natural logarithm values; values in parentheses indicate t-statistics; ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively; Obs. stands for the number of observations. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 5.48 Coefficients of the Regressors Related to FDI Location Selection at the Vietnam Provincial Level 
Variable group Variable 
Models without a time lag Models with a time lag 
2000-2015 2005-2015 2000-2015 2005-2015 









EG RS¹ PS PS PS PS PS PS PS P PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS 
Human capital factor EDU¹ PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS 
Economic factors 
ER PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS 
ICOR PS PS PS PS PS P P P P P NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
INC N N N N N P P P P P N N N N N N N N N N 
CPI¹ PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
CRI NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS P P N N P N N N NS N 
Provincial competition and institutional factors 
PCI      PS PS PS PS PS      PS PS PS PS PS 
IIP NS N N N N N P P P P NS NS NS NS N NS N N N N 
CR N N P P P P P P P P PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS 
Policy and law related factors PR2  N PS P P  NS P N N  P P P P  N N N P 
Infrastructure factors 
FRE PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS PS 
BED N N N N P N N N N N N NS N NS N N N N N N 
WEB P P P P P P P P P P P P N P N P P N P N 
Interaction terms 
CRI*PR2   P N    P P    P P    P P  
CR*PR2   N N    N P    N N    P P  
FRE*PR2   NS  PS   NS  P   PS  NS   P  NS 
BED*PR2   N  NS   P  N   N  P   N  P 
WEB*PR2   P  N   N  N   P  P   P  P 
Note: PS is positive and significant; NS is negative and significant; P is positive and insignificant; N is negative and insignificant; ¹ denotes there is a lag term in the 
variables RS, EDU, CPI in Models with a time lag.  




In conclusion, H4.1 cannot be rejected because geographical concentration of FDI exists at the 
provincial level in Vietnam. The determinants of FDI-inflow distribution among provinces and cities 
are RS, EDU, ER, ICOR, CPI, CRI, PCI, IIP, CR and FRE. The findings agree with the Escobar’s (2013) 
conclusion of the importance of education level, Castiglione et al.’s (2012) finding of the positive role 
of political stability and security, and Nguyen and Nguyen’s (2007) study of the positive link to 
infrastructure development in selecting investment locations by foreign investors. Table 5.49 
summarises the findings of the FDI location selection in Vietnam. 
Table 5.49 A Summary of the FDI Location Selection Determinants in Vietnam 
No. Hypothesis 
Findings 
National Regional Provincial 
H4.1 
Geographical concentration of FDI exists in certain 
locations affected by determinants of the FDI-inflow 
distribution in Vietnam 
No No Yes 
Q4. Is there any geographical concentration of FDI in Vietnam? 
1. Yes, there is evidence of geographical concentration of FDI at the provincial level, but 
evidence at the regional level was not found. 
2. RS, EDU, ER, ICOR, CPI, CRI, PCI, IIP, CR and FRE are the determinants affecting the FDI 
location selection of foreign investors at the provincial level. 
3. The effect of FRE on FDI attraction is weaker in provinces under more difficult socio-
economic conditions. The effects of CRI and CR are not different in provinces and cities 
under different socio-economic conditions. 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter reports the descriptive statistics and the empirical results. The findings on the 
relationship between FDI and EG, FDI competition, the effects of policies and laws on FDI, and the 
FDI location selection are summarised below. 
There is a long-term bi-directional positive relationship between FDI and EG at the provincial level in 
Vietnam. At the regional level, there is a two-way positive nexus between FDI and EG but not in the 
long term. At the national level, there is long-term and short-term causality from EG to FDI, but an 
effect of FDI on EG does not exist. 
In terms of the PCI-based and IIP-based competition, provinces and cities with better governance 
(higher PCI) significantly attract more FDI. The PCI sub-indices differently affect FDI provincial 
competition. Three PCI sub-indices, ENTRY, ACCESS and LEGAL, are more likely to determine 
investors’ decisions where to locate their capital in Vietnam than the other sub-indices (LAND, TIME, 
CHARGE, PROACT, SUPPORT and LABOUR). Provinces offering higher fiscal incentives (higher IIP 
index) attract less FDI. 
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The effects of laws on FDI attraction are insignificant at national and regional levels in Vietnam and 
the effects are not different among different regions. At the provincial level, the 2005 investment 
and enterprise laws have had no impact in attracting FDI. However, provincial ranking (PR and PR2) 
based on the decrees guiding the investment laws has a significant link with FDI attraction at the 
provincial level; provinces ranked with a higher PR and PR2 (under more difficult socio-economic 
conditions) attract less FDI. The positive effect of the 2005 laws on FDI decreases in provinces under 
more difficult socio-economic conditions. Becoming a member of WTO significantly positively 
affected FDI attraction at the Vietnam provincial level, but FDI was significantly, negatively impacted 
when Vietnam engaged in more FTAs. The effects of WTO and FTA are not different in the provinces 
and cities under different socio-economic conditions. 
Geographical concentration of FDI exists at the provincial level; there is no the evidence of 
geographical concentration of FDI at the regional level. RS, representing EG, the human capital factor 
(EDU), the economic factors (ER, ICOR, CPI and CRI), provincial competition and institution factors 
(PCI, IIP, and CR) and infrastructure development factor (FRE) are the determinants of FDI location 
selection of foreign investors at the Vietnam provincial level. The positive effect of FRE on FDI 
attraction is significantly weaker in provinces under more difficult socio-economic conditions. The 







This chapter summarises the thesis. Section 6.2 presents a summary of the study encapsulating the 
four research questions, the data and methodologies. Section 6.3 discusses the major findings of the 
study. Section 6.4 presents the implications of the study for academics, foreign investors and 
policymakers. The study’s limitations are discussed in Section 6.5, followed by suggestions for future 
research in Section 6.6. 
6.2 Summary of the Study 
FDI attraction has been investigated in many countries including Vietnam because of the economic, 
political, social, and natural environment effects that FDI capital may bring into a host country. 
Vietnam has successfully attracted FDI inflows since the 1986 economic reform. To benefit from FDI, 
the Vietnamese government made concerted efforts to improve the business environment such as 
passing the first FDI law in 1987, engaging in more FTAs, especially the trade agreement with the US 
in 2000, becoming a member of WTO in 2007, and reforming the business and investment laws in the 
2005 and 2014. The objective of this study was to explore: (i) the FDI and EG relationship, (ii) FDI 
competition, (iii) the effects of policies on FDI, (iv) the effects of laws on FDI, and (v) the 
determinants of FDI location selection in Vietnam. The focus was on examining the long-run bi-
directional relationship between FDI and EG, analysing the FDI determinants and identifying 
determinants that affect FDI location selection based on the investors’ perspective. 
To achieve the study objectives, four research questions, driven by the gaps in the literature, were 
investigated: “What is the relationship between FDI and EG in the provinces and cities of Vietnam?” 
(research question 1); “How does PCI-based and IIP-based competition affect FDI at the provincial 
level in Vietnam?” (research question 2); “Does the rule of law matter in attracting FDI to Vietnam?” 
(research question 3); and “Is there any geographical concentration of FDI in Vietnam?” (research 
question 4). 
This study made some key contributions to the literature, investment decisions, and policy 
implications. The literature is enriched by the unified conclusions on the FDI and EG relationship, the 
PCI-based and IIP-based competition, the effects of policies and laws on FDI, and the FDI location 
selection at the national, regional, and provincial levels in Vietnam. The study contributes to 
academia by investigating the long-term bi-directional relationship between FDI and EG at national 
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and provincial levels in Vietnam. RS is employed instead of GDP to represent EG at regional and 
provincial levels, which reduces the limitations of the GDP calculation at non-national levels. The PCI-
based competition in FDI attraction is explored as the first study that attempts to investigate the 
effects of not only PCI but also its sub-indices on FDI provincial competition. PR, PR2, RR and RR2 are 
introduced to rank provinces and regions based on their socio-economic conditions according to 
Vietnamese laws. The IIP index is used as an aggregate index of three types of investment incentives 
(free land, income tax exemption, and import tax exemption) to investigate IIP-based competition in 
FDI attraction. Additionally, the CR and WEB indices are employed to represent political stability and 
infrastructure development, respectively, to identify FDI determinants affecting the FDI location 
selection based on the investors’ perspective. FDI determinants are identified and analysed at the 
national, regional, and provincial levels. This study also suggests policies to attract FDI and enhance 
the effects of FDI in Vietnam. 
Chapter 1 defines and classifies FDI based on four alternative views (source country, host country, 
capital, and investment direction). The chapter presents an overview of the economic, political, 
social, and natural environment effects of FDI transferred to a host country, of which the economic 
element has been studied broadly by researchers. However, few studies have focused on the long-
term two-way relationship between FDI and EG, especially in Vietnam. Limited studies have 
identified FDI determinants in selecting investment locations based on the investors’ view. In 
addition, the topics on FDI in Vietnam (the link between FDI and EG, FDI provincial competition, 
policy effects on FDI, law effects on FDI, and FDI location selection) are investigated separately in 
different research areas using different data based on different study periods. This study explores 
the five topics in a single study to extend the cohesive literature on FDI in Vietnam. The chapter 
concludes with the study objective and four research questions.  
Chapter 2 provides an overview of inward FDI to Vietnam. The chapter also gives an overview of 
Vietnam’s socio-economic development, FDI-related laws and regulations, and FDI attraction. 
Vietnam has some advantages regarding socio-economic development, such as the high rate of 
labour force of 15 years of age and above, low unemployment rate, and high and steady GDP growth 
rate compared with the East Asia and Pacific region and the world. However, using capital efficiently, 
controlling inflation, and administering international trade are the country’s concerns. In terms of 
the FDI attraction, the Vietnamese law and regulation system related to FDI has improved since 
1987. Vietnam experienced rapid increases in the number of FDI licensed projects (from 211 in 1988-
1990 to 2,120 projects in 2015) and in the annual registered FDI capital (the registered capital in 
2015 was 15 times that in 1988-1990). Although FDI has contributed highly to Vietnam’s total social 
investment and exports, the contribution of FDI in creating jobs, increasing the state budget revenue 
and boosting the EG was quite modest compared with the FDI capital rate in the social investment 
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structure. Further, the country has faced unequal FDI distribution among economic activities as well 
as among regions, provinces and cities. Besides, Vietnam has attracted FDI mostly from Asia with a 
small percentage of FDI from developed countries. 
Chapter 3 reviews the literature on inward FDI with worldwide evidence of the relationship between 
FDI and EG, the determinants of FDI, and the empirical studies related to FDI in Vietnam. The 
literature review of the FDI-EG nexus shows a lack of studies investigating the long-term, two-way 
relationship between FDI and EG, especially for Vietnam. The literature review provides inconsistent 
conclusions on FDI determinants such as trade openness, exchange rate, and inflation, and shows 
that a limited number of studies explore the determinants of investors’ FDI location selection. The 
literature review on inward FDI to Vietnam shows the five research topics (the relationship between 
FDI and EG, the FDI provincial competition, the effects of policies on FDI, the effects of laws on FDI, 
and the FDI location selection) have not been investigated in a single study. Differences in research 
areas and study periods in the same topic generate inconsistent findings on inward FDI to Vietnam. 
The chapter develops the hypotheses based on the five research topics to investigate the four 
research questions. 
Chapter 4 describes the research data and methodologies. The chapter begins with the study period 
and research area. The selection and construction of the dependent and independent variables are 
also detailed. The literature review suggests the cointegration – OLS – ECM approach to test H1.1 on 
the long-term bi-directional link between FDI and EG at the provincial and national levels. The OLS 
estimation procedure is applied to test H1.2 and H1.3 on the relationship between FDI and EG, H2.1 and 
H2.2 on the FDI provincial competition and effects of policies, H3.1 and H3.2 on the effects of laws on 
FDI, and H4.1 on the geographical concentration of FDI in Vietnam. The Hausman test is used to 
determine whether a fixed or random effects model is appropriate to estimate the Panel OLS 
regression equations at the regional and provincial levels. The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
the empirical models employed to answer the four research questions.  
Chapter 5 discusses the empirical results. The data description gives an overview of the data at the 
national, regional, and provincial levels. The study’s findings on the relationship between FDI and EG, 
the PCI-based and IIP-based competition, the effects of laws on FDI, and the factors that determine 
the FDI location selection are described. The results show the long-term bi-directional positive 
relationship between FDI and EG at the provincial level in Vietnam. In terms of the PCI-based and IIP-
based competition, provinces and cities with better governance (higher PCI) attract significantly 
more FDI. Provinces offering higher fiscal incentives (higher IIP index) attract less FDI. The effects of 
laws on FDI attraction are insignificant in Vietnam. However, the ranking of provinces (PR and PR2) 
based on the decrees guiding the investment laws has a significant link with FDI attraction at the 
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provincial level. Provinces ranked with higher PR and PR2 (under more difficult socio-economic 
conditions) attract less FDI. The positive effect of the new laws in 2005 on FDI decreases in provinces 
with more difficult socio-economic conditions. Geographical concentration of FDI exists at the 
provincial level and that concentration of FDI at the regional level is mixed. RS representing EG, the 
human capital factor EDU, the economic factors ER, ICOR, CPI, and CRI, the provincial competition 
and institution factors PCI, IIP, and CR, and infrastructure development factor FRE are the 
determinants of FDI location selection by foreign investors at the Vietnam provincial level. The 
positive effect of FRE on FDI attraction is significantly weaker in provinces with more difficult socio-
economic conditions. 
6.3 Major Findings 
The study focuses on inward FDI at Vietnam’s provincial, regional and national levels. The research 
area comprises six regions with 63 provinces and cities (as at 31 December, 2015). Two annual panel 
data sets are used at the provincial and regional levels from 2000 to 2015. At the national level, time 
series data are used. However, to evaluate the long-term relationship between FDI and EG at the 
national level, the study period is from 1990 to 2015 for the five variables FDI, GDP, OT, ER and POP 
(see Appendix Table B.10).  
There are 38 variables in the study. FDI, RS, and GDP are used as dependent and independent 
variables in different regression models. Both RS and GDP represent EG; RS represents EG at the 
provincial and regional levels and GDP represents EG at the national level. The independent variables 
include three human capital factors, nine economic factors, four infrastructure factors, seven policy 
and law related factors, and twelve provincial competition and institutional factors. Appendix Table 
B.11 gives the data definitions and sources. 
The results of the relationship between FDI and EG, the PCI-based and IIP-based competition, the 
effects of laws on FDI, and the determinants of FDI location selection are summarised in Tables 5.29, 
5.32, 5.41, and 5.49, respectively. 
6.3.1 The Relationship between FDI and EG 
Research question 1 was driven by the limited number of empirical studies on the long-term bi-
directional relationship between FDI and EG in Vietnam. The knowledge gap is because of the lack of 
studies on the two-way relationship in the long term at the provincial and national levels and the 
inconsistent findings of the one-way nexus (including “FDI-to-EG” and “EG-to-FDI”) in the literature.   
The study used the cointegration – OLS – ECM approach to evaluate the long-term nexus between 
FDI and EG at the provincial and national levels in Vietnam. The OLS estimation procedure was 
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applied to test the one-way relationship between FDI and EG at the national, regional, and provincial 
levels in Vietnam from 2000 to 2015. The OLS procedure was employed at the national level and 
Panel OLS estimations were used at the regional and provincial levels. 
Table 6.1 summarises the results of the long-term relationship between FDI and EG at Vietnam’s 
provincial and national levels. A long-term bi-directional, positive nexus between FDI and EG is found 
at the provincial level, but does not exist at the national level in Vietnam. In any case, either through 
endogenous variables or both endogenous and exogenous variables, there is short-term causality 
from FDI to EG at the provincial level. At the national level, short-term causality from FDI to EG is not 
found. However, there is a long-term and short-term one-way relationship from EG to FDI in Vietnam 
from 1990 to 2015. 
Table 6.1 The Relationship between FDI and EG Using the Cointegration – OLS – ECM Approach 
Cointegration – OLS – ECM 
approach 






Unit root tests 
FDI, EG, ER, EDU, POP, and INC FDI, EG, ER, OT, and POP 
non-stationary at the level and 
integrated of I(1) 
non-stationary at the level and 
integrated of I(1) 
Cointegration 
tests 
Pedroni, Kao, and Johansen-Fisher 
cointegration tests 
Johansen cointegration test 
The long-term cointegration link 
between FDI and EG exists 
The long-term cointegration link 
between FDI and EG exists 
Step 2  
(Re-evaluate 
the FDI and 
EG nexus) 
OLS estimators 
Panel FMOLS estimators FMOLS estimators 
Positive FDI ↔ EG is found FDI ↔ EG does not exist 
Step 3 
(Investigate 




Panel VEC models VEC models 
FDI ↔ EG in the long term 
FDI → EG in the short term 
FDI ↔ EG does not exist 
EG → FDI in the long term 
EG → FDI in the short term 
Source: Author’s calculations 
The FDI-to-EG link from 2000 to 2015 was investigated using the OLS estimators without and with a 
lag term in FDI, STATE, MKT, SCI, and CPI at the national level, and without and with a lag term in FDI 
and CPI at the regional and provincial levels. The lag term was adapted from Escobari and Vacaflores 
(2014) and Nguyen, Ho, et al. (2012). Table 6.2 shows the one-way relationships between FDI and EG 
at the national, regional, and provincial levels in Vietnam. 
The estimated results show that the FDI-to-EG link is strong and positive at the regional level, but 
does not exist at the national level. At the provincial level, the FDI-to-EG link is significant and 
positive in the models with FDI, POP and ER regressors. These results confirm the findings of the 
long-term and short-term causality from FDI to EG using the cointegration-OLS-ECM approach. 
However, FDI insignificantly impacts EG at the provincial level in Model 20 including POP, ER, ICOR, 
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INC and CPI (see Tables 5.23 and 5.24). The possible reason that causes the different effects of FDI on 
EG, is because of unbalanced provincial and regional economic development. Scatterplots of FDI and 
RS (see Figures 5.4 and 5.5) show the strong positive relationship for the five cities under the non-
difficult socio-economic conditions and the weak positive relationship for the five provinces under 
the extremely difficult conditions. Therefore, the results align with the findings of the Nguyen and 
Ho’s (2013) and Nguyen, Ho, et al.’s (2012) studies of different interactions between FDI and EG in 
Vietnam’s areas under different socio-economic conditions. 
Table 6.2 The Relationship between FDI and EG Using the OLS Estimation Procedure 
OLS Estimation 
Procedure 
Provincial level Regional level National level 
FDI-to-EG nexus Mixed Yes No 
EG-to-FDI nexus Yes Yes Yes 
Conclusion: FDI↔EG Yes Yes No 
Source: Author’s calculations 
The EG-to-FDI link from 2000 to 2015 was examined using the OLS estimators without and with a lag 
in EG, STATE, MKT, SCI, CPI and EDU at the national level, and without and with a lag in EG, EDU, and 
CPI at the regional and provincial levels. At the national level, the estimated results show a positive 
EG-to-FDI nexus is likely to exist, which is consistent with the results of the VEC models of the EG-to-
FDI causality at the national level in Vietnam from 1990 to 2015. At the regional and provincial levels, 
the EG-to-FDI link is positive and significant in both without and with a lag, which supports the 
findings of the cointegration-OLS-ECM approach of the long-term bi-directional relationship between 
FDI and EG at Vietnam’s provincial level. 
6.3.2 PCI-based and IIP-based Competition 
Research question 2 was based on limited studies on PCI-based and IIP-based competition in FDI 
attraction and their inconsistent results. Previous studies on IIP are limited because they focus only 
on tax incentives (Wei & Li, 2011; Li & Shen, 2008; Sun, 2002) whereas IIP may include grants, tax 
preferences or holidays, free land or other inputs, and regulatory policy concessions. The previous 
findings of PCI-based competition in Vietnam are mixed; no study employs PCI sub-indices to 
investigate the competition factors that attract FDI at the provincial level in Vietnam.  
The results of the PCI-based and IIP-based competition in FDI attraction at the provincial level in 
Vietnam are summarised in Table 6.3. The significant positive link between governance (PCI) and FDI 
flows existed in Vietnam’s provinces and cities during the study period 2005-2015, which aligns with 
Nguyen and Ho’s (2013) and Malesky’s (2010) studies. However, only three of nine PCI sub-indices 
(ENTRY, ACCESS and LEGAL) are more likely to exhibit significant roles in determining FDI flows at the 
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provincial level. This means not all PCI sub-indices significantly affect FDI in Vietnam, which explains 
the weak PCI - FDI link found by Nguyen, Ho, et al. (2012) and Nguyen and Nguyen (2007). 
Table 6.3 PCI-based and IIP-based Competition at the Provincial Level in Vietnam  
Competition in FDI attraction Without time lag With time lag 
PCI PS PS 
PCI sub-indices 
ENTRY PS PS 
LAND NS N 
ACCESS P PS 
TIME P P 
CHARGE N P 
PROACT P N 
SUPPORT NS N 
LABOUR PS N 
LEGAL P PS 
IIP N NS 
Note: PS is positive and significant; NS is negative and significant; P is positive and insignificant; N is 
negative and insignificant. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
In terms of IIP-based competition, provinces offering higher fiscal incentives (higher IIP index) attract 
less FDI in Vietnam during the study period 2000-2015. This implies offering free land, income tax 
and import tax exemptions is less likely to attract more FDI at the provincial level in Vietnam. The 
result contrasts with Vu et al.’s (2009) finding of a positive link between sub-national investment 
incentives and FDI, but aligns with the Vu’s (2007) conclusion on the negative effect of incentives on 
FDI flows in the year after adoption of those incentives in Vietnam. 
6.3.3 The Effects of Laws on FDI 
Research question 3 was driven by the limited studies on the effects of laws on FDI at the non-
national level in Vietnam. ‘Law effects’ refers to not only to the impacts of the new investment and 
enterprise laws in 2005 and WTO membership in 2007 on FDI, but also to the effects of participation 
in FTAs on FDI flows over the study period 2000-2015, which has not previously been investigated.  
The results of the effects of laws on FDI in Vietnam are summarised in Table 6.4. The effects of laws 
(LAW, WTO, and FTA) on FDI attraction are insignificant at regional and national levels, and are not 
different for regions ranked differently based on the socio-economic conditions (extremely difficult, 
difficult, and neither extremely difficult nor difficult condition) regulated in the Vietnamese 
investment laws (Government, 2006; Government, 2000). The insignificant effect of WTO on FDI at 
the national level does not align with the findings of Nguyen, Zhang, et al. (2012) and Pham (2011). 
This may be because the study periods after Vietnam joined the WTO are limited in the Nguyen, 
Zhang, et al. (2012) and Pham (2011) studies (three years, 2008 to 2010, and one year, 2008, 
respectively), whereas it is longer in this study (eight years from 2008 to 2015). 
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Table 6.4 The Effects of Laws on FDI at Vietnam’s Provincial, Regional and National Levels 
Effects of Laws 
Without a time lag With a time lag 
Provincial Regional National Provincial Regional National 
LAW PS P N PS P N 
WTO PS N P PS P P 
FTA NS P P NS P P 
Different effects in 
different areas 
LAW Yes No  Yes No  
WTO No No  No No  
FTA No No  No No  
Note: PS is positive and significant; NS is negative and significant; P is positive and insignificant; N is 
negative and insignificant. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
The release of new investment and enterprise laws in 2005 significantly, positively impacted FDI at 
the provincial level, especially in first ranked provinces without difficult socio-economic conditions. 
This agrees with the Nguyen, Zhang, et al.’s (2012) finding of a positive impact of the 2005 new laws 
on inward FDI. The positive effect of 2005 new laws on FDI decreases in provinces under more 
difficult socio-economic conditions. The results also show the FTA and WTO memberships 
significantly affect FDI attraction at Vietnam’s provincial level. However, the effects of WTO and FTA 
are not different for provinces and cites ranked differently. 
6.3.4 The Determinants of FDI Location Selection 
Research question 4 identifies the geographical concentration of foreign investors in Vietnam based 
on the determinants of the FDI-inflow distribution. Investors’ subjective decisions in choosing the 
investment location are important to EG and development of host countries. However, few studies 
have focused on this topic for Vietnam. Different studies have found different determinants of FDI 
distribution such as improved democracy (Hasan & Mahvash, 2015), lower delinquency rates 
(Escobar, 2013), and political stability and security (Castiglione et al., 2012).  
The results are shown in Table 6.5. There is evidence of geographical concentration of FDI in 
Vietnam, especially at the provincial level. The determinants of FDI-inflow distribution among 
provinces and cities are RS, EDU, ER, ICOR, CPI, CRI, PCI, IIP, CR and FRE. The effect of FRE on FDI 
attraction is weaker in provinces with more difficult socio-economic conditions. There are no 
differences in the effects of CRI and CR on FDI attraction to provinces and cities ranked differently. 
The results imply that investors tend to invest more into areas with higher EG, a better educated 
labour force, lower value currency, more efficient capital use, lower inflation rate (in the previous 
year), better governance, fewer investment incentives and better infrastructure. The findings agree 
with the Escobar’s (2013) conclusion of the importance of education level, Castiglione et al.’s (2012) 
finding of the positive role of political stability and security, and Nguyen and Nguyen’s (2007) study 
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of the positive link to infrastructure development in selecting investment locations by foreign 
investors. 
Table 6.5 The Determinants of FDI Location Selection in Vietnam 
Variable groups Variables 
Without a time lag With a time lag 
Provincial Regional National Provincial Regional National 
00-15 05-15 00-15 00-15 00-15 05-15 00-15 00-15 
EG EG¹ PS P P P PS PS P N 
Human capital factor EDU¹ PS PS P P PS PS PS PS 
Economic factors 
ER PS PS P N PS PS N N 
ICOR PS P N P NS NS NS NS 
INC N P P N N N P PS 
CPI¹ PS PS PS P NS NS N N 
STATE¹    N    P 




PCI  PS    PS   
IIP N P   NS N   
CR P P P N PS PS P PS 
Policy and law related 
factors 
PR2 PS P   P N   
RR2   N    N  
Infrastructure factors 
COM    N    P 
FRE PS PS N N PS PS N NS 
BED N N NS P N N N NS 
WEB P    N    
Different effects in 
different areas 
CRI No No No  No No No  
CR No No No  No No No  
FRE Yes Yes No  Yes No No  
BED No No No  No No No  
WEB No No   No No   
Note: PS is positive and significant; NS is negative and significant; P is positive and insignificant; N is 
negative and insignificant. ¹ denotes there is a lag term in the variables in the case with a time lag. 
PCI data are not available before 2005 at the provincial level; the determinants of FDI location 
selection are investigated over two study periods 00-15 and 05-15 indicating 2000-2015 and 2005-
2015, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
6.4 Implications of the Study 
The findings of this study have several implications for academics, foreign investors, and Vietnam’s 
policymakers. 
6.4.1 Academic Implications 
First, the study contributes to academia by enriching the literature and providing cohesive 
conclusions on inward FDI to Vietnam in five research topics (the FDI and EG relationship, PCI-based 
and IIP-based competition, the effects of policies and laws on FDI, and FDI location selection). To 
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date, no empirical study has focused on these five research topics at the national, regional, and 
provincial levels in Vietnam in a single study. 
Second, the study findings fill the literature gap on the long-term bi-directional relationship between 
FDI and EG at provincial and national levels in Vietnam. At the provincial level, there is a long-term 
positive bi-directional nexus between FDI and EG from 2000 to 2015. However, a long-term positive 
two-way nexus between FDI and EG is not found from 1990 to 2015 at the national level. The results 
contrast with Srinivasan et al.’s (2010) findings of the existence of a long-run two-way nexus 
between FDI and EG in Vietnam from 1991 to 2007. This is because the short-term and long-term 
changes of FDI may have had marginal effects on the EG changes in Vietnam, which aligns with Wei 
and Li’s (2011) findings of the less important role of FDI in promoting EG. However, short-term and 
long-term changes in EG significantly positively affect FDI changes.  
In addition, the findings extend the literature on the investigation of a one-way nexus between FDI 
and EG at national, regional, and provincial levels in Vietnam. The FDI-to-EG relationship is not found 
at the national level, which follows the findings for other countries such as China (Wei & Li, 2011), 
Brunei and Laos (Srinivasan et al., 2010). The findings on the FDI-to-EG nexus (EG with FDI, POP and 
ER regressors) at the provincial level, 2000-2015, closely follow Hoang et al.’s (2010) findings of a 
strong and positive FDI-to-EG nexus in Vietnamese provinces, 1995-2006. However, the FDI-to-EG 
relationship is different for provinces and cities with different socio-economic conditions, and is less 
significant with the inclusion of ICOR, INC and CPI in the regression models. The findings of 
differences in the FDI-to-EG relationship align with the findings by Nguyen and Ho (2013), Wen 
(2013), Nguyen, Ho, et al. (2012), and Nguyen, Zhang, et al. (2012). The less important effect of FDI 
on EG at the provincial level is consistent with Wei and Li’s (2011) study. The EG-to-FDI nexus is 
found at national and provincial levels in Vietnam. The result aligns with the existence of an EG-to-
FDI nexus at the national level (Labes, 2015; Omri & Kahouli, 2014; Razmi & Behname, 2012; Wei & 
Li, 2011; Li & Shen, 2008; Thanyakhan, 2008; Sun, 2002), and at the provincial level (Nguyen & Ho, 
2013; Nguyen, Ho, et al., 2012). The FDI-to-EG and EG-to-FDI links are positive and significant at the 
regional level in Vietnam from 2000 to 2015. Therefore, the results support the findings in Nguyen 
and Ho (2013) of a positive two-way nexus between FDI and EG in Vietnamese regions from 2001 to 
2010. 
Third, the study suggests academia employs RS36 instead of GDP to represent EG at non-national 
levels, especially at the regional and provincial levels in Vietnam. This is because RS reduces the 
limitations of the GDP calculation at the non-national levels. Also, employing RS is based on the 
 
36 RS was used to represent EG in Mukherjee (2014) and Jude and Masca (2009). 
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evidence of a high correlation between GDP and RS at the national level for Vietnam from 1990 to 
2015 (see Appendix Table B.2). 
Fourth, the study bridges the literature gap about using PCI and its sub-indices to investigate PCI-
based competition in FDI attraction. To date, no empirical study has used the PCI sub-indices to 
explain the reasons for the mixed results in the relationship between governance and FDI attraction 
in Vietnam. This study’s findings show that three of nine PCI sub-indices (ENTRY, ACCESS and LEGAL) 
significantly affect FDI at the provincial level, which provides an explanation for the weak PCI-FDI link 
found by Nguyen, Ho, et al. (2012) and Nguyen and Nguyen (2007). 
Fifth, the findings extend the literature on the law effects including LAW, WTO and FTA on FDI 
attraction in Vietnam. The FTA effects have not been previously studied; the study findings show the 
WTO membership and FTAs significantly affect FDI attraction at the provincial level in Vietnam. 
However, there are no differences on the effects of WTO and FTA in provinces and cities ranked 
differently. The study’s result of a positive impact of the 2005 investment and enterprise laws on 
inward FDI is similar to Nguyen, Zhang, et al.’s (2012) finding. The positive effect of the 2005 new 
laws on FDI decreases in provinces with more difficult socio-economic conditions. 
Sixth, the study contributes to the literature on the ranking of provinces and regions in Vietnam, 
proposing the IIP, CR, and WEB indices to identify FDI determinants that affect FDI location selection 
based on the investors’ perspective. PR, PR2, RR and RR2 are introduced to rank provinces and 
regions based on their socio-economic conditions (extremely difficult, difficult, and non-difficult) 
according to the Vietnamese law (Government, 2006; Government, 2000). The IIP index is proposed 
as an aggregate index of three types of investment incentives (free land, income tax exemption, and 
import tax exemption). Therefore, this study expands the conclusion about IIP-based competition in 
FDI attraction so that it is not limited to tax incentives (Wei & Li, 2011; Li & Shen, 2008; Sun, 2002). 
The results show that free land, income tax and import tax exemptions are not FDI attractive factors. 
The CR and WEB indices are proposed to represent political stability and infrastructure development, 
respectively. CR positively affects the FDI location selection, which aligns with the findings by 
Castiglione et al. (2012) that the political stability is an important institutional factor attracting 
investors’ interest. Our study shows that WEB insignificantly affected FDI attraction into Vietnam 
from 2000 to 2015. This may imply that the first regulation on online information and public services 
on the Vietnamese official websites in 2011 (Government, 2011) has not had a positive effect on the 
quality of electronic portals. Foreign investors may not access these electronic portals to make 
investment decisions. Therefore, the effects of WEB may need to be re-investigated.  
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6.4.2 Implications for Foreign Investors 
The study findings also have implications for foreign investors. This study found that RS, EDU, ER, 
ICOR, CPI, CRI, PCI, IIP, CR and FRE are the determinants of FDI-inflow distribution in Vietnam. Based 
on these results, foreign investors may consider investing more into areas with higher EG, a better 
educated labour force, lower value currency, more efficient capital use, lower inflation rate (in the 
previous year), better governance, fewer investment incentives, less political risk and better 
infrastructure.  
Also, provinces ranked with a higher PR (i.e., with more difficult socio-economic conditions) attract 
less FDI. The effects of FRE and LAW on FDI attraction are weaker in provinces with more difficult 
socio-economic conditions. Therefore, ranking provinces and regions using PR, PR2, RR, and RR2 
proposed in this study, is a source of information for foreign investors to evaluate investment 
environments. In addition, investors should seek greater breakdown of information from the PCI by 
evaluating its sub-indices, especially ENTRY, ACCESS and LEGAL, before making investment decisions.  
Interestingly, the study’s findings show an increase in FDI flows into Vietnam after the 2008 global 
financial crisis (see Table 5.42). This implies that foreign investors chose Vietnam as their investment 
destination after the crisis to take advantage of a lower value currency and lower costs offered in 
areas with high IIP (free land and tax exemption). The study results on the effects of laws on FDI 
suggest that the changes to laws and the Vietnam’s WTO and FTA memberships may not be 
important at the national and regional levels, but they have significant impacts on investment 
decisions at Vietnam’s provincial level.  
6.4.3 Policy Implications 
The study’s findings show a less important role of FDI in promoting EG in Vietnam. Foreign investors 
are more likely to invest in provinces and cities with better governance (higher PCI) and are less likely 
to invest in areas offering higher fiscal incentives (higher IIP index). This implies that the IIP, including 
free land, income tax and import tax exemptions, has not been very successful in enhancing FDI 
competition at the provincial level in Vietnam. Foreign investors value good economic governance as 
a positive factor in the local investment environment and do not highly consider low cost of land and 
tax in selecting investment locations. The study results suggest policymakers should focus on 
improving the investment environment to assist the foreign investors to start businesses, better 
access to information, and solutions to legal matters instead of offering more investment incentives. 
This study shows that especially assisting investors to start a business is likely to be the most 
important PCI sub-index. This is because the ENTRY coefficient highly contributed to better 
governance and strongly associated with higher FDI at the provincial level in Vietnam from 2005 to 
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2015. Vietnamese state bodies may focus on improving the quality of their official websites (WEB) to 
reduce difficulties encountered by foreign investors using the electronic portals. 
The results on the other determinants of FDI-inflow distribution in Vietnam (RS, EDU, ER, ICOR, CPI, 
CR and FRE) suggest that Vietnamese policymakers and provincial governments should invest more 
in education and training, controlling the exchange and inflation rates, enhancing investment 
efficiency, maintaining political stability and security, and improving infrastructure to boost EG.  
In addition, the positive effects of FRE and LAW on FDI attraction decrease in provinces with more 
difficult socio-economic conditions. Therefore, this may enlighten Vietnam’s policymakers about 
investing more in infrastructure development and law improvement in areas with difficult and 
extremely difficult socio-economic conditions. This investment strategy is necessary to make the 
areas more attractive than non-difficult areas, and to reduce the FDI distribution inequality among 
regions, provinces and cities. Such an investment strategy may result in less inequality of 
development and income in Vietnam. The study findings also show the significant effects of the 
Vietnam’s WTO and FTA memberships on FDI attraction at the provincial level. This implies that the 
Vietnamese government may consider national law and agreement improvement to enshrine 
international commitments such as guaranteeing equality between foreign and domestic firms. 
6.5 Limitations of the Study 
This study has several limitations associated with data collection and construction. The limitations 
are: 
• The study captured data only from 2000 to 2015 to examine the long-term relationship 
between FDI and EG at the provincial level in Vietnam but the long-term nexus at the 
national level covered a longer period, 1990-2015. No data are available between 1990 and 
1999 at the provincial level (see Appendix Table B.10). In addition, the long-term nexus 
between FDI and EG at the regional level has not been investigated. Therefore, a longer 
study period such as 2000-2019 (20 years) may be considered to investigate the long-term 
relationship between FDI and EG at Vietnam’s provincial and regional levels in future study.  
• This study constructed WEB to represent the ability to access information at the provincial 
level instead of using the number of telephone and internet subscribers from Vietnam’s GSO 
at the national level because of data limitation. The WEB construction is limited because of 
non-yearly evaluation. WEB was evaluated only twice, in 2011 and 2016. Therefore, the 
estimates may not be reliable year by year and the findings may not be reported correctly. 
• The construction of the IIP index has several limitations. The index includes only three types 
of investment incentive (free land, income tax exemption, and import tax exemption), 
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whereas grants, tax holidays, policy concessions, etc., are also considered FDI incentives. The 
IIP index was based on coefficients indicating important levels of free land, income and 
import tax exemptions. The coefficients were based on the average rates of revenue from 
land and houses, revenue from FDI enterprises, and export and import duties in the State 
budget revenue final accounts in Vietnam from 2000 to 2015, not from the foreign investors’ 
perspective. Foreign investors may have different evaluations of how important the impacts 
of investment incentives on their FDI location selections are. This may result in different data 
for the IIP index and different conclusions on IIP-based competition in FDI attraction at the 
Vietnam’s provincial level. 
• The PCI-based competition in FDI attraction in this study was restricted to only 11 years 
(2005-2015) because no data are available before 2005. Hence, the study results captured 
PCI-based competition only during the post-2004 period when Vietnam became a member of 
WTO.  
• This study used only the political risk index to investigate the effects of institutional factors 
on FDI location in Vietnam. Institutional factors may also include low delinquency rates. 
Therefore, the findings may not represent the effects of all institutional factors that 
determine FDI-inflow distribution. 
• In the panel cointegration tests at the provincial level, trends were not included (see the 
notes of Tables 5.8 and 5.9) because of unclear trends of FDI and economic growth at the 
regional level (see Figure 5.2) and at the provincial level (see Figures C.3-C.8 in Appendix C). 
In case any trends exist, excluding trends is another limitation of the study. 
• To investigate the bi-directional relationships between FDI and EG, it is normally expected 
that the Panel FMOLS regression estimators where FDI or EG is the dependent variable 
include the same regressors. However, this study employed different regressors for each 
dependent variable. Table 5.11 shows the estimation of FDI with three variables including 
EG, ER, and EDU, while Table 5.12 presents the estimation of EG with four variables including 
FDI, ER, INC, and POP. This would be one of the study limitations although the implication of 
research is for the two variables, FDI and EG. 
• In terms of the Johansen Cointegration test (see Table 5.16), although the results show that 
there are at least 4 cointegrating vectors, the study emphasised on the cointegrating vectors 
of EG and FDI. Therefore, instead of showing 4 ECM terms, only ECM terms of FDI and EG 
were presented. This would be the other limitation of the study that restricts the 
interpretation of the VEC.  
145 
 
• Using only the Panel FMOLS estimator may not provide a good robustness analysis. 
Employing two different methods such as the Panel FMOLS and Panel DOLS estimators could 
increase the confidence on the obtained results. Both FMOLS and DOLS estimators account 
for potential endogeneity and serial correlation, thus they are asymptotically unbiased and 
normally distributed. Thus, they do not require exogeneity assumptions. The FMOLS is a non-
parametric approach, while the DOLS is a parametric approach using lags and leads. The 
DOLS estimator can account for forms of cross-sectional dependence as it allows time-
demeaning data. In addition, the group-mean Panel DOLS estimator is super consistent 
under cointegration, and is robust to the omission of variables that do not form part of the 
cointegrating relationship. 
6.6 Suggestions for Future Research 
Future research should expand the sample size to investigate the long-term relationship between FDI 
and EG at provincial, regional, and national levels in Vietnam. PCI-based competition in FDI attraction 
should be captured during a longer study period to discover the longer impacts of governance at 
Vietnam’s provincial level.  
A future study should consider obtaining the number of telephone and internet subscribers from 
GSO for Vietnam’s provinces and cities to get more reliable data representing communication 
development. This means hand-collected data are required because data are not available online. 
The data collected would be yearly to measure the impact of communication development not only 
at the national level but also at provincial and regional levels. Future research may also examine the 
reliability of WEB with evaluations in 2020 onwards.  
Regarding the IIP-based competition in FDI attraction, future research should include a wider range 
of investment incentives such as grants, holidays, policy concessions. In addition, future study should 
consider different techniques to construct the IIP index. A possible way is to use surveys to obtain 
the coefficients indicating important levels of investment incentives from investors. These data 
would improve the IIP index and enable future research to investigate the IIP-based competition in 
FDI attraction based on the investors’ evaluations.  
Future research should include data on delinquency rates to investigate the effects of that 
institutional factor on FDI location in Vietnam. These data would enrich the study on the 
determinants of FDI location selection from foreign investors’ point of view. Future study may also 
use questionnaires to get responses from investors rather than from a third hand data source (PRS). 
146 
 
In terms of the panel cointegration tests, as a note for future research, trends (with individual 
intercepts) would be considered for the panel cointegration tests. Although unclear trends of FDI and 
retail sales of good and services were found at the regional and provincial levels, including trends in 
the panel cointegration tests would enhance the analysis on the long-run bi-directional relationship 
between FDI and EG in case any trends exist.  
In order to enhance the quality of the research, it is no doubt that at least 4 ECM terms should be 
investigated for a good publication of the long-run two-way relationship between FDI and EG at the 
provincial and national level in Vietnam. To provide a good robustness analysis, future researches 
should employ two different methods such as the Panel FMOLS and Panel DOLS estimators, and use 
the Wooldridge (2002) robust version of Hausman test to choose fixed-effects or random-effects 
based on the robust test.  
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test of independence and Parasan Cross-sectional 
Dependence (CD) test are used to test for cross-sectional dependence or contemporaneous 
correlation. According to Baltagi (2008), cross-sectional dependence is a problem in macro panel 
with long time series (T is over 20-30 years) and not a big problem in micro panels (few T and large 
N). Based on the Baltagi’s (2008) discussion, the panel data used in our study is not a macro panel (as 
T equals 16 years). Therefore, the cross-sectional dependence may not be a great issue in our study. 





Basic Social-Economic Statistics of Vietnam  
Table A.1 The Total Population and Yearly Population Growth Rate in Vietnam 1950-2016 
Year Population 
Yearly population 
growth rate (%) 
Year Population 
Yearly population 
growth rate (%) 
1950 24,809,903 - 1984 59,653,092 2.36 
1951 25,364,453 2.24 1985 61,049,370 2.34 
1952 25,976,838 2.41 1986 62,459,557 2.31 
1953 26,646,172 2.58 1987 63,881,296 2.28 
1954 27,370,699 2.72 1988 65,313,709 2.24 
1955 28,147,785 2.84 1989 66,757,401 2.21 
1956 28,973,873 2.93 1990 68,209,604 2.18 
1957 29,844,533 3.00 1991 69,670,620 2.14 
1958 30,754,603 3.05 1992 71,129,537 2.09 
1959 31,698,436 3.07 1993 72,558,986 2.01 
1960 32,670,623 3.07 1994 73,923,849 1.88 
1961 33,666,768 3.05 1995 75,198,975 1.72 
1962 34,684,164 3.02 1996 76,375,677 1.56 
1963 35,722,092 2.99 1997 77,460,429 1.42 
1964 36,780,984 2.96 1998 78,462,888 1.29 
1965 37,860,014 2.93 1999 79,399,708 1.19 
1966 38,959,335 2.90 2000 80,285,563 1.12 
1967 40,074,695 2.86 2001 81,123,685 1.04 
1968 41,195,833 2.80 2002 81,917,488 0.98 
1969 42,309,662 2.70 2003 82,683,039 0.93 
1970 43,407,291 2.59 2004 83,439,812 0.92 
1971 44,485,910 2.48 2005 84,203,817 0.92 
1972 45,549,487 2.39 2006 84,979,667 0.92 
1973 46,604,726 2.32 2007 85,770,717 0.93 
1974 47,661,770 2.27 2008 86,589,342 0.95 
1975 48,729,397 2.24 2009 87,449,021 0.99 
1976 49,808,071 2.21 2010 88,357,775 1.04 
1977 50,899,504 2.19 2011 89,321,903 1.09 
1978 52,015,279 2.19 2012 90,335,547 1.13 
1979 53,169,674 2.22 2013 91,378,752 1.15 
1980 54,372,518 2.26 2014 92,423,338 1.14 
1981 55,627,743 2.31 2015 93,447,601 1.11 
1982 56,931,822 2.34 September 
22, 2016 
94,444,200 1.07 
1983 58,277,391 2.36 




Table A.2 Unemployment Rates in Vietnam, East Asia and the Pacific and the World 2000-2014 
Year Vietnam (%) East Asia & Pacific (%) World (%) 
2000 2.30 4.66 6.36 
2001 2.80 4.88 6.36 
2002 2.10 4.88 6.49 
2003 2.30 4.84 6.45 
2004 2.10 4.85 6.31 
2005 2.10 4.67 6.16 
2006 2.30 4.51 5.90 
2007 2.30 4.22 5.48 
2008 2.40 4.56 5.69 
2009 2.60 4.63 6.25 
2010 2.60 4.40 6.11 
2011 2.00 4.32 5.99 
2012 1.80 4.38 5.99 
2013 2.20 4.47 5.99 
2014 2.30 4.52 5.93 
Source: Data collected from the WB (2016c) 
 
Table A.3 The Total Capital by Type of Ownership and GDP in Vietnam 1995-2015 
 Unit: Billion VND (at current prices) 
Year 
Capital by type of ownership 
GDP 
Total State Non-state Foreign 
1995 72,447 30,447 20,000 22,000 228,892 
1996 87,394 42,894 21,800 22,700 272,036 
1997 108,370 53,570 24,500 30,300 313,623 
1998 117,134 65,034 27,800 24,300 361,017 
1999 131,171 76,958 31,542 22,671 399,942 
2000 151,183 89,417 34,594 27,172 441,646 
2001 170,496 101,973 38,512 30,011 481,295 
2002 200,145 114,738 50,612 34,795 535,762 
2003 239,246 126,558 74,388 38,300 613,443 
2004 290,927 139,831 109,754 41,342 715,307 
2005 343,135 161,635 130,398 51,102 914,001 
2006 404,712 185,102 154,006 65,604 1,061,565 
2007 532,093 197,989 204,705 129,399 1,246,769 
2008 616,735 209,031 217,034 190,670 1,616,047 
2009 708,826 287,534 240,109 181,183 1,809,149 
2010 830,278 316,285 299,487 214,506 2,157,828 
2011 924,495 341,555 356,049 226,891 2,779,880 
2012 1,010,114 406,514 385,027 218,573 3,245,419 
2013 1,094,542 441,924 412,506 240,112 3,584,262 
2014 1,220,724 486,804 468,513 265,407 3,937,856 
2015 1,367,200 519,500 529,600 318,100 4,192,862 
Source: Data collected from GSO (2016i) and GSO (2016j) 
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Table A.4 The GDP Growth Rate of Vietnam, East Asia and the Pacific and the World 2000-2015 
Year Vietnam (%) East Asia & Pacific (%) World (%) 
2000 6.79 4.64 4.33 
2001 6.19 2.69 1.97 
2002 6.32 3.73 2.18 
2003 6.90 4.37 2.90 
2004 7.54 5.25 4.46 
2005 7.55 4.92 3.82 
2006 6.98 5.71 4.38 
2007 7.13 6.71 4.31 
2008 5.66 3.58 1.84 
2009 5.40 1.32 -1.68 
2010 6.42 7.27 4.35 
2011 6.24 4.52 3.13 
2012 5.25 4.72 2.48 
2013 5.42 4.51 2.40 
2014 5.98 4.00 2.63 
2015 6.68 3.89 2.47 
Source: Data collected from the WB (2016b) 
 
Table A.5 The Capital Growth Rate and ICOR of Vietnam 2000-2015  
Year 
Total capital GDP 
ICOR 
Billion VND Growth rate (%) Billion VND 
t It 𝑟𝑡 =
𝐼𝑡 − 𝐼𝑡−1
𝐼𝑡−1




1999              131,171  -              399,942  - 
2000              151,183  15.26              441,646  3.63 
2001              170,496  12.77              481,295  4.30 
2002              200,145  17.39              535,762  3.67 
2003              239,246  19.54              613,443  3.08 
2004              290,927  21.60              715,307  2.86 
2005              343,135  17.95              914,001  1.73 
2006              404,712  17.95          1,061,565  2.74 
2007              532,093  31.47          1,246,769  2.87 
2008              616,735  15.91          1,616,047  1.67 
2009              708,826  14.93          1,809,149  3.67 
2010              830,278  17.13          2,157,828  2.38 
2011              924,495  11.35          2,779,880  1.49 
2012          1,010,114  9.26          3,245,419  2.17 
2013          1,094,542  8.36          3,584,262  3.23 
2014          1,220,724  11.53          3,937,856  3.45 
2015          1,367,200  12.00          4,192,862  5.36 





Table A.6 The GDP per Capita and CPI-based Inflation Rates of Vietnam, the Middle Income 
Group Countries and the World 2000-2015 
Year 
GDP per capita (current US$) CPI-based inflation rates (annual %) 
Vietnam Middle Income World Vietnam Middle Income World 
2000 433.33 1212.57 5448.71 -1.71 4.80 3.63 
2001 448.88 1214.93 5348.03 -0.43 5.39 3.99 
2002 477.11 1259.52 5485.18 3.83 5.22 3.07 
2003 530.86 1402.27 6083.80 3.22 5.30 3.30 
2004 606.90 1640.89 6769.32 7.76 5.02 3.63 
2005 699.50 1931.14 7237.16 8.28 5.63 4.25 
2006 796.67 2269.66 7744.76 7.39 6.19 4.49 
2007 919.21 2784.62 8625.65 8.30 6.49 5.34 
2008 1164.61 3298.65 9340.89 23.12 10.54 8.95 
2009 1232.37 3182.66 8746.66 7.05 4.20 3.04 
2010 1333.58 3848.12 9481.63 8.86 5.00 3.55 
2011 1542.67 4477.33 10395.90 18.68 6.24 5.00 
2012 1754.55 4708.56 10498.46 9.09 4.56 3.85 
2013 1907.56 4928.73 10650.83 6.59 4.83 2.70 
2014 2052.32 5023.49 10757.29 4.09 3.94 2.66 
2015 2111.14 4667.56 9995.55 0.63 3.06 1.44 
Source: Data collected from the WB (2016c) 
 
Table A.7 Exports and Imports in Vietnam, East Asia and the Pacific and the World 2000-2015 
Year 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
Vietnam East Asia & Pacific World Vietnam East Asia & Pacific World 
2000 49.97 27.41 26.26 53.28 25.04 25.34 
2001 51.00 26.47 25.53 52.69 24.44 24.93 
2002 50.58 27.25 25.50 57.25 24.90 24.58 
2003 52.47 29.62 26.00 62.64 27.22 25.24 
2004 54.90 32.69 27.58 67.36 30.28 26.81 
2005 63.70 34.62 28.74 67.02 31.40 27.78 
2006 67.72 36.32 29.98 70.60 32.23 28.89 
2007 70.52 36.48 30.18 84.09 31.80 29.20 
2008 70.34 36.20 30.79 83.98 32.98 30.32 
2009 62.97 29.88 26.55 73.34 26.74 25.95 
2010 72.00 32.63 28.93 80.22 29.61 28.26 
2011 79.39 33.55 30.62 83.52 31.82 30.18 
2012 80.03 32.71 30.72 76.53 31.40 30.19 
2013 83.63 32.45 30.54 81.47 31.46 29.95 
2014 86.40 32.38 30.36 83.13 31.18 29.82 
2015 89.78 29.94 29.27 88.99 27.64 28.66 





Table A.8 FDI Projects Licensed by Provinces or Cities in Vietnam (accumulation of projects as at 
31 December, 2015)  












Total 20069 281882.5 Da Nang city 373 4023.5 
Region 1. NMMA 617 13369 Quang Nam 136 5525.8 
Lai Chau 3 4 Quang Ngai 47 4274.5 
Dien Bien     Binh Dinh 59 1761.8 
Son La 9 134.1 Phu Yen 52 4764.9 
Hoa Binh 44 510.6 Khanh Hoa 95 2349.4 
Cao Bang 24 51.2 Ninh Thuan 34 949.6 
Lang Son 36 207 Binh Thuan 117 3527.9 
Bac Giang 229 2459 Region 4. CH 131 781.7 
Thai Nguyen 100 7116.5 Kon Tum 2 70.2 
Bac Kan 6 14.3 Gia Lai 5 9.7 
Ha Giang 7 1029 Dak Lak 13 200.3 
Tuyen Quang 6 164.5 Dak Nong 6 19.6 
Phu Tho 101 632.8 Lam Dong 105 481.9 
Lao Cai 30 838.6 Region 5. SE  10686 122544.5 
Yen Bai 22 207.4 Tay Ninh 237 3146.3 
Region 2. RRD 6186 72257.9 Binh Phuoc 160 1213.1 
Ha Noi city 3467 25490.9 Binh Duong 2731 24026 
Ha Tay     Dong Nai 1350 24025.9 
Hai Phong city 513 11651.3 Ba Ria - Vung Tau 322 27766.4 
Hai Duong 376 7385.2 Ho Chi Minh city 5886 42366.8 
Hung Yen 372 3443.5 Region 6. MRD 1162 16867.7 
Ninh Binh 51 1206.5 Long An 760 5406 
Thai Binh 61 472.5 Tien Giang 78 1532.5 
Ha Nam 165 1438.5 Ben Tre 55 591.1 
Nam Dinh 81 679 Tra Vinh 27 2684.1 
Bac Ninh 721 11328.3 Vinh Long 27 234.2 
Vinh Phuc 268 3781.5 Dong Thap 17 105.5 
Quang Ninh 111 5380.7 An Giang 27 204 
Region 3. NCCA 1236 53278 Kien Giang 38 2957.6 
Thanh Hoa 71 10409.1 Can Tho city 74 799.2 
Nghe An 69 1640.6 Hau Giang 20 1351.2 
Ha Tinh 64 11265 Soc Trang 13 118.6 
Quang Binh 12 109.1 Bac Lieu 17 94.2 
Quang Tri 21 85.6 Ca Mau 9 789.5 
Thua Thien Hue 86 2591.2 Oil and Gas 51 2783.7 
Source: Data collected from GSO (2016h) and GSO (2015d) 
 
 
37 Includes supplementary capital to licensed projects in previous years; Lai Chau province’s data includes Dien 




Methodology and Data  
Table B.1 The Vietnam Administrative Units at the Provincial Level as at 31 December, 2015 
Count No. Code Cities or Provinces Count No. Code Cities or Provinces 
  
I 
Region 1. NORTHERN MIDLANDS AND 
MOUNTAIN AREAS 
32 7 III48 Da Nang city 
1 1 I02 Ha Giang 33 8 III49 Quang Nam 
2 2 I04 Cao Bang 34 9 III51 Quang Ngai 
3 3 I06 Bac Kan 35 10 III52 Binh Dinh 
4 4 I08 Tuyen Quang 36 11 III54 Phu Yen 
5 5 I10 Lao Cai 37 12 III56 Khanh Hoa 
6 6 I15 Yen Bai 38 13 III58 Ninh Thuan 
7 7 I19 Thai Nguyen 39 14 III60 Binh Thuan 
8 8 I20 Lang Son  IV Region 4. CENTRAL HIGHLANDS 
9 9 I24 Bac Giang 40 1 IV62 Kon Tum 
10 10 I25 Phu Tho 41 2 IV64 Gia Lai 
11 11 I11 Dien Bien 42 3 IV66 Dak Lak 
12 12 I12 Lai Chau 43 4 IV67 Dak Nong 
13 13 I14 Son La 44 5 IV68 Lam Dong 
14 14 I17 Hoa Binh  V Region 5. SOUTH EAST  
 II Region 2. RED RIVER DELTA 
45 1 V70 Binh Phuoc  
46 2 V72 Tay Ninh 
15 1 II01 Ha Noi city 47 3 V74 Binh Duong 
16 2 II26 Vinh Phuc 48 4 V75 Dong Nai 
17 3 II27 Bac Ninh 49 5 V77 Ba Ria - Vung Tau 
18 4 II22 Quang Ninh 50 6 V79 Ho Chi Minh city 
19 5 II30 Hai Duong  VI Region 6. MEKONG RIVER DELTA 
20 6 II31 Hai Phong city 51 1 VI80 Long An 
21 7 II33 Hung Yen 52 2 VI82 Tien Giang 
22 8 II34 Thai Binh 53 3 VI83 Ben Tre 
23 9 II35 Ha Nam 54 4 VI84 Tra Vinh 
24 10 II36 Nam Dinh 55 5 VI86 Vinh Long 
25 11 II37 Ninh Binh 56 6 VI87 Dong Thap 
 III 
Region 3. NORTH CENTRAL AND 
CENTRAL COASTAL AREAS 
57 7 VI89 An Giang 
26 1 III38 Thanh Hoa 58 8 VI91 Kien Giang 
27 2 III40 Nghe An 59 9 VI92 Can Tho city 
28 3 III42 Ha Tinh 60 10 VI93 Hau Giang 
29 4 III44 Quang Binh 61 11 VI94 Soc Trang 
30 5 III45 Quang Tri 62 12 VI95 Bac Lieu 
31 6 III46 Thua Thien Hue 63 13 VI96 Ca Mau 






Table B.2 Retail Sales and GDP in Vietnam 1990-2015 
Unit: Billion VND (at current prices) 
Years GDP Retail Sales 
1990 41955 19031 
1991 76707 33404 
1992 110532 51215 
1993 140258 67273 
1994 178534 93490 
1995 228892 121160 
1996 272036 145874 
1997 313623 161900 
1998 361017 185598 
1999 399942 200924 
2000 441646 220411 
2001 481295 245315 
2002 535762 280884 
2003 613443 333809 
2004 715307 398525 
2005 914001 480294 
2006 1061565 596207 
2007 1246769 746159 
2008 1616047 1007214 
2009 1809149 1405865 
2010 2157828 1677345 
2011 2779880 2079524 
2012 3245419 2369131 
2013 3584262 2615204 
2014 3937856 2916200 
2015 4192862 3186600 
Note: Correlation result of RS and GDP (calculated by Data Analysis Tools of Microsoft Excel) as 
follows: 
  GDP Retail Sale 
GDP 1  
Retail Sale 0.99740877 1 









Table B.3 An Example of Computing Education Level (EDU) in Vietnam 2000-2015 
Years 
Average Population 
The student number in 
universities and colleges 
Education Level 
POP (in thousand persons) STU (in students) 𝐸𝐷𝑈(%) =
𝑆𝑇𝑈
𝑃𝑂𝑃×1000
× 100  
2000 77630.9 452396 0.5828 
2001 78620.5 873039 1.1104 
2002 79537.7 908811 1.1426 
2003 80467.4 1131030 1.4056 
2004 81436.4 1319754 1.6206 
2005 82392.1 1404673 1.7049 
2006 83311.2 1666239 2.0000 
2007 84218.5 1928436 2.2898 
2008 85118.7 1675700 1.9687 
2009 86025.0 1796174 2.0880 
2010 86947.4 2162106 2.4867 
2011 87860.4 2208062 2.5131 
2012 88809.3 2208062 2.4863 
2013 89759.5 2058922 2.2938 
2014 90728.9 2363942 2.6055 
2015 91713.3 2118500 2.3099 
Note: Education level (EDU) is the rate of the student numbers in universities and colleges (STU) over 
the average population (POP). The table shows how to calculate EDU at the national level. The 
formula used to compute EDU (EDU = STU/POP/1000) is also employed at the regional and provincial 
levels. An EDU value of 2.3099 in 2015 means that 2.3099% of population enrolled in universities and 
colleges in Vietnam in 2015. 





















Table B.4 The Quality of Official Websites of Provinces and Cities (WEB) in Vietnam (Evaluation 





i ii iii iv v 
Ha Giang 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://www.hagiang.gov.vn  
Cao Bang 1 0 0 0 0 1 http://www.caobang.gov.vn 
Bac Kan 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://www.backan.gov.vn  
Tuyen Quang 1 0 1 0 0 2 http://www.tuyenquang.gov.vn  
Lao Cai 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://www.laocai.gov.vn 
Yen Bai 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://www.yenbai.gov.vn  
Thai Nguyen 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://www.thainguyen.gov.vn  
Lang Son 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://www.langson.gov.vn 
Bac Giang 1 0 1 0 0 2 http://www.bacgiang.gov.vn 
Phu Tho 1 0 1 1 0 3 http://www.phutho.gov.vn 
Lai Chau 1 0 0 0 1 2 http://www.laichau.gov.vn  
Son La 1 0 0 0 0 1 http://www.sonla.gov.vn  
Hoa Binh 1 1 1 1 0 4 http://www.ipshoabinh.gov.vn/english 
Ha Noi 1 0 0 0 0 1 http://www.hanoi.gov.vn 
Vinh Phuc 1 0 1 1 0 3 http://www.vinhphuc.gov.vn 
Bac Ninh 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://www.bacninh.gov.vn  
Quang Ninh 1 0 1 1 0 3 http://www.quangninh.gov.vn 
Hai Duong 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://www.haiduong.gov.vn 
Hai Phong 1 0 1 1 0 3 http://www.haiphong.gov.vn 
Hung Yen 1 0 0 0 0 1 http://www.hungyen.gov.vn  
Thai Binh 1 0 0 0 0 1 http://www.thaibinh.gov.vn  
Ha Nam 1 0 0 0 0 1 http://www.hanam.gov.vn 
Nam Dinh 1 1 1 1 0 4 http://www.namdinhbusiness.gov.vn 
Ninh Binh 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://www.ninhbinh.gov.vn 
Thanh Hoa 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://www.thanhhoa.gov.vn  
Nghe An 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://www.ngheanbusiness.gov.vn 
Ha Tinh 1 1 0 1 0 3 http://dhtn.hatinh.gov.vn 
Quang Binh 1 0 1 1 0 3 http://www.quangbinh.gov.vn 
Quang Tri 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://www.quangtri.gov.vn  
Thua Thien Hue 1 0 1 1 0 3 http://www.hue.gov.vn  
Da Nang 1 1 1 1 0 4 http://www.danang.gov.vn  
Quang Nam 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://www.quangnam.gov.vn 
Quang Ngai 1 0 1 0 0 2 http://www.quangngai.gov.vn  
Binh Dinh 1 1 1 1 0 4 http://www.binhdinhinvest.gov.vn 
Phu Yen 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://www.phuyen.gov.vn 
Khanh Hoa 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://www.khanhhoa.gov.vn 
Ninh Thuan 1 0 1 1 0 3 http://www.ninhthuan.gov.vn  
Binh Thuan 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://www.binhthuan.gov.vn 
Kon Tum 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://www.kontum.gov.vn 
Gia Lai 1 0 0 0 0 1 http://khdtgialai.gov.vn 
Dak Lak 1 1 1 1 0 4 http://www.daklak.gov.vn 







i ii iii iv v 
Binh Phuoc 1 0 1 0 1 3 http://www.binhphuoc.gov.vn 
Tay Ninh 1 1 1 1 0 4 http://www.tayninh.gov.vn  
Binh Duong 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://www.binhduong.gov.vn 
Dong Nai 1 1 1 1 1 5 http://www.dongnai.gov.vn 
Ba Ria - Vung Tau 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://www.baria-vungtau.gov.vn  
Ho Chi Minh city 1 1 1 1 0 4 http://www.hochiminhcity.gov.vn 
Long An 1 0 1 1 0 3 http://www.longan.gov.vn 
Tien Giang 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://www.tiengiang.gov.vn 
Ben Tre 1 0 1 1 0 3 http://www.bentre.gov.vn  
Tra Vinh 1 0 1 1 0 3 http://www.travinh.gov.vn  
Vinh Long 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://www.vinhlong.gov.vn 
Dong Thap 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://www.dongthap.gov.vn  
An Giang 1 0 1 1 0 3 http://www.angiang.gov.vn 
Kien Giang 1 1 0 1 0 3 http://www.kiengiang.gov.vn 
Can Tho 1 1 1 1 0 4 http://www.cantho.gov.vn 
Soc Trang 1 0 1 1 0 3 http://www.soctrang.gov.vn  
Bac Lieu 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://www.baclieu.gov.vn 
Ca Mau 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://www.camau.gov.vn 
Note: WEB is evaluated by five factors: i) language availability includes more than one language; ii) 
availability of law documents; iii) economics and social information (on English page); iv) documents 
of investment registration (on English page); v) online registration and support (on English page). 
Each factor is evaluated based on the websites listed in the last column of the table by scoring 1 for a 
YES answer or 0 for a NO. WEB is the sum of the five factors’ scores with the same value from 2000 
to 2011. 




Table B.5 The Quality of Official Websites of Provinces and Cities (WEB) in Vietnam (Evaluation 




WEB Websites Start year 
i ii iii iv v 
Ha Giang 0 1 0 0 0 1 http://www.hagiang.gov.vn  2012 
Cao Bang 0 1 0 0 0 1 http://www.caobang.gov.vn 2016 
Bac Kan 0 1 0 0 0 1 http://www.backan.gov.vn  2012 
Tuyen Quang 0 1 0 0 0 1 http://www.tuyenquang.gov.vn  2012 
Lao Cai 1 1 0 0 0 2 http://www.laocai.gov.vn 2016 
Yen Bai 0 1 0 0 0 1 http://www.yenbai.gov.vn  2016 
Thai Nguyen 1 1 1 0 0 3 http://www.thainguyen.gov.vn  2012 
Lang Son 0 1 0 0 0 1 http://www.langson.gov.vn 2015 
Bac Giang 1 1 1 0 0 3 http://www.bacgiang.gov.vn 2012 
Phu Tho 1 1 1 1 1 5 http://www.phutho.gov.vn 2014 
Lai Chau 1 1 1 0 0 3 http://www.laichau.gov.vn 2014 
Son La 1 1 0 0 0 2 http://www.sonla.gov.vn 2012 
Hoa Binh 1 1 1 0 0 3 http://www.hoabinh.gov.vn 2012 
Ha Noi 1 1 1 1 0 4 http://www.hanoi.gov.vn 2009 
Vinh Phuc 1 1 1 1 0 4 http://www.vinhphuc.gov.vn 2012 
Bac Ninh 1 1 1 1 0 4 http://www.bacninh.gov.vn 2011 
Quang Ninh 1 1 1 1 0 4 http://www.quangninh.gov.vn 2015 
Hai Duong 0 1 1 1 0 3 http://www.haiduong.gov.vn 2012 
Hai Phong 1 1 1 1 0 4 http://haiphong.gov.vn 2012 
Hung Yen 1 1 1 0 0 3 http://www.hungyen.gov.vn 2012 
Thai Binh 1 1 1 1 0 4 http://www.thaibinh.gov.vn 2012 
Ha Nam 1 1 1 0 0 3 http://hanam.gov.vn 2012 
Nam Dinh 1 1 0 0 0 2 http://www.namdinh.gov.vn 2012 
Ninh Binh 1 1 1 0 0 3 http://ninhbinh.gov.vn 2012 
Thanh Hoa 1 1 0 0 0 2 http://www.thanhhoa.gov.vn 2012 
Nghe An 1 1 1 1 0 4 http://www.nghean.gov.vn 2012 
Ha Tinh 1 1 0 0 0 2 http://dhtn.hatinh.gov.vn 2012 
Quang Binh 1 1 1 1 0 4 http://www.quangbinh.gov.vn 2015 
Quang Tri 0 1 0 0 0 1 http://www.quangtri.gov.vn 2012 
Thua Thien Hue 1 1 1 0 0 3 http://www.hue.gov.vn 2014 
Da Nang 1 1 1 1 0 4 http://www.danang.gov.vn 2012 
Quang Nam 1 1 1 0 0 3 http://www.quangnam.gov.vn 2015 
Quang Ngai 1 1 1 0 0 3 http://www.quangngai.gov.vn  2012 
Binh Dinh 1 1 1 1 0 4 http://www.binhdinh.gov.vn 2012 
Phu Yen 0 1 0 0 0 1 http://www.phuyen.gov.vn 2005 
Khanh Hoa 1 1 1 1 0 4 http://www.khanhhoa.gov.vn 2015 
Ninh Thuan 1 1 1 1 0 4 http://www.ninhthuan.gov.vn 2005 
Binh Thuan 0 1 0 0 0 1 http://www.binhthuan.gov.vn 2012 
Kon Tum 0 1 0 0 0 1 http://www.kontum.gov.vn 2013 
Gia Lai 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://gialai.gov.vn Cannot access 
Dak Lak 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://www.daklak.gov.vn Cannot access 






WEB Websites Start year 
i ii iii iv v 
Binh Phuoc 1 1 1 0 0 3 http://www.binhphuoc.gov.vn 2006 
Tay Ninh 0 0 1 0 0 1 http://www.tayninh.gov.vn 2010 
Binh Duong 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://www.binhduong.gov.vn Cannot access 
Dong Nai 1 1 1 1 1 5 http://www.dongnai.gov.vn 2005 
Ba Ria - Vung Tau 1 1 1 1 0 4 http://www.baria-vungtau.gov.vn  2012 
Ho Chi Minh city 1 1 1 1 0 4 http://www.hochiminhcity.gov.vn 2006 
Long An 1 0 1 1 0 3 http://www.longan.gov.vn 2012 
Tien Giang 0 0 0 0 0 0 http://www.tiengiang.gov.vn Cannot access 
Ben Tre 0 1 0 0 0 1 http://www.bentre.gov.vn 2004 
Tra Vinh 1 1 1 1 0 4 http://www.travinh.gov.vn 2007 
Vinh Long 1 1 1 1 0 4 http://www.vinhlong.gov.vn 2007 
Dong Thap 1 0 1 1 0 3 http://www.dongthap.gov.vn 2012 
An Giang 1 0 1 1 0 3 http://www.angiang.gov.vn 2010 
Kien Giang 1 0 1 1 0 3 http://www.kiengiang.gov.vn 2012 
Can Tho 1 1 1 1 0 4 http://www.cantho.gov.vn 2012 
Soc Trang 1 0 1 1 0 3 http://www.soctrang.gov.vn 2005 
Bac Lieu 1 0 1 1 0 3 http://www.baclieu.gov.vn 2016 
Ca Mau 1 0 1 1 0 3 http://www.camau.gov.vn 2008 
Note: WEB was evaluated for the second time on 6th September, 2016 similar to the first evaluation 
on 20 June, 2011 (see Table B.3). If one of the websites could not be accessed, all the five factors are 
scored a value of 0. The column Start year indicates the first year when the website was used. If the 
start year is between 2012 and 2015, WEB takes the value of the first evaluation before the start 
year, and takes the value of the second evaluation from the start year. For example, in Quang Nam, 
WEB takes a value of 0 from 2000 to 2014 and 3 in 2015 because the start year of its website is 2015. 
Otherwise, results of the first and second evaluations are used for the period 2000-2011 and the 
period 2012-2015, respectively. 




Table B.6 A List of Free Trade Agreements in which Vietnam is a Member  
No. Names 
Date of signed 
and in effect 
1 ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 01/01/1993 
2 The US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) 10/12/2001 
3 




ASEAN-Republic of Korea Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement 
(AKFTA) 
01/06/2007 
5 ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP) 01/12/2008 
6 Japan-Vietnam Economic Partnership Agreement (Japan-Vietnam EPA) 01/10/2009 
7 
ASEAN-India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (ASEAN-
India CECA) 
01/01/2010 
8 ASEAN-Australia and New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (ASEAN-ANZ FTA) 01/01/2010 
9 Chile-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (Chile-Viet Nam FTA) 14/03/2012 
10 
Republic of Korea-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (Republic of Korea-
Vietnam FTA) 
20/12/2015 
Note: FTA variable is the number of Free Trade Agreements (signed and in effect) in which Vietnam is 
a member. The information from ARIC (2016) gives results as follows: FTA = 0 from 1990 to 1992, FTA 
= 1 from 1993 to 2000, FTA = 2 from 2001 to 2004, FTA = 3 from 2005 to 2006, FTA = 4 in 2007, FTA = 
5 in 2008, FTA = 6 in 2009, FTA = 8 from 2010 to 2011, FTA = 9 from 2012 to 2014 and FTA = 10 in 
2015. 





Table B.7 The Methods for Constructing the Province Ranking (PR) Variable 














I Region 1. Northern Midlands and Mountain Areas 31 Da Nang city 1 2 
1 Ha Giang 2 2 32 Quang Nam 2 2 
2 Cao Bang 2 2 33 Quang Ngai 2 2 
3 Bac Kan 2 2 34 Binh Dinh 2 2 
4 Tuyen Quang 2 2 35 Phu Yen 2 2 
5 Lao Cai 2 2 36 Khanh Hoa 2 2 
6 Yen Bai 2 2 37 Ninh Thuan 2 2 
7 Thai Nguyen 2 2 38 Binh Thuan 2 2 
8 Lang Son 2 2 IV Region 4. Central Highlands 
9 Bac Giang 2 2 39 Kon Tum 2 2 
10 Phu Tho 2 2 40 Gia Lai 2 2 
11 Lai Chau 2 2 41 Dak Lak 2 2 
12 Son La 2 2 42 Lam Dong 2 2 
13 Hoa Binh 2 2 V Region 5. South East 
II Region 2. Red River Delta 43 Binh Phuoc 2 2 
14 Ha Noi city 1 0 44 Tay Ninh 1 2 
15 Vinh Phuc 2 0 45 Binh Duong 1 0 
16 Bac Ninh 1 0 46 Dong Nai 2 0 
17 Quang Ninh 2 2 47 Ba Ria - Vung Tau 1 2 
18 Hai Duong 2 0 48 Ho Chi Minh city 1 0 
19 Hai Phong city 1 2 VI Region 6. Mekong River Delta 
20 Hung Yen 1 0 49 Long An 2 1 
21 Thai Binh 1 1 50 Tien Giang 2 2 
22 Ha Nam 1 1 51 Ben Tre 2 2 
23 Nam Dinh 1 1 52 Tra Vinh 2 2 
24 Ninh Binh 2 1 53 Vinh Long 2 1 
III Region 3. North Central and Central Coastal Areas 54 Dong Thap 2 2 
25 Thanh Hoa 2 2 55 An Giang 2 2 
26 Nghe An 2 2 56 Kien Giang 2 2 
27 Ha Tinh 2 2 57 Can Tho city 2 0 
28 Quang Binh 2 2 58 Soc Trang 2 2 
29 Quang Tri 2 2 59 Bac Lieu 2 2 
30 Thua Thien Hue 2 2 60 Ca Mau 2 2 
Note: PR=2 if provinces and cities are on the list of areas under the extreme difficult socio-economic 
condition, PR = 1 if provinces or cities are on the list of areas under the difficult socio-economic 
condition, and PR = 0 otherwise. PR values under Decree No. 24/2000/ND-CP and Decree No. 
108/2006/ND-CP are applied in the period 2000-2005 and the period 2006-2015, respectively. 
Source: Information is gathered from Appendix I (List of areas where investment is encouraged) of 
Decree No. 24/2000/ND-CP (Government, 2000) and Appendix III (List of areas where investment is 
encouraged) of Decree No. 108/2006/ND-CP (Government, 2006).
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Risk - CR 
Weight 12% 42% 4% 12% 6% 6% 
1996 0.42 0.93 0.50 0.55 0.83 0.50 0.74 
1997 0.42 0.93 0.50 0.55 0.83 0.50 0.74 
1998 0.17 0.87 0.50 0.36 0.83 0.33 0.63 
1999 0.17 0.87 0.50 0.36 0.83 0.33 0.63 
2000 0.25 0.91 0.50 0.55 0.83 0.33 0.69 
2001 0.25 0.91 0.50 0.55 0.83 0.33 0.69 
2002 0.25 0.88 0.50 0.59 0.67 0.25 0.66 
2003 0.25 0.88 0.50 0.55 0.67 0.25 0.66 
2004 0.33 0.86 0.50 0.68 0.67 0.25 0.68 
2005 0.33 0.86 0.50 0.68 0.67 0.25 0.68 
2006 0.33 0.86 0.50 0.73 0.67 0.42 0.70 
2007 0.33 0.86 0.50 0.73 0.67 0.58 0.71 
2008 0.33 0.85 0.50 0.64 0.67 0.58 0.69 
2009 0.33 0.85 0.50 0.64 0.67 0.58 0.69 
2010 0.38 0.84 0.50 0.64 0.67 0.42 0.68 
2011 0.38 0.79 0.50 0.55 0.67 0.42 0.64 
2012 0.38 0.78 0.50 0.55 0.67 0.42 0.64 
2013 0.38 0.76 0.50 0.55 0.67 0.42 0.63 
2014 0.38 0.78 0.50 0.64 0.67 0.42 0.65 
2015 0.38 0.79 0.50 0.64 0.67 0.42 0.66 
Note: VA, PV, GE, RQ, RL, and CC are available every two years from 1996 to 2001, therefore their 
values in 1997, 1999 and 2001 are equal to those in 1996, 1998 and 2000, respectively. CR and the 







0.38 × 0.12 + 0.79 × 0.42 + 0.50 × 0.04 + 0.64 × 0.12 + 0.67 × 0.06 + 0.42 × 0.06
0.12 + 0.42 + 0.04 + 0.12 + 0.06 + 0.06
= 0.66 
















No. Variable name 
Notations 
Units 
Provinces Regions Vietnam 
FDI 1 FDI Registered Capital FDIit FDIjt FDIt Million USD 
Economic 
growth 
2 GDP   GDPt Billion VND 




4 Average Population POPit POPjt POPt 
Thousand 
persons 
5 Labour Force LFit LFjt LFt 
Thousand 
persons 
6 Education Level EDUit EDUjt EDUt % 
Economic 
7 Open Trade   OTt Billion VND 
8 Exchange Rate ERit ERjt ERt VND/USD 
9 Inflation CPIit CPIjt CPIt  
10 Incremental Capital Output Ratio ICORit ICORjt ICORt  
11 Monthly Average Income INCit INCjt INCt Thousand VND 




  MKTt % 
14 
Science, Technology and 
Environment Expenditure  
  SCIt % 
15 Financial Crisis 2008 CRIit CRIjt CRIt  
Infrastructure 
16 Volume of Goods Freight  FREit FREjt FREt Thousand tons 
17 Number of Patient Beds BEDit BEDjt BEDt Thousand beds 
18 
The Development of 
Communication 
  COMt 
Thousand 
subscribers 
19 Website quality WEBit    
Policy and law 
related 
20 Law of Investment and Enterprise  LAWit LAWjt LAWt  
21 World Trade Organization  WTOit WTOjt WTOt  
22 Free Trade Agreements  FTAit FTAjt FTAt  
23 Province Ranking PRit    
24 Province Ranking (Dummy) PR2it    
25 Region Ranking  RRjt   






27 Investment Incentive Policies IIPit    
28 Provincial Competitiveness Index PCIit    
29 Entry Costs ENTRYit    
30 Land Access and Security of Tenure LANDit    
31 
Transparency and Access to 
Information 
ACCESSit    
32 
Time Costs and Regulatory 
Compliance 
TIMEit    
33 Informal Charges CHARGEit    
34 Proactivity PROACTit    
35 Business Support SUPPORTit    
36 Labour & Training LABOURit    
37 Legal Institutions LEGALit    
38 Country Risk CRit CRjt CRt  





Table B.10 The Studied Periods of Variables in this Study at Vietnam’s Provincial, Regional and 
National Levels 
Variable groups No. Variables 
Studied period 
Provinces Regions Vietnam 
FDI 1 FDI 2000-2015 2000-2015 1990-2015 
Economic growth 
2 GDP   1990-2015 
3 RS 2000-2015 2000-2015  
Demographic and human capital 
4 POP 2000-2015 2000-2015 1990-2015 
5 LF 2005-2015 2005-2015 2000-2015 
6 EDU 2000-2015 2000-2015 1999-2015 
Economic 
7 OT   1990-2015 
8 ER 2000-2015 2000-2015 1990-2015 
9 CPI 2000-2015 2000-2015 1995-2015 
10 ICOR 2000-2015 2000-2015 1995-2015 
11 INC 2000-2015 2000-2015 1995-2015 
12 STATE   1995-2015 
13 MKT   1995-2015 
14 SCI   2000-2014 
15 CRI 2000-2015 2000-2015 2000-2015 
Infrastructure 
16 FRE 2000-2015 2000-2015 2000-2014 
17 COM   1995-2015 
18 WEB 2000-2015   
Policy and law related 
19 LAW 2000-2015 2000-2015 1990-2015 
20 WTO 2000-2015 2000-2015 1990-2015 
21 FTA 2000-2015 2000-2015 1990-2015 
22 PR 2000-2015   
23 PR2 2000-2015   
24 RR  2000-2015  
25 RR2  2000-2015  
Provincial competition and institutional factors 
26 IIP 2000-2015   
27 PCI 2005-2015   
28 ENTRY 2005-2015   
29 LAND 2005-2015   
30 ACCESS 2005-2015   
31 TIME 2005-2015   
32 CHARGE 2005-2015   
33 PROACT 2005-2015   
34 SUPPORT 2005-2015   
35 LABOUR 2005-2015   
36 LEGAL 2005-2015   
37 CR 2000-2015 2000-2015 1996-2015 




Table B.11 Data Definitions and Sources 
Variable 
groups 







The total registered capital of licensed inward FDI projects annually 
(including added capital of projected licensed in previous years) 






2 GDP GDP Billion VND Gross Domestic Product at current prices GSO (2016i) (1) 
3 Retail Sales RS Billion VND Retail Sales of Goods and Services at current prices 













GSO (2017a), GSO 
(2016e) 
(4) 
5 Labour Force LF 
Thousand 
persons 
Labour Force at 15 years of age and above 
GSO (2016k), GSO 
(2016l) 
(4) 
6 Education Level EDU % 
The rate of the student number in universities and colleges over the 
average population (see Appendix Table B.3). 
The author (4) 
Economic 
7 Open Trade OT Billion VND Open Trade is a sum of Export and Import values of goods in Vietnam 
The author, GSO 
(2016g) 
(1) 
8 Exchange Rate ER VND/USD VND USD yearly average exchange rate FXTOP (2017) (5) 
9 Inflation CPI  
Annual average Consumer Price Index representing the inflation in 
Vietnam 






Incremental Capital Output Ratio is the aggregated indicator of the 
ratio of investment to growth, which is equal to 1 divided by the 
marginal product of capital (see Appendix Table A.5). 
The author, GSO 








The monthly average income per employee in state sector at current 
price 
GSO (2016c), GSO 
(2016d), GSO 





STATE % The share of the state-owned investment over the total investment GSO (2016j) (1) 
13 Marketization MKT % 
The share of the non-state-owned investment over the total 
investment namely Marketization 







The share of state budget expenditure on Science, Technology and 
Environment 
GSO (2016s), GSO 











CRI is a dummy variable that reflects the financial crisis in 2008 
(CRI=1 after 2007, CRI=0 otherwise) 








Volume of goods freight 










The number of telephone and internet subscribers 
GSO (2016p), GSO 
(2005a) and GSO 
(2000b) 
(1) 
28 Website quality WEB  
The ability to access information of the investors (a category 
variable) is constructed based on the quality of official websites or 
portals of state bodies (provinces and cities) in Vietnam from 2000 to 
2015. WEB is evaluated by five factors including i) languages’ 
availability are more than one language; ii) availability of law 
documents; iii) Economics and Social Information (on English page); 
iv) documents of investment registration (on English page); v) Online 
registration and support (on English page). If all the five factors are 
available, WEB=5; four factors are available, WEB=4; three factors 
are available, WEB=3; two factors are available, WEB=2; one factor is 
available, WEB=1; otherwise WEB=0 (see Tables B.4 and B.5 in 
Appendix B). 








LAW is a dummy variable indicating Vietnam had new laws of 
Investment and Enterprise in 2005 (LAW = 0 in the period 2000-2004, 
LAW = 1 in the period 2005-2015). 





WTO is a dummy variable indicating Vietnam joined WTO in 2007 
(WTO = 0 in the period 2000-2007, WTO = 1 in the period 2008-
2015). 





The number of Free Trade Agreements in which Vietnam is a 
member (signed and in effect). FTA is constructed by the researcher 
based on data from ARIC (2016) (see Appendix Table B.6). 
The author and 
ARIC (2016) 
(5) 
22 Province Ranking PR  
Province Ranking indicates differences of investment condition 
among provinces and cities in Vietnam. PR is a category variable 
constructed as follows: PR=2 if provinces and cities are on the list of 
areas under the extreme difficult socio-economic condition, PR = 1 if 
provinces or cities are on the list of areas under the difficult socio-
economic condition, and PR = 0 otherwise (see Appendix Table B.7). 










PR2 is a dummy variable created based on PR as follows: PR2 = 1 if 
PR = 2, otherwise 0. 
The author (2) 
24 Region Ranking RR  
Region Ranking indicates differences of investment condition among 
regions. RR is a category variable defined based on PR as follows: RR 
= 0 if a region is not under extreme difficult and difficult socio-
economic conditions, which means that the region owns at least one 
province under the neither extreme difficult nor difficult socio-
economic condition (PR = 0); RR = 2 if a region is under extreme 
difficult socio-economic conditions, which means that all provinces 
belong to the region are under the extreme difficult socio-economic 
condition (PR = 2); RR = 1 otherwise. 





RR2 is a dummy variable created based on RR as follows: RR2 = 1 if 
the socio-economic condition of a region is extreme difficult (RR = 2), 
0 otherwise (if the socio-economic condition of a region is not 
extreme difficult (either RR=1 or RR=0)). 











Investment Incentive Policies indicate competition in attracting FDI 
at the provincial level. IIP, a combination of three categories of free 
land, income tax and import tax exemption, is constructed based on 
regulations and laws in Vietnam from 2000 to 2015 at the provincial 






















Provincial Competitiveness Index represents Vietnam’s business 
environment and is assessed by an annual business survey of 
economic governance quality in encouraging development of the 
non-state sector in provinces and cities. PCI is available since 2005. 





No. Variable name Abbreviation Units Definitions Sources Notes 
28 Entry Costs ENTRY  
ENTRY is one of ten PCI sub-indices. It shows the differences in entry 
costs for business start-up in provinces and cities in Vietnam. 
VCCI (2016a) (2) 
29 




LAND is one of ten PCI sub-indices. It shows how easy to access land 
and the security of tenure once land is acquired in provinces and 
cities in Vietnam. 
VCCI (2016a) (2) 
30 
Transparency 
and Access to 
Information 
ACCESS  
ACCESS is one of ten PCI sub-indices. It shows firms’ ability of 
accessing to the proper planning and legal documents necessary to 
run their businesses, equitable availability of those documents, 
predictable implementation of new policies and laws, and the 
business utility of the provincial webpage. 
VCCI (2016a) (2) 
31 




TIME is one of ten PCI sub-indices. It shows how much time firms 
waste on bureaucratic compliance, as well as how often and for how 
long firms must shut their operations down for inspections by local 
regulatory agencies. 
VCCI (2016a) (2) 
32 Informal Charges CHARGE  
CHARGE is one of ten PCI sub-indices. It shows how much firms pay 
informal charges, how much of an obstacle those extra fees pose for 
their business operations, whether payment of those extra fees 
results in expected results or "services", and whether provincial 
officials use compliance with local regulations to extract rents. 
VCCI (2016a) (2) 
33 Proactivity PROACT  
PROACT is one of ten PCI sub-indices. It shows how much crowding 
out of private activity from policy biases toward state, foreign, or 
connected firms. 
VCCI (2016a) (2) 
34 Business Support SUPPORT  
SUPPORT is one of ten PCI sub-indices. It indicates provincial services 
for private sector trade promotion, provision of regulatory 
information to firms, business partner matchmaking, provision of 
industrial zones or industrial clusters, and technological services for 
firms. 





LABOUR is one of ten PCI sub-indices. It shows the efforts by 
provincial authorities to promote vocational training and skills 
development for local industries and to assist in the placement of 
local labour. 
VCCI (2016a) (2) 
36 Legal Institutions LEGAL  
LEGAL is one of ten PCI sub-indices. It shows the private sector's 
confidence in provincial legal institutions; whether firms regard 
provincial legal institutions as an effective vehicle for dispute 





No. Variable name Abbreviation Units Definitions Sources Notes 
resolution, or as an avenue for lodging appeals against corrupt 
official behaviour. 
37 Country Risk CR  
Country Risk shows effects of institutional factors on FDI location in 
Vietnam and is computed based on ten out of 12 components of the 
political risk index (PRS, 2017). The ten components are divided into 
six sub-indexes including Voice and Accountability, Political Stability 
and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory 
Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. CR rating of 0% to 
less than 50% indicates a Very High Risk; 50% to less than 60% High 
Risk; 60% to less than 70% Moderate Risk; 70% to less than 80% Low 
Risk; and 80.0% or more Very Low Risk (additional information on 
constructing CR is provided in Appendix Table B.8). 









The number of patient beds including those of hospitals, regional 
polyclinics, sanatorium and rehabilitation hospitals, and medical 
service units. 
GSO (2016n) and 
GSO (2016o) 
(4) 
Note:  (1) Variables are only available at the national level. 
(2) Variables are only available at the provincial level. 
(3) Variables are only available at the regrional level. 
(4) Variables are available at the provincial, regional and national levels. 
(5) Variables are only available at the national level. Therefore, data of these variables at the regional and provincial levels are assumed to have values of 




Data Descriptive Statistics 
 
Note: The scatterplot is drawn with a panel option of stack cross sections and the Kernel Fit line. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Figure C.1 The Scatterplot of FDI and RS at the Regional Level in Vietnam 
 
 
Note: The scatterplot is drawn with a panel option of stack cross sections and the Kernel Fit line. 
Source: Author’s calculations 






























      
Source: Author’s calculations 
Figure C.3 FDI and RS in Region 1 – Northern Midlands and Mountain Areas (2000-2015) 
 
     
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Source: Author’s calculations 
Figure C.5 FDI and RS in Region 3 – North Central and Central Coastal Areas (2000-2015) 
       
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Source: Author’s calculations 
Figure C.7 FDI and RS in Region 5 – South East (2000-2015) 
       
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Note:  I = Region 1 (The Northern Midlands and Mountain Areas);  
 II = Region 2 (The Red River Delta); 
 III = Region 3 (The North Central and Central Coastal Areas);  
 IV = Region 4 (The Central Highlands);  
 V = Region 5 (The South East); and  
 VI = Region 6 (The Mekong River Delta). 
 L_RS and L_FDI indicate that RS and FDI are natural logarithm values. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
















































































Note: L_RS and L_FDI indicate that RS and FDI are natural logarithm values. 
Source: Author’s calculations 





















































































































































Notes: L_RS and L_FDI indicate that RS and FDI are natural logarithm values. 
Sources: Author’s calculations  











































































































































Notes: L_RS and L_FDI indicate that RS and FDI are natural logarithm values. 
Sources: Author’s calculations 
































































































































































Notes: L_RS and L_FDI indicate that RS and FDI are natural logarithm values. 
Sources: Author’s calculations  























































Notes: L_RS and L_FDI indicate that RS and FDI are natural logarithm values. 
Sources: Author’s calculations  






















































































Notes: L_RS and L_FDI indicate that RS and FDI are natural logarithm values. 
Sources: Author’s calculations  
Figure C.15 Scatterplots of FDI and RS at the Provincial Level in Region 6 in Vietnam 
 
Table C.1  The Effects of FRE on the FDI Location Selection with PR2 at the Vietnam Provincial 
Level 
PR2 









FDI change 1.3057-0.7630*PR2 1.8764-1.1294*PR2 1.2034-0.5413*PR2 1.5664-0.8583*PR2 
PR2 = 0 1.3057 1.8764 1.2034 1.5664 
PR2 = 1 0.5427 0.7470 0.6621 0.7081 
Note: The values of 1.3057 and 1.8764 are the coefficients of FRE in Model 45 (see Table 5.44) and 
Model 50 (see Table 5.46), respectively.  The values of 1.2034 and 1.5664 are the coefficients of FRE 
in Model 47 (see Table 5.45) and Model 52 (see Table 5.47), respectively.  The values of -0.7630, -
1.1294, -0.5413 and -0.8583 are the coefficients of interaction terms of FRE with PR2 in the models, 
respectively. 
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